Yale journal of law and feminism最新文献

{"title":"Gender, Race & the Inadequate Regulation of Cosmetics","authors":"Marie C. Boyd","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3348675","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3348675","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars and other commentators have identified failures in the regulation of cosmetics—which depends heavily on voluntary industry self-regulation—and called for more stringent regulation of these products. Yet these calls have largely neglected an important dimension of the problem: the current laissez-faire approach to the regulation of cosmetics disproportionally places women, and particularly women who are members of other excluded groups, at risk. This Article examines federal cosmetics law and regulation through a feminist lens. It argues that cosmetics law and regulation have lagged behind that of the other major product categories regulated by the Food and Drug Administration under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 because cosmetics are a gendered product and industry. In addition, conflicting views of the meaning of cosmetics among self-identified feminists, and differences in women’s relationships to cosmetics, mean that reform efforts must confront opposition and tension both within and outside of feminism. Ultimately, this Article questions the legitimacy of the current approach to cosmetics law and regulation. It concludes with several recommendations about how to address some of the failures of cosmetics law and regulation.","PeriodicalId":83555,"journal":{"name":"Yale journal of law and feminism","volume":"110 1","pages":"3"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80573227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Overdue Case against Sex-Segregated Bathrooms","authors":"Laura Portuondo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3221820","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3221820","url":null,"abstract":"INTRODUCTION. ...................................... .............. 466 I. THE UNREVEALING HISTORY OF SEX-SEGREGATED BATHROOMS .............. 470 A. Origins ................................... ..... 471 B. Sex-Segregated Bathrooms and the ERA Debates ...... ...... 476 II. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF SEX-SEGREGATED BATHROOMS .. ............ 482 A. The Interest in Accommodating Biological Differences................483 B. The Interest in Protecting Privacy......... .................485 C. The Interest in Protecting Women's Safety .... ................... 491 III. THE LEGAL CASE AGAINST SEX-SEGREGATED BATHROOMS...................497 A. The Intermediate Scrutiny Standard .......... ........ 497 B. Applying Intermediate Scrutiny to the Judicially Asserted Interests ............................ ..............499 1. Accommodating Biological Differences .......... .......... 499 2. Privacy . ..................................... 502 3. Safety ............................. .............. 510 IV. THE NORMATIVE CASE AGAINST SEX-SEGREGATED BATHROOMS .......... 514 A. When Separate May Be Equal: The Subordination Distinction.....514 B. Overcoming the Privacy Objection: Sex-Segregated Bathrooms Perpetuate Harmful Stereotypes ................ ...... 517 C. Overcoming the Safety Objection: Sex-Segregated Bathrooms Perpetuate Dangers for Women ................. ..... 521","PeriodicalId":83555,"journal":{"name":"Yale journal of law and feminism","volume":"89 1","pages":"5"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86964722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How Women Could Save the World, If Only We Would Let Them: From Gender Essentialism to Inclusive Security","authors":"C. Powell","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2671309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2671309","url":null,"abstract":"We increasingly hear that empowering women and placing them in positions of leadership will lead to a safer, more prosperous world. The UN Security Council’s groundbreaking resolutions on Women Peace, and Security (WPS) — and U.S. law implementing these commitments — rest on the assumption that women’s participation in peace and security matters will lead to more sustainable peace, because women presumably “perform” in ways that reduce conflict, violence, and extremism. This idea is of heightened importance today because women are still vastly underrepresented in positions of leadership in the peace and security field, having yet to “shatter that highest and hardest glass ceiling” as Commander-in-Chief in the United States or rise to the role of Secretary-General in the United Nations. Before her own historic race to become the first woman Commander in Chief, Hillary Clinton had prominently made the claim we increasingly hear that women’s empowerment is not only the right thing to do, but the smart thing to do for global and economic security. Such claims raise fundamental questions for international law, equality theory, and feminism. Assertions that the world would be a better — more peaceful, more prosperous — place, if women assumed leadership positions in peace and security matters are unapologetically instrumentalist and reinforce essentialist views of women. At the same time, evidence suggests that these claims are to some extent accurate. Thus, these assertions should be carefully examined. Reviewing new research, this Article argues that while some evidence supports these claims, the statistical evidence supporting these claims suffers from methodological flaws. Moreover, the forms of gender performance reflected in the data — which international law has organized itself around — are based on the socially constructed roles women play as caregivers, nurturers, and collaborators, not necessarily on their inherent biological roles. Yet, international law reifies these roles and the stereotypes that surround them, even as it tries to open up opportunities for women beyond traditional sex-segregated positions that have long relegated women around the world to the pink ghetto of economic inequality and inferior political and social status. Having to maneuver around formal equality, on the one hand, and instrumentalist claims that women will “save” the world, on the other, means that the category of “woman” can restrict even as it liberates. After all, not all women are “peace-loving,” particularly in a world where the women who succeed are often those who can succeed on terms defined by men.Two prevailing theoretical frameworks — antisubordination and securitization—shape the current debate about WPS, but each ultimately falls short. This Article identifies democratic legitimacy as a novel third approach missing from the existing debate. As an alternative view, the democratic legitimacy account effectively reframes the WPS debate as one concer","PeriodicalId":83555,"journal":{"name":"Yale journal of law and feminism","volume":"29 1","pages":"2"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73900596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The U Visa's Failed Promise for Survivors of Domestic Violence","authors":"Natalie Nanasi","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2872866","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2872866","url":null,"abstract":"Recognizing the unique vulnerabilities of immigrants who become victims of crime in the United States, Congress enacted the U visa, a form of immigration relief that provides victims, including survivors of domestic violence, a path to legal status. Along with this humanitarian aim, the U visa was intended to aid law enforcement in efforts to investigate and prosecute crime, based on the notion that victims without legal status might otherwise be too fearful to “come out of the shadows” by reporting offenses to the police. Although these two goals were purportedly coequal, in practice, by requiring survivors to cooperate with law enforcement in order to obtain U nonimmigrant status, the benefits to police and prosecutors are achieved at the expense of the victims Congress sought to protect, exacerbating the very vulnerabilities the U visa was intended to address. This article posits that this marginalization of immigrant victims’ interest should have been foreseen, as U visa requirements are analogous to other mandatory interventions in cases of domestic violence that have disempowered and destabilized survivors, particularly poor women of color. In tracing the history of the public response to domestic violence, from the time when spousal abuse was ignored or condoned to the overcorrection that has led to compulsory state involvement in women’s lives, it becomes clear that the U visa has perpetuated the swing of the pendulum away from victim autonomy and toward an aggressive criminal justice response to domestic violence. This article details why such a shift is particularly damaging for immigrant survivors – due to language barriers, complicated relationships with police, familial ties and economic constraints – and proposes novel solutions that mitigate the harmful effects of the U visa certification requirement and break away from ineffective conventions surrounding assistance for survivors of domestic violence.","PeriodicalId":83555,"journal":{"name":"Yale journal of law and feminism","volume":"213 1","pages":"273"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77665128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Parenting Title VII: Rethinking the History of the Sex Discrimination Prohibition","authors":"Arianne Renan Barzilay","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2962529","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2962529","url":null,"abstract":"It is a pillar of employment discrimination law that Title VII’s prohibition of “sex” discrimination lacks prior legislative history. When interpreting the meaning of sex discrimination protection under Title VII, courts have stated that it is impossible to fathom what Congress intended when it included “sex” in the Act. After all, the sex provision was added at the last minute by the Southern archconservative congressman Howard “Judge” Smith in an attempt to frustrate the Civil Rights Act’s passage. Courts have often interpreted the sex provision’s passage as a “fluke” that has left us bereft of prior legislative history that might guide judicial interpretation. It is not surprising, then, that Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition has been rather narrowly construed. This Article rethinks this received narrative and emphasizes its implausibility in light of the pre-Civil Rights Act contributions feminists made to the national discourse on sex discrimination. It considers not only scholarship on Equal Rights Feminists’ role in passing Title VII’s sex provision, but also scholarship on the often-overlooked Working-Class Social and Labor Feminists. The Article also explores the contestations between these two groups over the meaning of sex discrimination. It provides a more complex narrative of the provision’s parentage than the one previously recognized. The Article reframes the narrative by broadening the scope of inquiry in two ways: first, by focusing on Working-Class Social and Labor Feminists’ agitation for equality in the workplace, and second, by looking further back in time in order to reconceptualize debates over workplace equality as formative of the discourse on sex discrimination. The Article begins with early twentieth century contestations over protective labor legislation and argues that Working-Class Social Feminists supported labor regulation based not merely on sex stereotypes, but on their understanding of labor regulation as a means to combat sex discrimination. It continues through the New Deal, when an early sex anti-classification provision was inscribed in federal law by Social Feminists to provide equal pay for men and women. It examines the debates over workplace sex discrimination that reverberated in the decades following World War II and persisted through the early 1960s—when Congress passed the Equal Pay Act and the President’s Commission on the Status of Women issued its report. The Article considers these developments as part of feminists’ sustained efforts to combat sex discrimination, and as stage-setters for the sex provision’s passage. It claims that Working-Class Social and Labor Feminists’ long agitation for women’s equality de-facto constitutes decades’ worth of legislative history for the sex provision. When Congress voted to include “sex” discrimination in Title VII, it was already well aware of its robust meanings, thanks in large part to these feminists’ efforts to ameliorate systemic disadvantages","PeriodicalId":83555,"journal":{"name":"Yale journal of law and feminism","volume":"163 1","pages":"2"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77766683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Fundamental Rights in a Post- Obergefell World","authors":"P. Nicolas","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2645978","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2645978","url":null,"abstract":"In this essay, I identify and critically examine several substantive criticisms raised by the dissents in the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, which struck down state laws and constitutional provisions barring same-sex couples from marrying within the state or having their out-of-state marriages recognized by the state.Specifically, I address three points raised by the dissents. First, that the majority improperly framed the right at issue broadly as the right to marriage instead of narrowly as the right to same-sex marriage, conflicting with the Court’s holding in Washington v. Glucksberg that in fundamental rights cases the right at issue must be framed narrowly. This disregard of Glucksberg, according to one dissent, may lead to finding an analogous right to polygamous marriage. Second, that the right to marry sought in the case was a positive right, and that the Court thus erred in recognizing the right as fundamental under the Due Process Clause, which only protects negative rights. And finally, that the majority’s invocation of the Equal Protection Clause in tandem with the Due Process Clause in support of its conclusion was both doctrinally without support and violated the canon against unnecessarily deciding constitutional questions.I argue that the majority’s framing of the right was consistent with Glucksberg, demonstrating that the precedents upon which it was built, while requiring specific framing, do not call for the narrowest framing possible, and in turn that the majority’s approach does not necessitate a finding of a right to polygamous marriage. Furthermore, while agreeing with the dissents that the Due Process Clause protects only negative rights, I demonstrate that the Equal Protection Clause has historically protected positive rights. Because marriage has historically consisted of a bundle of rights, both positive and negative, the majority’s invocation of both clauses was both supported by precedent and necessary to the decision. Finally, I demonstrate that the two clauses, working in tandem, prevent states from eliminating civil marriage in the future, even if they eliminate it for same-sex and opposite-sex couples alike.","PeriodicalId":83555,"journal":{"name":"Yale journal of law and feminism","volume":"144 1","pages":"4"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79932942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Insuring Children Against Parental Incarceration Risk","authors":"Angela Cai","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2309089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2309089","url":null,"abstract":"In the United States, where government policies have resulted in extremely high incarceration rates, parental incarceration is a prevalent, distinct, and severe form of childhood disadvantage. Children who lose their parents to incarceration suffer unique harms, which are not addressed by current social insurance programs. In particular, an inmate’s child suffers direct financial harm from losing financial and in-kind support, from diversion of household resources to the incarcerated inmate parent, and from deficits in future contributions due to the parent’s ex-felon status. Children of incarcerated parents tend to already be poor, and these additional deprivations create severely negative consequences for their welfare. This Article proposes that the state should provide children with incarceration insurance: an upfront subsidy to the child whose parent goes to prison, to be repaid to the state by the incarcerated parent on a deferred basis in lieu of child support. The state should supply this social insurance program because of its interest and obligation in promoting child welfare and enforcing parental responsibility. The United States in particular has a strong obligation to the children who bear hidden costs of the government’s choice to pursue an aggressive criminal punishment regime that disproportionately harms poor and minority children. This proposal is an innovative departure from the status quo, which does little to support children while allowing child support arrears to accrue against inmate parents. The proposal allows for a menu of implementation options that states can choose from to fit their own circumstances and needs. A baseline version of the proposal engages with the question of how to assign family responsibility, legal and philosophical inquiries about desert, and how to mitigate the impact of localized disadvantage on broader society. The resulting policy regime thus must support the basic motivations behind the proposal: to plug a resource gap and thus promote child welfare, especially for disadvantaged children, to maintain the bonds of parental obligation while incarceration forces physical removal, and to propel the state to neutralize the effects of its own role in driving up parental incarceration for disadvantaged children. Doing so will allow both the parent and the state to internalize some collateral costs of mass incarceration currently borne by innocent third parties.","PeriodicalId":83555,"journal":{"name":"Yale journal of law and feminism","volume":"112 1","pages":"4"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76743432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Rape Law Fundamentals","authors":"Corey Rayburn Yung","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2337621","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2337621","url":null,"abstract":"Modern American rape law is the product of historical contingencies, compromises, legislative inattention, successful reforms, and backlash. It is neither a puzzle to be solved nor a coherent system of rules and values. Perhaps the clearest lesson to draw from our criminal laws regarding sex is that there is no logic, reason, or consistency among them. As a result of its checkered past, myths and misunderstandings about rape law abound. Jed Rubenfeld’s recent article, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, exemplifies the confusion many courts, scholars, and members of the public have about modern rape law. Rubenfeld’s specific proposal to base rape statutes on a right to self-possession, because it is derived from mistaken premises about rape law, would likely make legal over 90% of rapes in America. By replacing the non-consent element of modern rape statutes with a narrow force requirement, Rubenfeld’s recommendation essentially decriminalizes non-stranger rape and rape by a victim’s intoxication.In this Article, I examine the missteps Rubenfeld makes to explain why he ends up supporting such a disastrous conclusion. For example, Rubenfeld sees the need for his right to self-possession theory because he believes that autonomy is the sole basis that scholars offer for the foundation of rape law. However, rape is also properly supported as an independent offense by the nature and severity of harm caused, gender dynamics involved, and terror inflicted on the general population by widespread sexual violence. He also uses specious analogies and idiosyncratic conceptions of autonomy to establish the critical components of his argument.Despite the faults of his specific claims, Rubenfeld points rape scholars in a worthwhile direction. Instead of seeking diminishing returns with statutory tinkering, there is much to be gained by focusing on the foundations of rape law. By better integrating the fundamental values of rape law (autonomy, gender, harm, and terror), the major problems of high rape prevalence, law enforcement failure, and political hostility to rape victims that plague America can be better addressed.","PeriodicalId":83555,"journal":{"name":"Yale journal of law and feminism","volume":"17 1","pages":"1"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75729489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Roe’s Race: The Supreme Court, Population Control, and Reproductive Justice","authors":"M. Ziegler","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2148055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2148055","url":null,"abstract":"Questions of race and abortion have shaped current legal debates about defunding Planned Parenthood and banning race-selection abortion. In these discussions, abortion opponents draw a close connection between the eugenic or population control movements of the twentieth century and the contemporary abortion-rights movement. In challenging legal restrictions on abortion, abortion-rights activists generally insist that their movement and its predecessors have primarily privileged reproductive choice. Notwithstanding the centrality of race to abortion politics, there has been no meaningful history of the racial politics of abortion that produced or followed Roe v. Wade. This article closes this gap in the abortion discussion by focusing on the racial politics of abortion in the 1970s. In the 1970s, some population controllers did have ties to the eugenic legal reform movement or a particular interest in limiting the growth of poor, non-white populations. Those groups most closely involved with the abortion-rights movement, however, primarily focused on family planning for white, middle-class families, emphasizing the importance of environmental stewardship and sexual liberation. Arguments treating the abortion-rights, population control, and eugenics movements as indistinguishable from one another are flawed. At the same time, by reinterpreting Roe, feminists created new opportunities to reshape the racial politics of abortion. By defending their own understanding of the opinion against antiabortion attack, feminists were able to redefine abortion as a right that belonged to women irrespective of its political consequences. The article shows that, by grounding the discussion in proper historical context, discussion of race and abortion will be more principled and productive. Abortion opponents can fairly discuss the history of the family planning movement, but blurring any distinction between the abortion-rights movement and its predecessors is problematic and misleading. In turn, abortion-rights activists should address the past relevance of population-based claims, acknowledging the contributions of those who worked to redefine abortion as a woman’s right.","PeriodicalId":83555,"journal":{"name":"Yale journal of law and feminism","volume":"6 1","pages":"2"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91313526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Disposable Mothers: Paid In-Home Caretaking and the Regulation of Parenthood","authors":"T. Schaefer","doi":"10.7916/D8B56QHJ","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/D8B56QHJ","url":null,"abstract":"Recent custody decisions in the United States have treated paid in-home caretakers - or nannies - as a substitute for parents who are either unavailable or unable to care for their children. They have created a legal category of nanny that detaches primary caretaking from the caretaker and attributes care provided by in-home caretakers to paying parents. In doing so, courts have imposed outdated norms of family life and childcare to the detriment of women and paid caretakers. This Article sounds a strong warning against this emergent - but thus far unnoticed - judicial approach. The current approach stems from an overwhelming consensus among judges and scholars that paid caretakers are inherently different from parents. The legal category nanny - that is someone who performs one-on-one intensive child care but by definition cannot be considered a parent - fits well with the legal regime and cultural norms that regulate contemporary parenthood. Legally, the parental exclusivity doctrine promotes a nuclear family model by mandating that children can only have one set of two parents at any given time. Culturally, parents are encouraged to utilize intensive, development-focused childrearing methods. The new approach appears compatible with both because it provides children with child-centered care and makes families which do not function as nuclear families appear as if they did. This Article argues that this new approach - and the consensus underpinning it - rest on flawed and potentially harmful assumptions about parenting and caretaking. The detachment of the care from the caretaker is artificial and contradicts the well established judicial and legislative view that performing hands-on caretaking tasks over time creates a parent-child bond. In addition, attributing paid caretakers' labor to hiring parents is unjust: it devalues care work, renders paid caretakers disposable, and places the majority of parents, who cannot afford in-home caretaking, in a disadvantageous position. Furthermore, it endangers the feminist effort to promote policies that allow women to better combine motherhood with workforce participation. The Article urges readers to rethink conventional understandings of parenting and caretaking and to recognize fully the price that the current legal approach exacts - and who pays it.","PeriodicalId":83555,"journal":{"name":"Yale journal of law and feminism","volume":"57 10 1","pages":"305-351"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83555735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}