{"title":"The resilience of Arab monarchy","authors":"Ludger Kuhnhardt","doi":"10.5771/9783748904090-607","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"REVOLUTIONS ARE NOT mechanical processes of social engineering. They unfold as an intrinsically unpredictable flow of events. Structurally, revolutions will go through phases, often through contradictory periods. Hardly any revolution will evolve without turbulences and phases of consolidation. And revolutions do not happen without moments of stagnation, surprising advancement, and unexpected transformation. The beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011 has not been of a different nature. It started as a fundamental surprise to most, took different turns in different countries, and was far from over by the end of 2011. Transatlantic partners are fully aware of the stark differences among Arab countries. They realize the genuine nature of each nation's struggle for democracy. Yet, they are inclined to take the Western experience with democracy as the key benchmark for judging current progress in the Arab world. The constitutional promise of the U.S. or the success of the peaceful revolutions in Eastern and Central Europe in 1989 and 1990 are inspiring, but one must be cautious in applying them to the Arab Spring. Preconditions have to be taken into account. Beside, the history of Europe's 19th and 20th century also suggest room for failure in the process of moving toward rule of law and participatory democracy Some cynics have already suggested that the Arab Spring could be followed by an Arab autumn or even winter. Even if one discards such visions as inappropriate self-fulfilling prophecy, certain European experiences should probably not be forgotten: In the 1380s, Germany experienced its own Spring toward pluralism and democracy called Vormarz. That German spring movement (Sturm and Drang) was essentially a cultural uprising without the follow-up of transformational political change. In 1848, across Europe, revolutionary upheavals promoted the hope for an early parliamentary constitutionalism across the continent. In most places, this hope was soon to he replaced by variants of a restrictive consolidation of the ancient regimes. In 1989, the experience of Romania deviated strongly from most of the peaceful revolutions across Europe. Ousting and even killing the former dictator was a camouflage for the old regime to prevail for almost another decade. While the rest of Central and South Eastern Europe struggled with regime change and renewal, Romania prolonged regime atrophy and resistance to renewal. For the time being, the Arab Spring has evolved into the prelude of a revolutionary transformation that will go on, most likely for many more years to come. The Prague Spring of 1968, in the former Czechoslovakia, comes to mind: It was welcomed with euphoria in the West and in secrecy by many citizens under communist rule in the east of Europe. Yet, it turned out to he just the beginning of a transformative period in the communist world. It took another two decades before a substantial change of the political order in most communist states came about. The Prague Spring was the spring of a generation, not the spring of a year. No matter what direction the Arab Spring may take in the years ahead, two trends are startling: First, the Arab Spring has initiated a wide range of different reactions and trends around the Arab world. The homogenous Arab world is a myth. Likewise, the notion that Arab societies are permanently stagnant and immobile is a myth. The quest for dignity, voice, and inclusion under rule of law, and a true structure of social pluralism, has been the signature of peaceful protest all over the Arab world. The reactions of incumbent regimes have demonstrated a variety of strategies but also different levels of strength, legitimacy, and criminal energy. Second, and more surprising, is the relative resilience of the Arab monarchies to the Arab Spring: Morocco and Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Oman, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar and Bahrain have been reasonably unaffected and remain stable (in spite of the temporary clashes in Bahrain and their oppression with the help of Saudi Arabia's army). …","PeriodicalId":82330,"journal":{"name":"Policy review","volume":"95 1","pages":"57"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Policy review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748904090-607","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Abstract
REVOLUTIONS ARE NOT mechanical processes of social engineering. They unfold as an intrinsically unpredictable flow of events. Structurally, revolutions will go through phases, often through contradictory periods. Hardly any revolution will evolve without turbulences and phases of consolidation. And revolutions do not happen without moments of stagnation, surprising advancement, and unexpected transformation. The beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011 has not been of a different nature. It started as a fundamental surprise to most, took different turns in different countries, and was far from over by the end of 2011. Transatlantic partners are fully aware of the stark differences among Arab countries. They realize the genuine nature of each nation's struggle for democracy. Yet, they are inclined to take the Western experience with democracy as the key benchmark for judging current progress in the Arab world. The constitutional promise of the U.S. or the success of the peaceful revolutions in Eastern and Central Europe in 1989 and 1990 are inspiring, but one must be cautious in applying them to the Arab Spring. Preconditions have to be taken into account. Beside, the history of Europe's 19th and 20th century also suggest room for failure in the process of moving toward rule of law and participatory democracy Some cynics have already suggested that the Arab Spring could be followed by an Arab autumn or even winter. Even if one discards such visions as inappropriate self-fulfilling prophecy, certain European experiences should probably not be forgotten: In the 1380s, Germany experienced its own Spring toward pluralism and democracy called Vormarz. That German spring movement (Sturm and Drang) was essentially a cultural uprising without the follow-up of transformational political change. In 1848, across Europe, revolutionary upheavals promoted the hope for an early parliamentary constitutionalism across the continent. In most places, this hope was soon to he replaced by variants of a restrictive consolidation of the ancient regimes. In 1989, the experience of Romania deviated strongly from most of the peaceful revolutions across Europe. Ousting and even killing the former dictator was a camouflage for the old regime to prevail for almost another decade. While the rest of Central and South Eastern Europe struggled with regime change and renewal, Romania prolonged regime atrophy and resistance to renewal. For the time being, the Arab Spring has evolved into the prelude of a revolutionary transformation that will go on, most likely for many more years to come. The Prague Spring of 1968, in the former Czechoslovakia, comes to mind: It was welcomed with euphoria in the West and in secrecy by many citizens under communist rule in the east of Europe. Yet, it turned out to he just the beginning of a transformative period in the communist world. It took another two decades before a substantial change of the political order in most communist states came about. The Prague Spring was the spring of a generation, not the spring of a year. No matter what direction the Arab Spring may take in the years ahead, two trends are startling: First, the Arab Spring has initiated a wide range of different reactions and trends around the Arab world. The homogenous Arab world is a myth. Likewise, the notion that Arab societies are permanently stagnant and immobile is a myth. The quest for dignity, voice, and inclusion under rule of law, and a true structure of social pluralism, has been the signature of peaceful protest all over the Arab world. The reactions of incumbent regimes have demonstrated a variety of strategies but also different levels of strength, legitimacy, and criminal energy. Second, and more surprising, is the relative resilience of the Arab monarchies to the Arab Spring: Morocco and Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Oman, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar and Bahrain have been reasonably unaffected and remain stable (in spite of the temporary clashes in Bahrain and their oppression with the help of Saudi Arabia's army). …
革命不是社会工程的机械过程。它们以一种本质上不可预测的事件流展开。从结构上讲,革命要经历几个阶段,往往要经历矛盾的时期。几乎没有一场革命是不经历动荡和巩固阶段的。没有停滞、惊人的进步和意想不到的转变,革命就不会发生。2011年阿拉伯之春的开始并没有什么不同的性质。它一开始对大多数人来说是一个根本性的意外,在不同的国家发生了不同的变化,到2011年底还远远没有结束。跨大西洋伙伴充分意识到阿拉伯国家之间的明显差异。他们认识到每个国家争取民主的真正本质。然而,他们倾向于把西方的民主经验作为评判阿拉伯世界当前进步的关键基准。美国的宪法承诺或1989年和1990年东欧和中欧和平革命的成功令人鼓舞,但在将其应用于阿拉伯之春时必须谨慎。必须考虑到先决条件。此外,欧洲19世纪和20世纪的历史也表明,在走向法治和参与式民主的过程中,有失败的余地。一些愤世嫉俗者已经提出,阿拉伯之春之后可能会出现阿拉伯之秋,甚至是阿拉伯之冬。即使人们把这些愿景视为不恰当的自我实现预言,也不应该忘记欧洲的某些经历:13世纪80年代,德国经历了自己的多元化和民主之春,被称为“Vormarz”。德国的春季运动(Sturm and Drang)本质上是一场文化起义,没有后续的转型政治变革。1848年,在整个欧洲,革命的动荡促进了整个大陆早期议会宪政的希望。在大多数地方,这种希望很快就被古代政权的各种限制性巩固所取代。1989年,罗马尼亚的经历与欧洲大多数和平革命的经历大相径庭。驱逐甚至杀害这位前独裁者是旧政权在接下来的十年里占据统治地位的伪装。当中欧和东南欧其他国家为政权更迭和更新而挣扎时,罗马尼亚却延长了政权萎缩和对更新的抵制。就目前而言,阿拉伯之春已经演变成一场革命转型的前奏,这场变革将持续下去,很可能还会持续许多年。我想起了1968年发生在前捷克斯洛伐克的“布拉格之春”(Prague Spring):它在西方受到热烈欢迎,在共产主义统治下的东欧,许多公民私下里对此表示欢迎。然而,事实证明,这只是共产主义世界变革时期的开始。又过了20年,大多数共产主义国家的政治秩序才发生了实质性的变化。布拉格之春是一代人的春天,而不是一年的春天。无论“阿拉伯之春”在未来几年走向何方,有两个趋势令人吃惊:首先,“阿拉伯之春”在阿拉伯世界引发了广泛的不同反应和趋势。单一的阿拉伯世界是一个神话。同样,认为阿拉伯社会永远停滞不前、动弹不得的观点也是无稽之谈。在法治下寻求尊严、发言权和包容,以及真正的社会多元化结构,一直是整个阿拉伯世界和平抗议的标志。现任政权的反应显示了各种各样的策略,但也显示了不同程度的力量、合法性和犯罪能量。其次,也是更令人惊讶的是,阿拉伯君主国对“阿拉伯之春”的相对韧性:摩洛哥和约旦、沙特阿拉伯和阿曼、科威特和阿拉伯联合酋长国、卡塔尔和巴林基本上没有受到影响,并保持了稳定(尽管巴林发生了暂时的冲突,并在沙特军队的帮助下对它们进行了镇压)。...