AI and ethicsPub Date : 2026-09-14DOI: 10.1007/s43681-026-01378-8
Oğuz Onat
{"title":"Whose future is coded? A decolonial-feminist interrogation of the right to collective dreaming in AI governance","authors":"Oğuz Onat","doi":"10.1007/s43681-026-01378-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s43681-026-01378-8","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Contemporary AI governance frames gender justice as a technical problem of bias, measured, audited, and mitigated at the level of the model. This paper argues that the framing misses a deeper harm: the algorithmic foreclosure of the futures communities can imagine for themselves. I pose a single diagnostic question: <i>Whose future does this system make unimaginable?</i> To answer it, the paper develops Dreaming Otherwise, a dialectical framework moving through epistemic disobedience (refusal of imposed legibility), the epistemic commons (collective knowing-together), and collective dreaming (authoring the future rather than receiving it). The foreclosure is not only metaphor: the paper identifies six mechanisms of machine learning through which learned systems close futures differently from written bureaucracies, from distributional support closure and embedding geometry to model collapse. The framework is translated into a three-layered rights architecture: epistemic vulnerability as its ground, Hohfeldian jural relations as its structure, and relational autonomy as its mode of exercise. The architecture is then operationalized inside Article 27(1)(c)-(d) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, the fundamental rights impact assessment whose application to stand-alone high-risk systems the Digital Omnibus has deferred to 2 December 2027, where affected groups are already named and group-level risks already required to be identified. I argue that imaginative foreclosure can be read into this existing mechanism as a specific risk of harm, without any new regulatory provision. The paper contributes a decolonial-feminist diagnosis, a dialectical praxis of refusal, commons, and dream, and a rights architecture claimable within existing law and, in principle, beyond it.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":72137,"journal":{"name":"AI and ethics","volume":"6 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148986352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
AI and ethicsPub Date : 2026-09-14DOI: 10.1007/s43681-026-01379-7
Connor Nitchals
{"title":"Designing for disagreement: epistemic friction, sycophancy, and the ethics of human–AI advice—a critical integrative review","authors":"Connor Nitchals","doi":"10.1007/s43681-026-01379-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s43681-026-01379-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Conversational artificial intelligence is increasingly used not only to retrieve information but to advise, interpret, persuade, and participate in decisions. This shift creates an ethical problem that is not captured by accuracy, bias, or generic trustworthiness alone: a system can be helpful and factually competent while still undermining a user’s capacity to evaluate reasons independently. This critical integrative review synthesizes research on automation bias, algorithm appreciation and aversion, large-language-model sycophancy, persuasive dialogue, anthropomorphic interaction, explainable AI, and human autonomy. The central contribution is the concept of calibrated epistemic friction: deliberate interactional features that preserve opportunities for doubt, verification, counterargument, and reflective endorsement without making assistance unusably burdensome. The review distinguishes supportive agreement from sycophancy, persuasion from manipulation, and appropriate reliance from epistemic delegation. It then develops a multilevel risk model linking system incentives, interaction mechanisms, user conditions, epistemic effects, and downstream ethical harms. Evidence from medicine, moral decision-making, political persuasion, and chatbot relationships shows that the key ethical variable is not whether people trust AI, but whether reliance remains sensitive to evidence, stakes, uncertainty, and reversibility. The review concludes with design and governance principles for disagreement-capable AI, including calibrated challenge, uncertainty signaling, counter-position generation, provenance support, friction proportional to stakes, and auditable influence pathways. These proposals reposition productive disagreement as a positive safety and autonomy property of human–AI systems.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":72137,"journal":{"name":"AI and ethics","volume":"6 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148986354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
AI and ethicsPub Date : 2026-09-11DOI: 10.1007/s43681-026-01358-y
Fabian Teichmann
{"title":"Who watches the machines? Institutional design and the ethics of national AI enforcement: lessons from Germany’s KI-MIG","authors":"Fabian Teichmann","doi":"10.1007/s43681-026-01358-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s43681-026-01358-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The effectiveness and the moral credibility of the European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act will be decided less by its substantive provisions than by the national institutions charged with enforcing them. This article examines Germany’s KI-Marktüberwachungs- und Innovationsförderungsgesetz (KI-MIG), adopted by the Bundestag on 11 June 2026 and in force since 29 July 2026, as one of the first comprehensive national enforcement frameworks for the AI Act and as a test case for the claim that institutional design is itself an ethical variable. The article reconstructs the KI-MIG’s architecture—the centralisation of market surveillance at the Federal Network Agency, a coordination and competence centre (KoKIVO), an independent market surveillance chamber for fundamental-rights-sensitive systems, a central complaints body, and a hybrid model that preserves sectoral competences—and evaluates it against five criteria of legitimate enforcement derived from regulatory theory: independence and mandate fidelity, competence and capacity, accessibility and voice, coherence, and regulatory candour. The assessment yields verdicts rather than a mere inventory. The design earns genuine credit on coherence and on accessibility, but the article concludes that the independence construction for fundamental-rights-sensitive supervision—a chamber staffed, in personal union, by the leadership of a hierarchically embedded economic regulator—falls short of the AI Act’s heightened requirements. Further concerns—dispersed notification responsibilities, undersecured Länder capacity, and an official rhetoric of ‘lean oversight’ that risks normalising under-enforcement—are sharpened by the Digital Omnibus’s deferral of high-risk obligations to December 2027. The article concludes with transferable design principles for jurisdictions that are now building AI enforcement institutions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":72137,"journal":{"name":"AI and ethics","volume":"6 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s43681-026-01358-y.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148927633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
AI and ethicsPub Date : 2026-09-11DOI: 10.1007/s43681-026-01373-z
Helen Choi
{"title":"Towards a practice of knowledge commoning: academics’ ethical duties to defend Wikipedia in the age of generative AI","authors":"Helen Choi","doi":"10.1007/s43681-026-01373-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s43681-026-01373-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Wikipedia is the most widely used reference work in history and one of the most valuable training resources available to the generative AI (genAI) industry; and yet that same industry is systematically undermining the conditions that make Wikipedia possible. GenAI companies extract Wikipedia’s corpus to train their products while redirecting users away from the encyclopedia. The result is declining readership, a shrinking volunteer base, and a growing threat to the encyclopedia’s long-term sustainability as a knowledge commons. This article examines that threat through the lens of commons theory, arguing that Wikipedia functions as a knowledge commons that is collaboratively constructed, transparently produced, and freely accessible, and that genAI-based tools operate as a force against it. Against this backdrop, the article makes the case that academics have a responsibility to defend Wikipedia and address the epistemic injustice caused by the genAI industry’s attempts to consolidate control over knowledge production. </p></div>","PeriodicalId":72137,"journal":{"name":"AI and ethics","volume":"6 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s43681-026-01373-z.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148927493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
AI and ethicsPub Date : 2026-09-11DOI: 10.1007/s43681-026-01355-1
Venkatesh H. Chembrolu, Vasudeva Prabhath Lolugu, Jyotiranjan Beuria
{"title":"Beyond alignment: representational ethics and the governance of constructed worlds","authors":"Venkatesh H. Chembrolu, Vasudeva Prabhath Lolugu, Jyotiranjan Beuria","doi":"10.1007/s43681-026-01355-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s43681-026-01355-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Much of the ethical debate about artificial intelligence turns on a single question: do AI systems behave in line with human preferences, norms, or regulation? This question has primarily been the focus in AI ethics. This paper offers a conceptual and philosophical contribution. Here we give an alternative basis for AI ethics by evaluating the role technology plays in building and stabilising worlds of meaning. Experience is modelled as passing through nested representational layers: the world <span>(mathcal {W})</span>, the screen of perceived reality <span>(mathcal {W}')</span> on which agents encounter and interpret the world, and the artificial screens <span>(mathcal {W}'')</span> built by digital platforms, recommender systems, and immersive environments. Meaning is formed, held, and acted on within a minimal cycle of perception, integration, and action. On that basis, many familiar ethical problems around AI show up less as simple failures of behaviour or compliance and more as breakdowns in <i>semantic coherence, that is,</i> in the preservation of meaning along the chain <span>(mathcal {W}rightarrow mathcal {W}'rightarrow mathcal {W}'')</span>. <i>Perceptual sovereignty</i> complements semantic coherence by naming agents’ capacity to understand, contest, redirect, or exit such mediation. Fairness, transparency, accountability, privacy, and safety are recast as aspects of these deeper conditions of coherence and agency, not as free-standing technical or policy goals. We derive a four-level hierarchy of ethical depth (L<span>(_0)</span>–L<span>(_3)</span>) and sketch governance aimed at the integrity of constructed worlds, with consequences for how risk, responsibility, and regulation are conceived when technological mediation is everywhere.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":72137,"journal":{"name":"AI and ethics","volume":"6 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148927390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
AI and ethicsPub Date : 2026-09-11DOI: 10.1007/s43681-026-01371-1
Nadia Akter, Md. Atikuzzaman
{"title":"AI and academic integrity in higher education: measuring university students’ knowledge, attitude and practice regarding AI-giarism","authors":"Nadia Akter, Md. Atikuzzaman","doi":"10.1007/s43681-026-01371-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s43681-026-01371-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The increasing use of generative AI in academic writing has created new challenges for academic integrity, including AI-based plagiarism (AI-giarism). This study assessed university students’ knowledge, attitudes, and practices (KAP) regarding AI-giarism in Bangladesh. A cross-sectional quantitative survey was conducted among 386 students from public and private universities in Bangladesh using a structured questionnaire. Data were analyzed using descriptive statistics, independent-samples t-tests, one-way ANOVA, and multiple linear regression. Students demonstrated moderate knowledge and mixed practices regarding AI-giarism, while their attitudes were generally favorable toward academic integrity. No significant differences in KAP were observed by gender, age, education level, or research experience. However, attitudes differed significantly by university type, residential status, publication experience, and academic discipline, whereas academic writing training was associated with better-reported practices. Students with greater familiarity with AI demonstrated higher knowledge. In the regression analyses, AI familiarity, attitude, and practice were significantly associated with knowledge, whereas residential status and publication experience were associated with attitude. Knowledge was the only significant variable associated with practice. The findings indicate gaps between students’ understanding and responsible AI-related academic practices. The results highlight the need for clear institutional guidance, academic integrity and AI literacy training, and assessment practices that promote transparent and responsible use of generative AI.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":72137,"journal":{"name":"AI and ethics","volume":"6 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148927494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
AI and ethicsPub Date : 2026-09-10DOI: 10.1007/s43681-026-01360-4
Tak Ming Yu, Xia Zheng, Hoi-kuen Ng
{"title":"From responsibility gaps to meaningful human control: an ethical and regulatory governance framework for intelligent AI systems","authors":"Tak Ming Yu, Xia Zheng, Hoi-kuen Ng","doi":"10.1007/s43681-026-01360-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s43681-026-01360-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly capable of influencing consequential decisions, creating concerns about how human responsibility can be preserved when system behaviour becomes more autonomous and difficult to understand. Although responsibility does not disappear, it may become distributed and obscured across designers, developers, deploying organisations, operators, supervisors and public authorities. This creates a governance challenge: ensuring that responsibility remains identifiable, practically exercisable and institutionally enforceable. This study examines how Meaningful Human Control (MHC) can address this challenge through a system-sensitive governance approach. It introduces two complementary analytical frameworks. The Four AI System Model classifies AI systems according to autonomy and intervention, identifying different governance configurations and the forms and intensities of control they require. The Four-Layer Governance Model provides a common governance architecture across conceptual, operational, legal and institutional arrangements, while recognising that the priorities and mechanisms of control within each layer vary according to autonomy, intervention and associated risks. Using police internal monitoring and facial recognition as contrasting examples, the study demonstrates how MHC can be translated from an ethical principle into governance practice. The analysis shows that meaningful control depends not only on human involvement in decisions, but also on defined purposes and boundaries, operational procedures for review and correction, legal safeguards, and institutional capacity for oversight and intervention. The study argues that responsible AI governance requires more than technical explainability or formal human oversight. Governable AI requires bounded authority, traceable responsibility, meaningful human control, and the capacity to challenge, correct or suspend AI-enabled decisions when necessary.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":72137,"journal":{"name":"AI and ethics","volume":"6 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148927071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
AI and ethicsPub Date : 2026-09-10DOI: 10.1007/s43681-026-01354-2
Miranda Boldrini, Damien Lacroux, Marie-Sophie von Braun, Vera Pancaldi, Paola Ulivi, Vanessa Nurock
{"title":"Trust and the reliability of AI algorithms for clinical decision-making support in medicine: the MIRACLE case study","authors":"Miranda Boldrini, Damien Lacroux, Marie-Sophie von Braun, Vera Pancaldi, Paola Ulivi, Vanessa Nurock","doi":"10.1007/s43681-026-01354-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s43681-026-01354-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In debates on artificial intelligence in healthcare, trust is frequently invoked as an ethical requirement and equated with technical properties such as transparency, explainability, and performance. This paper distinguishes technical reliability from trust in AI-supported clinical decision-making, arguing that the two belong to distinct registers that current debates tend to elide. The argument is conceptual and case-based, drawing on the European MIRACLE project, which develops a machine learning algorithm to support adjuvant therapy decisions in resected early-stage non-small-cell lung cancer. The paper first examines how technical reliability is conceptualized during algorithm development, then argues that reliability, though necessary, cannot by itself generate trust. Drawing on the bioethical literature on trust in the therapeutic relationship, it holds that trust is relational, involves vulnerability and responsibility, and cannot be attributed to artificial intelligence systems as such: its conditions lie in the relational and organizational arrangements within which algorithms are deployed. On this basis, the paper proposes replacing the expression \"trustworthy AI\" with \"technically reliable AI,\" a distinction that relocates the conditions of trust from the design of the system to the clinical settings in which it is used.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":72137,"journal":{"name":"AI and ethics","volume":"6 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148927359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
AI and ethicsPub Date : 2026-09-09DOI: 10.1007/s43681-026-01346-2
Simona Chiodo
{"title":"What does the correlation between the anthropomorphisation of technologies and the automation of humans mean?","authors":"Simona Chiodo","doi":"10.1007/s43681-026-01346-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s43681-026-01346-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In recent years, the phenomenon of anthropomorphisation of technologies, especially artificial intelligence, has been extensively studied. The reciprocal phenomenon, which may be defined as the automation of humans, has been studied less extensively. And the correlation between the two phenomena has been studied even less. The objective of the article is to contribute to filling the gap by addressing the following question: if we realise that there is a direct proportionality between the anthropomorphisation of technologies and the automation of humans, what may their direct proportionality mean from a philosophical perspective? More precisely, what may their direct proportionality mean for both the way we think of technologies and the way we think of humans, i.e. ourselves? The argument I will propose is that, even though, more superficially, the coexistence of the two phenomena seems to be symptomatic of the radicalisation of typically neoliberal values, starting with humans thought of as optimised and productive as technologies, less superficially, it may be symptomatic of their crisis, because, as paradoxical as it may seem, radicalising the automation of humans means sabotaging their optimisation and productivity and, thus, escaping typically neoliberal values.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":72137,"journal":{"name":"AI and ethics","volume":"6 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s43681-026-01346-2.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148926999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
AI and ethicsPub Date : 2026-09-09DOI: 10.1007/s43681-026-01364-0
Marcus Bruzzo
{"title":"AI-augmented consequentialist ethics (AI-ACE): a new frontier for the concept of responsibility","authors":"Marcus Bruzzo","doi":"10.1007/s43681-026-01364-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s43681-026-01364-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper explores the transformation of consequentialist normative ethics, which bases the ‘morality’ of an action on the predictability of its results, is being redefined by Artificial Intelligence. Traditionally, human responsibility is limited by the cognitive capacity to foresee consequences (non-culpable ignorance). The central thesis is that AI, by processing vast “Data Lakes,” generates a “hyper-vision” that makes previously unattainable patterns visible, dramatically expanding the domain of what is “reasonably predictable.” This creates AI-Augmented Consequentialism, where the agent’s moral duty comes to include consideration of the predictive potential of available technology. Consequently, ethical responsibility expands, eroding the claim of ignorance as a moral excuse (erosion of culpable ignorance), and the failure to use this capacity can be seen as negligence. However, the supposed hyper-vision faces issues of system opacity (black box) and ‘moral deskilling’, where human autonomy can be sacrificed in favor of algorithmic optimization. Although AI should enhance human ethical maturity, not replace it, human dependence on AI for prediction becomes inescapable.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":72137,"journal":{"name":"AI and ethics","volume":"6 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148927000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}