The review of international organizations最新文献_第7页

Governments as borrowers and regulators 政府既是借款人又是监管者

The review of international organizations Pub Date : 2023-11-28 DOI: 10.1007/s11558-023-09516-1

Timm Betz, Amy Pond

引用次数: 1

Building bridges or digging the trench? International organizations, social media, and polarized fragmentation 建桥还是挖沟?国际组织、社交媒体和两极分化

The review of international organizations Pub Date : 2023-11-27 DOI: 10.1007/s11558-023-09517-0

Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt

{"title":"Building bridges or digging the trench? International organizations, social media, and polarized fragmentation","authors":"Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt","doi":"10.1007/s11558-023-09517-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-023-09517-0","url":null,"abstract":"Communication departments of international organizations (IOs) are important intermediaries of global governance who increasingly use social media to reach out to citizens directly. Social media pose new challenges for IO communication such as a highly competitive economy of attention and the fragmentation of the audiences driven by networked curation of content and selective exposure. In this context, communication departments have to make tough choices about what to communicate and how, aggravating inherent tensions between IO communication as comprehensive public information (aimed at institutional transparency)—and partisan political advocacy (aimed at normative change). If IO communication focuses on advocacy it might garner substantial resonance on social media. Such advocacy nevertheless fails to the extent that it fosters the polarized fragmentation of networked communication and undermines the credibility of IO communication as a source of trustworthy information across polarized “echo chambers.” The paper illustrates this argument through a content and social network analysis of Twitter communication on the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM). Remarkably, instead of facilitating cross-cluster communication (“building bridges”) Twitter handles run by the United Nations Department of Global Communications (UNDGC) seem to have substantially fostered ideological fragmentation (“digging the trench”) by their way of partisan retweeting, mentioning, and (hash)tagging.","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"87 9","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138442791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

How backsliding governments keep the European Union hospitable for autocracy: Evidence from intergovernmental negotiations 倒退的政府如何让欧盟对独裁保持友好:来自政府间谈判的证据

The review of international organizations Pub Date : 2023-11-13 DOI: 10.1007/s11558-023-09518-z

Thomas Winzen

{"title":"How backsliding governments keep the European Union hospitable for autocracy: Evidence from intergovernmental negotiations","authors":"Thomas Winzen","doi":"10.1007/s11558-023-09518-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-023-09518-z","url":null,"abstract":"The European Union (EU) is a democratic organization but faces severe cases of democratic backsliding. The literature deems the EU a hospitable environment for and reluctant to reign in backsliding. This study focuses on the tactics that backsliding governments employ to preserve this hospitable environment and the conditions under which they succeed. I argue that backsliding governments seek to repurpose the practice of accommodation that permeates EU decision-making for the protection of their backsliding projects. Doing so promises backsliders an escape from their precarious bargaining position in a democratic organization but comes with constraints. Backsliders must limit opposition carefully to a subset of EU competences, backsliding-inhibiting competences, that threaten their backsliding projects the most. Moreover, they can only rely on accommodation in the Council if the democratic member states perceive opposition as justified and remain insulated from political accountability by Europe’s parliaments. I present evidence based on quantitative and qualitative analyses of bargaining positions, processes, and outcomes in EU decision-making. The results have implications for understanding the EU’s autocratic predicament, the opportunities of backsliding governments, and the role of autocracies in regional and international organizations.","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"30 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91398696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Ronny Patz and Klaus H. Goetz. 2019. Managing Money and Discord in the UN: Budgeting and Bureaucracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 罗尼·帕兹和克劳斯·h·格茨，2019。《联合国的资金管理与纷争:预算与官僚主义》(牛津:牛津大学出版社)

The review of international organizations Pub Date : 2023-11-09 DOI: 10.1007/s11558-023-09514-3

Sebastian Haug

引用次数: 0

Christina L. Davis. 2023. Discriminatory Clubs: The Geopolitics of International Organizations. (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 克里斯蒂娜·l·戴维斯，2023。歧视性俱乐部:国际组织的地缘政治。(普林斯顿:普林斯顿大学出版社)

The review of international organizations Pub Date : 2023-11-08 DOI: 10.1007/s11558-023-09515-2

Randall W. Stone

引用次数: 0

Trojan horses in liberal international organizations? How democratic backsliders undermine the UNHRC 自由派国际组织中的特洛伊木马？民主倒退者如何破坏联合国人权委员会

The review of international organizations Pub Date : 2023-11-07 DOI: 10.1007/s11558-023-09511-6

Anna M. Meyerrose, Irfan Nooruddin

{"title":"Trojan horses in liberal international organizations? How democratic backsliders undermine the UNHRC","authors":"Anna M. Meyerrose, Irfan Nooruddin","doi":"10.1007/s11558-023-09511-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-023-09511-6","url":null,"abstract":"Liberal democracy is facing renewed challenges from a growing group of states undergoing democratic backsliding. While entrenched autocrats have long resented and contested the established liberal order, we know far less about how newer backsliding states behave on the international stage. We argue these states, who joined prominent western liberal institutions prior to their backsliding, will use their established membership in these organizations both to protect themselves from future scrutiny regarding adherence to liberal democratic values and to oppose the prevailing western liberal norms that increasingly conflict with their evolving interests. Using voting data from the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) from 2006-2021, we show that backsliding states are more likely to vote against targeted resolutions that name and shame specific countries. We supplement this analysis with detailed data from the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) and combine regression analysis and a structural topic model (STM) to show that backsliding states are more critical in their UPR reports when evaluating advanced western democracies, and more likely to emphasize issues that align with their own interests while de-emphasizing ones that might threaten government power and control over citizens.","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"53 13","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71516926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Empowering your victims: Why repressive regimes allow individual petitions in international organizations 赋予受害者权力：为什么专制政权允许国际组织中的个人请愿

The review of international organizations Pub Date : 2023-11-06 DOI: 10.1007/s11558-023-09512-5

Rachel J. Schoner

{"title":"Empowering your victims: Why repressive regimes allow individual petitions in international organizations","authors":"Rachel J. Schoner","doi":"10.1007/s11558-023-09512-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-023-09512-5","url":null,"abstract":"The growing literature explaining why repressive regimes ratify human rights treaties fails to explain why some regimes take the additional step to delegate authority to their people to file international legal complaints while others do not. I examine individual petition mechanisms in the United Nations which allow individuals to file complaints to an overseeing treaty body. I argue that repressive regimes face international incentives to signal their commitment to the European Union, a global power with a strong and continued interest in the global human rights regime. Repressive regimes, however, only ratify agreements when they perceive low domestic costs with little institutional constraints on the executive. In support of my theory, I find that repressive regimes are more likely to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ Optional Protocol allowing individual petitions when they are trade dependent on the EU while facing lesser institutional constraints, both legislative and judicial. The results are similar to explaining treaty ratification, but the interaction is substantively larger for OP ratification among repressive countries, highlighting the increased costs repressive leaders face to allowing individual petitions. Individual standing in the overseeing body of the ICCPR is one example of non-state actor access in international institutions, which is an important component of understanding institutional design and compliance.","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"58 52","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71474977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Sharing rivals, sending weapons: Rivalry and cooperation in the international arms trade, 1920–1939 分享对手，发送武器:国际武器贸易中的竞争与合作，1920-1939

The review of international organizations Pub Date : 2023-10-17 DOI: 10.1007/s11558-023-09501-8

Marius Mehrl, Daniel Seussler, Paul W. Thurner

{"title":"Sharing rivals, sending weapons: Rivalry and cooperation in the international arms trade, 1920–1939","authors":"Marius Mehrl, Daniel Seussler, Paul W. Thurner","doi":"10.1007/s11558-023-09501-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-023-09501-8","url":null,"abstract":"States must navigate the structure of the international system in their relations with other states. One crucial component of this structure are rivalries as they indicate latent threat to states. Rivalries should thus influence how states behave within the given system, but also how they seek to shape and restructure it. Focusing on arms transfers, we clarify how the systemic structure implied by rivalries drives states’ efforts to engage in security cooperation with other states. Intuitively, a rivalry with another country should diminish an exporter’s propensity to transfer weapons there. But what is more, we argue that rivalries outside of this focal dyad matter as a potential importer’s enmity towards other countries will reveal information about its security interests to the exporter. Specifically, sharing rivalries with the same set of countries will signal to the exporter that there is a congruence in security interests and thus facilitate security cooperation. This security cooperation should take the form of arms transfers, at least if exporters value buck-passing and fear entrapment. We test our expectations using original data on Major Conventional Weapons transfers in the Interwar years, a period where this condition likely holds, and inferential network analysis models. Sharing rivals increases two countries’ probability to trade arms whereas a rivalry between countries exhibits no effect. This research contributes to our understanding of security cooperation, the arms trade, and networked international relations.","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"28 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50164754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

A paradox of openness: Democracies, financial integration & crisis 开放的悖论:民主、金融一体化与危机

The review of international organizations Pub Date : 2023-10-17 DOI: 10.1007/s11558-023-09502-7

Devin Case-Ruchala

引用次数: 0

Why hide? Africa’s unreported debt to China 为什么隐藏?非洲欠中国的未报告债务

The review of international organizations Pub Date : 2023-10-16 DOI: 10.1007/s11558-023-09513-4

Kathleen J. Brown

{"title":"Why hide? Africa’s unreported debt to China","authors":"Kathleen J. Brown","doi":"10.1007/s11558-023-09513-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-023-09513-4","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Hidden debt is endemic throughout the sovereign credit market and poses a serious threat to global financial stability. Yet, little is known about why governments conceal their liabilities from creditors. I argue that governments intentionally hide debts from international financial institutions (IFIs) to maximize their ability to borrow while avoiding punishment for rising debt burdens. IFIs frequently penalize governments in low-income countries for borrowing beyond their means. By hiding some debt, governments are able to continue borrowing without being disciplined. I test this using recently released data that reveals half of the Chinese loans in Sub-Saharan Africa are missing from sovereign debt records. I find that borrower governments hide loans to avoid violating World Bank debt sustainability thresholds. However, governments hide less debt while under IMF scrutiny so as to reduce the risk that they will be discovered and punished. These findings offer evidence that borrower governments use hidden debt as a strategic tool to pursue fiscal goals. Further, this work reveals the unintended consequences of IFI intervention in less-developed countries, as efforts to ensure fiscal stability increase governments’ incentives to hide debt.","PeriodicalId":75182,"journal":{"name":"The review of international organizations","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136078027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1