Establishing a New Stock Market for Shareholder Value Oriented Firms in Korea

Stephen Choi, Kon-Sik Kim
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引用次数: 6

Abstract

We propose introducing more competition into the design and implementation of investor protection in Korea. Our proposal in Korea is to start small. We focus on the possibility of giving firms in Korea greater choice within the existing regulatory regime. As an initial (and obtainable) goal we propose taking an approach similar to that pursued by the Brazilian Stock Exchange (Bovespa) to establish a new voluntary section for firms satisfying global corporate governance standards on the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE). Another option would be to go the seemingly opposite direction and allow some firms to opt out of any domestic regulation and instead to follow the regulatory regime of a foreign country (putting these firms in their own section of the stock market and enhancing the level of enforcement of foreign regulators through the assistance of Korean regulators). Such an approach would allow firms the ability to choose for themselves - within limits - the level of investor protections they desire (through a listing on a foreign exchange). Firms already with large and entrenched controlling shareholders or managers and a dispersed pool of minority investors will probably not take advantage of the ability to opt into a higher level of corporate governance. Instead, our suggested reforms will assist primarily newer companies seeking to raise funds from the public capital markets for the first time. Also, even among more established firms, a small, yet growing, number of firms under professional management may be interested in moving into a more advanced section of the KSE. Indirectly, we predict that feedback effects through the creation of a new investor-protection environment (with accompanying norms and institutions) will affect the rest of Korea's capital markets.
韩国为股东价值导向企业建立新的股票市场
我们建议在韩国投资者保护的设计和实施中引入更多的竞争。我们在韩国的建议是从小事做起。我们关注的是让韩国企业在现有监管体制下有更多选择的可能性。作为最初的(和可实现的)目标,我们建议采取类似于巴西证券交易所(Bovespa)所追求的方法,为在韩国证券交易所(KSE)满足全球公司治理标准的公司建立一个新的自愿部分。另一个选择是走看似相反的方向,允许一些公司选择不受任何国内监管,而是遵循外国的监管制度(将这些公司纳入本国的股票市场,并通过韩国监管机构的协助提高外国监管机构的执法水平)。这种方法将使公司有能力在有限的范围内自行选择他们想要的投资者保护水平(通过在外汇交易所上市)。已经拥有庞大且根深蒂固的控股股东或管理者,以及分散的少数投资者的公司,可能不会利用这种选择进入更高水平公司治理的能力。相反,我们建议的改革将主要帮助那些首次寻求从公开资本市场筹集资金的新公司。此外,即使在更成熟的公司中,少数(但仍在增长)由专业管理的公司可能有兴趣进入KSE更先进的部分。间接地,我们预测通过建立新的投资者保护环境(伴随规范和制度)产生的反馈效应将影响韩国其他资本市场。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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