Chicago journal of international law最新文献

{"title":"Courts, Tribunals, and Legal Unification - The Agency Problem","authors":"P. Stephan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.353240","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.353240","url":null,"abstract":"I discuss the roles of adjudication bodies in promoting the unification of law. Then I clarify the redistributive dimensions of unification projects. Working within the familiar framework of game theory as applied to international relations, I distinguish between the coordination and defection problems that underlie most international interactions. I argue that adjudication bodies have the ability to generate solutions to some coordination problems, but face major obstacles when seeking to implement stable solutions to others, and to many defection problems. The difficulties vary depending on the types of adjudication bodies involved, but each type has its own drawbacks. I offer examples from a range of current unification projects - carriage of goods, antitrust, and environmental law - to illustrate how application problems can frustrate unification.","PeriodicalId":87172,"journal":{"name":"Chicago journal of international law","volume":"71 1","pages":"7"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75053036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Money on the Table?: Responding to Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage","authors":"Daniel N. Shaviro","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.349501","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.349501","url":null,"abstract":"Transactions commonly known as \"cross-border tax arbitrages\" take advantage of inconsistencies between countries' tax rules to achieve more favorable tax results than could have been achieved by investing just in one country. Examples include \"dual resident companies\" and \"double dip leases,\" in which clever structuring may enable a multinational enterprise to claim the same deduction in two countries. This article analyzes the national and worldwide welfare considerations that may be relevant to a country's deciding whether to allow tax benefits that will be thus duplicated, taking into account strategic interactions with other countries. It also briefly discusses cross-border tax arbitrage in relation to tax harmonization and the proposed creation of multilateral tax institutions akin to the GATT and WTO.","PeriodicalId":87172,"journal":{"name":"Chicago journal of international law","volume":"8 1","pages":"6"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74260245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"From the core to the peripheries: multilateral governance of malaria in a multi-cultural world.","authors":"Obijiofor Aginam","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.319162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.319162","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the vicious tension between the malaria control policies of multilateral organizations like the World Health Organization (WHO) and the traditional malaria therapies used by populations in malaria endemic African societies. It argues that age-old traditional therapies in malaria endemic societies are relegated to the peripheries of global malaria regime. The article discusses the vision of the WHO's Roll-Back Malaria Campaign (RBM), an innovative private-public partnership aimed at reducing the mortality and morbidity burdens of malaria in the developing world. The article raises questions of accountability and transparency of the operational framework of global partnerships such as the RBM. While such partnerships have emerged as useful mechanisms in global health governance in recent years, the search for a cosmopolitan, inclusive, and humane malaria regime must strive to identify all the key actors and stakeholders: populations that live their daily lives with burdens of malaria, national governments, civil society, multilateral health organizations, and pharmaceutical companies. This article draws from extended field interviews, which the author conducted in rural societies in Nigeria. It concludes that a sustained relegation of African traditional medicine to the peripheries/margins of contemporary multilateral/global malaria regime is one form of what Richard Falk has characterized as \"globalism-from-above\". One obvious consequence of this is that the phenomenon of globalization of public health remains intensely hegemonic and predatory.","PeriodicalId":87172,"journal":{"name":"Chicago journal of international law","volume":"40 1","pages":"87-103"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84652071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Passports, Private Choice, and Private Interests: Regulatory Competition and Cooperation in Corporate, Securities, and Bankruptcy Law","authors":"Frederick Tung","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.334700","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.334700","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses international regulatory competition in the related areas of corporate, securities, and bankruptcy law, contrasting two different forms that regulatory competition may take. The first is private choice, or \"direct competition.\" In this arrangement, firms are free to elect the regulatory regime that will govern their affairs, regardless of the location of a firm's assets, personnel, registered office, or transactions. The paradigmatic example is corporate charter competition among US states. The second form of competition is the \"regulatory passport\" arrangement, which has also been variously described as \"mutual recognition\" and \"reciprocity.\" In this scenario, nations agree to recognize the extraterritorial reach of firms' home country regulatory regimes, forswearing territorial regulation by host countries. These two forms of regulatory competition are distinguishable along several dimensions, a point that is sometimes obscured. Some analysts have tended to lump regulatory passport arrangements together with direct competition in discussing the promise and prospects of regulatory competition generally. Regulatory passport arrangements appear to be much more common than instances of direct competition, and some seem fond of characterizing passport systems as a step \"toward\" direct competition. Care should be taken not to conflate direct competition with regulatory passports. Not only are the competitive effects very different, but the politics are as well. Structurally, direct competition would likely be far more effective than a regulatory passport system at placing competitive pressures on lawmakers. However, questions exist concerning the prospects for achieving the choice of law harmonization necessary for direct competition, which must overcome entrenched interests of regulators and their important constituents. These political obstacles are likely to prevent development of the requisite choice of law cooperation. Direct competition among US states over corporate charters may be a peculiarity of the US federal system. Similar political considerations suggest that regulatory passport systems are more likely to emerge. Even with regulatory passports, though, political considerations in the negotiation and implementation of such arrangements will tend to blunt the competitive pressures meant to be focused on national regulators. This paper, part of a symposium on Exploring the Need for International Harmonization, offers a general discussion of the competitive promise of regulatory passports, contrasting the ideal type with direct competition and with the regulatory passport arrangements that exist.","PeriodicalId":87172,"journal":{"name":"Chicago journal of international law","volume":"8 1","pages":"9"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79580820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Domestic Regulation, Sovereignty, and Scientific Evidence Requirements: A Pessimistic View","authors":"A. Sykes","doi":"10.1017/CBO9780511511325.011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511511325.011","url":null,"abstract":"The World Trade Organization (\"WTO\") and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (\"GATT\"), have been extraordinarily successful at liberalizing trade in the global economy. The process of liberalization has entailed a series of negotiations resulting in reciprocal commitments to reduce or eliminate tariffs, quotas, and other traditional instruments of protectionism. To ensure the integrity of those commitments, it has been necessary since the inception of GATT to prohibit member nations from substituting other protectionist devices for those which they promise to forego. Domestic regulations, in particular, can disadvantage or exclude foreign suppliers from export markets. Such regulatory obstacles to exports are known as \"technical barriers to trade.\" A number of legal principles have evolved in the WTO system to discipline technical barriers.1 Regulations that discriminate against foreign suppliers are the most obvious source of undesirable technical barriers, and WTO law imposes an obligation on the regulators of member nations to avoid discrimination that disfavors foreign suppliers.2 Facially nondiscriminatory regulations that impose IMAGE FORMULA5 relatively greater compliance costs on foreign suppliers can have the same effect as discriminatory regulations, however, and WTO law thus includes an array of constraints on domestic regulation that go beyond simple nondiscrimination requirements.3 One such constraint may be termed a \"scientific evidence requirement\"-a requirement that certain regulations, generally those enacted for the purpose of protecting health, safety, or the environment, be based on scientific evidence. The scientific evidence may go either to the existence of a risk, or to the efficacy of the regulation in reducing the risk. The logic of scientific evidence requirements is obvious. If a regulation that is ostensibly aimed at protecting health, safety, or the environment nevertheless has the effect of restricting trade, and there is no scientific evidence of any danger to be avoided or of any reduction in risk as a result of the regulation, then the suspicion arises that the regulation is disguised protectionism. In effect, a scientific evidence requirement aids in motive review, and helps to sort regulations between those that are protectionist and those that seek to promote some legitimate, non-protectionist regulatory objective.4 But scientific evidence requirements can also create hurdles for regulators who sincerely pursue objectives other than protectionism. Depending on the context, scientific evidence may be inconclusive or its conclusions highly tentative or preliminary. Convincing scientific proof of certain types of risk, particularly low level risks, may be difficult to produce. And scientists may well disagree about the existence of a risk or the efficacy of various ways to reduce it. In the face of such scientific uncertainty, scientific evidence requirements may stand in the way of honest","PeriodicalId":87172,"journal":{"name":"Chicago journal of international law","volume":"1 1","pages":"353"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83086429","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Establishing a New Stock Market for Shareholder Value Oriented Firms in Korea","authors":"Stephen Choi, Kon-Sik Kim","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.314921","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.314921","url":null,"abstract":"We propose introducing more competition into the design and implementation of investor protection in Korea. Our proposal in Korea is to start small. We focus on the possibility of giving firms in Korea greater choice within the existing regulatory regime. As an initial (and obtainable) goal we propose taking an approach similar to that pursued by the Brazilian Stock Exchange (Bovespa) to establish a new voluntary section for firms satisfying global corporate governance standards on the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE). Another option would be to go the seemingly opposite direction and allow some firms to opt out of any domestic regulation and instead to follow the regulatory regime of a foreign country (putting these firms in their own section of the stock market and enhancing the level of enforcement of foreign regulators through the assistance of Korean regulators). Such an approach would allow firms the ability to choose for themselves - within limits - the level of investor protections they desire (through a listing on a foreign exchange). Firms already with large and entrenched controlling shareholders or managers and a dispersed pool of minority investors will probably not take advantage of the ability to opt into a higher level of corporate governance. Instead, our suggested reforms will assist primarily newer companies seeking to raise funds from the public capital markets for the first time. Also, even among more established firms, a small, yet growing, number of firms under professional management may be interested in moving into a more advanced section of the KSE. Indirectly, we predict that feedback effects through the creation of a new investor-protection environment (with accompanying norms and institutions) will affect the rest of Korea's capital markets.","PeriodicalId":87172,"journal":{"name":"Chicago journal of international law","volume":"39 1","pages":"4"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87984509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Bioterrorism, public health, and international law.","authors":"David P Fidler","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":87172,"journal":{"name":"Chicago journal of international law","volume":"3 1","pages":"7-26"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"24955627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"From the core to the peripheries: multilateral governance of malaria in a multi-cultural world.","authors":"Obijiofor Aginam","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":87172,"journal":{"name":"Chicago journal of international law","volume":"3 1","pages":"87-103"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"24956103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"TRIPS, pharmaceuticals, developing countries, and the Doha \"solution\".","authors":"Alan O Sykes","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":87172,"journal":{"name":"Chicago journal of international law","volume":"3 1","pages":"47-68"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"24955629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"TRIPS, pharmaceutical patents, and access to essential medicines: a long way from Seattle to Doha.","authors":"Ellen 't Hoen","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":87172,"journal":{"name":"Chicago journal of international law","volume":"3 1","pages":"27-46"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"24955628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}