Money on the Table?: Responding to Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage

Daniel N. Shaviro
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

Transactions commonly known as "cross-border tax arbitrages" take advantage of inconsistencies between countries' tax rules to achieve more favorable tax results than could have been achieved by investing just in one country. Examples include "dual resident companies" and "double dip leases," in which clever structuring may enable a multinational enterprise to claim the same deduction in two countries. This article analyzes the national and worldwide welfare considerations that may be relevant to a country's deciding whether to allow tax benefits that will be thus duplicated, taking into account strategic interactions with other countries. It also briefly discusses cross-border tax arbitrage in relation to tax harmonization and the proposed creation of multilateral tax institutions akin to the GATT and WTO.
钱在桌子上?:应对跨境税收套利
通常被称为“跨境税收套利”的交易利用各国税收规则的不一致性来获得比只在一个国家投资更有利的税收结果。例子包括“双重居民公司”和“双底租赁”,其中巧妙的结构可以使跨国企业在两个国家申请相同的扣除。考虑到与其他国家的战略互动,本文分析了可能与一个国家决定是否允许将被复制的税收优惠相关的国家和国际福利考虑因素。它还简要讨论了与税收协调和提议建立类似关贸总协定和世贸组织的多边税收机构有关的跨国界税收套利。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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