Policy review最新文献

{"title":"The resilience of Arab monarchy","authors":"Ludger Kuhnhardt","doi":"10.5771/9783748904090-607","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748904090-607","url":null,"abstract":"REVOLUTIONS ARE NOT mechanical processes of social engineering. They unfold as an intrinsically unpredictable flow of events. Structurally, revolutions will go through phases, often through contradictory periods. Hardly any revolution will evolve without turbulences and phases of consolidation. And revolutions do not happen without moments of stagnation, surprising advancement, and unexpected transformation. The beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011 has not been of a different nature. It started as a fundamental surprise to most, took different turns in different countries, and was far from over by the end of 2011. Transatlantic partners are fully aware of the stark differences among Arab countries. They realize the genuine nature of each nation's struggle for democracy. Yet, they are inclined to take the Western experience with democracy as the key benchmark for judging current progress in the Arab world. The constitutional promise of the U.S. or the success of the peaceful revolutions in Eastern and Central Europe in 1989 and 1990 are inspiring, but one must be cautious in applying them to the Arab Spring. Preconditions have to be taken into account. Beside, the history of Europe's 19th and 20th century also suggest room for failure in the process of moving toward rule of law and participatory democracy Some cynics have already suggested that the Arab Spring could be followed by an Arab autumn or even winter. Even if one discards such visions as inappropriate self-fulfilling prophecy, certain European experiences should probably not be forgotten: In the 1380s, Germany experienced its own Spring toward pluralism and democracy called Vormarz. That German spring movement (Sturm and Drang) was essentially a cultural uprising without the follow-up of transformational political change. In 1848, across Europe, revolutionary upheavals promoted the hope for an early parliamentary constitutionalism across the continent. In most places, this hope was soon to he replaced by variants of a restrictive consolidation of the ancient regimes. In 1989, the experience of Romania deviated strongly from most of the peaceful revolutions across Europe. Ousting and even killing the former dictator was a camouflage for the old regime to prevail for almost another decade. While the rest of Central and South Eastern Europe struggled with regime change and renewal, Romania prolonged regime atrophy and resistance to renewal. For the time being, the Arab Spring has evolved into the prelude of a revolutionary transformation that will go on, most likely for many more years to come. The Prague Spring of 1968, in the former Czechoslovakia, comes to mind: It was welcomed with euphoria in the West and in secrecy by many citizens under communist rule in the east of Europe. Yet, it turned out to he just the beginning of a transformative period in the communist world. It took another two decades before a substantial change of the political order in most communist states came about. Th","PeriodicalId":82330,"journal":{"name":"Policy review","volume":"95 1","pages":"57"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85889528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A realistic reset with Russia","authors":"J. Goldgeier","doi":"10.4324/9780203846698.CH19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203846698.CH19","url":null,"abstract":"MEETING FOR THE first time in London on April 1, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and U.S. President Barack Obama declared in their joint statement they were\" ready to move beyond Cold War mentalities and chart a fresh starts in relations between [the] two countries. It is rather startling that 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the leaders of the two nations believe they need to stress their readiness to overcome Cold War mentalities. But is it really Cold War mentalities that have been the problem? The dashing of expectations that has occurred often in the past two decades should lead us to be somewhat sober about the prospects going forward, despite the Obama administration's worthy goal of pushing the \"reset button\" and its early achievements. Looking back through the history of the intervening years can help us understand why we have made such little progress in forging a strong U.S.-Russian relationship since the hopeful days after the collapse of communism. Doing so reveals that the problems in the relationship have been caused not by lingering Cold War mentalities, but rather by two very different visions of the post-Cold War world, as well as by the sharp asymmetries in power that emerged when the Soviet Union imploded. While Medvedev and Obama followed their April meeting with a productive summit in Moscow in July, we should be realistic about what we can expect given the underlying differences in both worldview and power that will continue to exist. A false start THE RUSH OF events that occurred as the Soviet Union unraveled seems rather surreal in retrospect: Boris Yeltsin standing on a tank in August 1991, staring down a drunken band of coup plotters. The Baltic countries and then Ukraine declaring their independence. Yeltsin meeting with the leaders of Ukraine and Belarus in the Beloveschaya forest in early December 1991 to effectively declare the end of the Soviet Union, followed by Mikhail Gorbachev's formal admission a few weeks later that the state built by Lenin and Stalin was no more. In early 1992, a triumphant Yeltsin visited Camp David to meet with George H.W. Bush. Yeltsin was enthusiastic about the prospects for U.S.-Russian friendship. Gorbachev had been the darling of the West for his programs of perestroika and glasnost, opening up the Soviet system, and creating opportunities for both democracy and the stirrings of a market economy. To outmaneuver his Soviet rival in 1991, Yeltsin had decided to be more pro-democracy, more pro-market, and more pro-Western than Gorbachev, hoping to garner American support to ensure his defeat of the communists. Meeting at Camp David in February 1992, Yeltsin pressed Bush to declare that America and Russia were now allies rather than using the more ambiguous phrase \"friendship and partnership.\" Bush demurred, saying \"We are using this transitional language because we don't want to act like all our problems are solved.\" (1) While Bush missed an opportunity to draw closer to Yel","PeriodicalId":82330,"journal":{"name":"Policy review","volume":"232 1","pages":"15"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90498117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The French Path to Jihad","authors":"J. Rosenthal","doi":"10.1057/9780230616509_24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230616509_24","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82330,"journal":{"name":"Policy review","volume":"22 1","pages":"183-193"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86166033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Religious Sources of Islamic Terrorism","authors":"Shmuel Bar","doi":"10.1057/9780230616509_2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230616509_2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82330,"journal":{"name":"Policy review","volume":"52 205 1","pages":"11-20"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83284532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Knowing the Enemy","authors":"Ariel Cohen","doi":"10.1126/science.342.6165.1415-c","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1126/science.342.6165.1415-c","url":null,"abstract":"THE CONFLICTS IN Iraq, Lebanon, and Afghanistan and the global Islamist insurgency have revealed that Western democracies and their political and military leaders do not fully comprehend the multifaceted threats represented by radical Muslim nonstate actors. In this, they violate the most famous dictum of Sun Tzu, the Chinese strategic genius of 2,500 years ago: \"If you know yourself and understand your opponent you will never put your victory in jeopardy in any conflict.\" The broad support that al Qaeda jihadis and radical Islamist militias such as Hamas and Hezbollah enjoy in the Muslim world and in the global Muslim diaspora, as well as among non-Muslim anti-American political forces around the world demonstrates that describing the global Islamic insurgency as a fringe or minority phenomenon is unrealistic and self-defeating. Since 9/11, democracies have fought three wars against nonstate Islamist actors. The West needs to draw important lessons from Iraq, Afghanistan, and the clash between Israel and Hezbollah to address these strategic deficits. Lack of clarity in defining the enemy and delays in formulating political and information strategy severely endanger U.S. national interests and the security of the West. Fighting the wrong enemy THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION lost valuable time before it finally defined radical Islam as the premier national security threat in October 2005. Initially in the post-9/11 period, the president targeted \"evildoers\" and \"terrorism\" as the enemy. Moreover, Islam was declared a \"religion of peace\" and Saudi Arabia, which has spent the last 30 years spreading its Wahhabi/Salafi gospel, was labeled as \"our friend.\" Unsurprisingly, the nation and the military were somewhat disoriented. The U.S. military quickly and successfully destroyed the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. After that, however, the menu of enemies became slim: Saudi Arabia, from which 15 out of 19 hijackers came, was considered too important an oil supplier and too pivotal a state in the Middle East to be engaged. Pakistan, both the parent and the nursemaid of the Taliban, promised cooperation. Most important, the U.S. did not know (and still does not know) how to fight nonstate actors, be they sub-state terrorist organizations, militias, or supra-state religious/political movements. The jury is still out as to all the reasons for the Soviet collapse, but it was defeated in part through an indirect strategy formulated by the Reagan administration, and in part because it disintegrated due to its own internal weaknesses. If we are to believe one who was \"present at the destruction\"--Russian Prime Minister Egor Gaidar--a key reason was the flooding of the world market with cheap Saudi oil. The Soviet Union was also bankrupted by its unsustainably expensive military-industrial complex. In addition, it was burdened with ideological fatigue and cynicism, torn by ethnic centrifugal forces, and being bled in Afghanistan by the U.S.-supported mujahedeen. (1) For","PeriodicalId":82330,"journal":{"name":"Policy review","volume":"100 1","pages":"41"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76234553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Future of Tradition","authors":"Lee Harris","doi":"10.4324/9780203044995","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203044995","url":null,"abstract":"AMERICA HAS BEEN in the midst of a culture war for some time and will probably remain so for some time longer. But culture war is not peculiar to this country. Indeed, there have been at least three great culture wars fought in the course of Western history, including one contemporaneous with the rise of the Sophists in ancient Greece, the epoch identified with the French Enlightenment and the German Aufklarung, and our own current battle. The first two ended in disaster for the societies in which they occurred--the outcome of the third is still pending. Each of these wars has its own particular antagonists, each its own weapons of combat, each its own battlefield. But the essential nature of a culture war is invariant: A set of traditional values comes under attack by those who, like the Greek Sophist, the French philosophe, and the American intellectual, make their living by their superior proficiency in handling abstract ideas, and promote a radically new and revolutionary set of values. This is precisely what one would expect from those who excel in dispute and argumentation. In every culture war the existing customs and traditions of a society are called to the bar of reason and ruthlessly interrogated and cross-examined by an intellectual elite asking whether they can be rationally justified or are simply the products of superstition and thus unworthy of being taken seriously by enlightened men and women. Indeed, there could be no better example of this disdainful attitude toward inherited tradition than that displayed by the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Canada in discussing her court's legalization of gay marriage, clearly expressed by her summary dismissal of any opposition to the high court's decision as arising from nothing more than \"residual personal prejudice.\" Against such opposition, it is no wonder that many conservatives--including many of those who call themselves neoconservatives--have attempted to combat the opponents of tradition with their opponents' own weapon of enlightened rationality. But is it possible to defend tradition with the help of reason? Can a particular tradition be justified by reason? And what if our traditional belief conflicts with reason--can we rationally justify keeping it? Suppose we have been raised in the belief that we must wash our hands before every meal in order to appease a local deity in our pantheon, say, the god of the harvest; and suppose again that we have come to learn of the hygienic benefits of washing our hands before every meal. Must we keep the absurd tradition once we have grasped its scientific rationale? In either case, whether tradition and reason conflict, or tradition is revealed to be reason disguised, reason wins and tradition loses. Where reason shines forth, then, tradition is no longer necessary. Hence the question before us: In a world that is being more and more rationalized, does tradition have a future? Or will we one day look upon it as we now look upon the my","PeriodicalId":82330,"journal":{"name":"Policy review","volume":"16 1","pages":"3"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90452674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Terrorism to Come","authors":"W. Laqueur","doi":"10.4324/9780203790267-16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203790267-16","url":null,"abstract":"TERRORISM HAS BECOME over a number of years the topic of ceaseless comment, debate, controversy, and search for roots and motives, and it figures on top of the national and international agenda. It is also at present one of the most highly emotionally charged topics of public debate, though quite why this should be the case is not entirely clear, because the overwhelming majority of participants do not sympathize with terrorism. Confusion prevails, but confusion alone does not explain the emotions. There is always confusion when a new international phenomenon appears on the scene. This was the case, for instance, when communism first appeared (it was thought to be aiming largely at the nationalization of women and the burning of priests) and also fascism. But terrorism is not an unprecedented phenomenon; it is as old as the hills. Thirty years ago, when the terrorism debate got underway, it was widely asserted that terrorism was basically a left-wing revolutionary movement caused by oppression and exploitation. Hence the conclusion: Find a political and social solution, remedy the underlying evil--no oppression, no terrorism. The argument about the left-wing character of terrorism is no longer frequently heard, but the belief in a fatal link between poverty and violence has persisted. Whenever a major terrorist attack has taken place, one has heard appeals from high and low to provide credits and loans, to deal at long last with the deeper, true causes of terrorism, the roots rather than the symptoms and outward manifestations. And these roots are believed to be poverty, unemployment, backwardness, and inequality. It is not too difficult to examine whether there is such a correlation between poverty and terrorism, and all the investigations have shown that this is not the case. The experts have maintained for a long time that poverty does not cause terrorism and prosperity does not cure it. In the world's 50 poorest countries there is little or no terrorism. A study by scholars Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova reached the conclusion that the terrorists are not poor people and do not come from poor societies. A Harvard economist has shown that economic growth is closely related to a society's ability to manage conflicts. More recently, a study of India has demonstrated that terrorism in the subcontinent has occurred in the most prosperous (Punjab) and most egalitarian (Kashmir, with a poverty ratio of 3.5 compared with the national average of 26 percent) regions and that, on the other hand, the poorest regions such as North Bihar have been free of terrorism. In the Arab countries (such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, but also in North Africa), the terrorists originated not in the poorest and most neglected districts but hailed from places with concentrations of radical preachers. The backwardness, if any, was intellectual and cultural--not economic and social. These findings, however, have had little impact on public opinion (or on many politicians), a","PeriodicalId":82330,"journal":{"name":"Policy review","volume":"55 1","pages":"49"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85076392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The pathos of the Kass report.","authors":"Peter Berkowitz","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82330,"journal":{"name":"Policy review","volume":"115 ","pages":"1-7"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"26515738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How We Won in Vietnam","authors":"V. Dinh","doi":"10.4324/9781351144889-18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351144889-18","url":null,"abstract":"THE PAST TWO YEARS have witnessed significant developments in United States policy toward Vietnam. High-level congressional delegations to Vietnam led by Sens. Richard Shelby and Chuck Hagel were followed by a visit by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. This past March, as Vietnam launched a propaganda campaign to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the communist victory, William Cohen became the first American secretary of defense to visit the country since the end of the war. Over the summer, the United States and Vietnam signed a bilateral trade and investment treaty and opened the door to the possibility of full economic normalization -- a long way from the U.S.-led international trade embargo against Vietnam that started in 1975. The culmination of these developments was President Clinton's trip this November, the first presidential visit to Vietnam since Richard Nixon in July 1969. For any other country of comparable size and stature, this level of attention would be quite extraordinary. But of course Vietnam is not just another country of marginal international significance. It is a name that remains deeply ingrained in the American psyche as a not-so-gentle reminder of our fallibility. The attention showered on this troubled nation on the other side of the earth to a large extent represents not just an exercise in foreign policy but also a national effort to come to grips with a painful history. It is not only about what we are to do with Vietnam; it is about what we are to think of ourselves. Former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara touched off a flurry of self-examination with the publication of his book Argument Without End in 1999. \"Reassessment\" and \"closure\" became the code words in this process of collective therapy. The dominant theme of the analyses of the twenty-fifth anniversary of war's end (and the thirtieth anniversary of Kent State) was the recounting of American errors and misjudgments throughout the conflict. In some ways, this analysis was an attempt to cure America of the Vietnam syndrome -- the lingering fear of combat that inhibits American resolve for foreign intervention. Knowing our mistakes, or at least thinking that we know our mistakes, we can go forth unencumbered by the experience. And acknowledging mistakes facilitates reconciliation -- not just between us and our former enemies, but more important, between conflicting parties and among ourselves. This past April, as a guest of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Foundation, I returned to the country I had fled. The visit was filled with symbolism. The same people who built the Wall as a memorial to those who died in defeat were reaching out to those who lived through victory. And we witnessed some truly remarkable moments: American veterans greeting and at times weeping with Vietnamese veterans; American business leaders advising Vietnamese political leaders on economic policy; Vietnamese groups asking for American help on projects ranging from e","PeriodicalId":82330,"journal":{"name":"Policy review","volume":"45 1","pages":"51"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80959935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Republic, If We Can Keep It","authors":"Tod Lindberg","doi":"10.5860/choice.50-1585","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.50-1585","url":null,"abstract":"THE AMERICAN POLITICAL system has thrown off some truly anomalous results in the past decade. We have gone from the historic 1994 election (a 50-seat swing in the House of Representatives bringing to power a Republican leadership promising \"Revolution\"), to an historic presidential impeachment and acquittal, to an historic 2000 election in which voters divided as evenly as imaginable in their preference for Democrats or Republicans. We are practically awash in the historic these days. Commentary in the weeks after the 2000 presidential election told us to watch events closely, since we would never see their like again in our lifetime. This may be true, but it may also miss the larger point. For those who found themselves disturbed one way or another by the outcome and aftermath of the contest between George W. Bush and Al Gore -- or as the Clinton impeachment drama unfolded, or as the Republican Congress tried to enact its Revolution -- the uniqueness of each event and the unlikelihood of a recurrence may be a false consolation. We may not run into these particular oddities again, but it may be that we are in the midst of something bigger -- a pattern of oddity. One can certainly try to explain away these and lesser instances of strange politics. For example: The fact that a former professional wrestler was elected governor of Minnesota -- and that one Sunday in 1999, the governor decided to make a triumphant return to the ring as referee in the World Wrestling Federation Summerslam -- well, it is certainly strange. But it is also perhaps colorful, in the great American tradition of eccentricity, and not especially noteworthy except in the context of that tradition. Anyway, Jesse Ventura won office with a narrow plurality in a three-way election. How significant is this? Or, for another example, the fact that voters in Missouri cast their ballots in the state's 2000 Senate race for a man who died three weeks earlier -- because the governor promised to appoint the man's widow to the seat -- is macabre, and perhaps uniquely so. But the \"widow's pension\" has a long pedigree in American politics, even if it is not exactly a noble one, and it hardly seems fair to single out this instance as especially noteworthy. Americans are sympathetic to the bereaved, after all. The late Mel Carnahan's election may have been no more than a particularly florid expression of that. And if it's a bit odd that the son of the forty-first president sought to become the forty-third in a race that ultimately hinged on the vote count in the state in which the candidate's brother served as governor -- even as the wife of the president of the United States was unprecedentedly winning election as a United States senator -- well, family has always been important in politics, no? But if instead of trying to explain away these possibly isolated instances of oddity, we take the sum of them -- then add to the mix a failed revolution, an impeachment and acquittal, and the closest an","PeriodicalId":82330,"journal":{"name":"Policy review","volume":"20 1","pages":"3"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73253080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}