2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)最新文献

sElect: A Lightweight Verifiable Remote Voting System 选择:一个轻量级的可验证远程投票系统

2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2016-08-11 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2016.31

Ralf Küsters, Johannes Müller, Enrico Scapin, Tomasz Truderung

引用次数: 37

Multi-run Side-Channel Analysis Using Symbolic Execution and Max-SMT 使用符号执行和Max-SMT的多运行侧信道分析

2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2016-08-11 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2016.34

C. Pasareanu, Quoc-Sang Phan, P. Malacaria

引用次数: 95

Axioms for Information Leakage 信息泄漏公理

2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2016-08-11 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2016.13

M. Alvim, K. Chatzikokolakis, Annabelle McIver, Carroll Morgan, C. Palamidessi, Geoffrey Smith

引用次数: 43

Quantitative Verification and Synthesis of Attack-Defence Scenarios 攻防场景的定量验证与综合

2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2016-06-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2016.15

Zaruhi Aslanyan, F. Nielson, D. Parker

{"title":"Quantitative Verification and Synthesis of Attack-Defence Scenarios","authors":"Zaruhi Aslanyan, F. Nielson, D. Parker","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2016.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2016.15","url":null,"abstract":"Attack-defence trees are a powerful technique for formally evaluating attack-defence scenarios. They represent in an intuitive, graphical way the interaction between an attacker and a defender who compete in order to achieve conflicting objectives. We propose a novel framework for the formal analysis of quantitative properties of complex attack-defence scenarios, using an extension of attack-defence trees which models temporal ordering of actions and allows explicit dependencies in the strategies adopted by attackers and defenders. We adopt a game-theoretic approach, translating attack-defence trees to two-player stochastic games, and then employ probabilistic model checking techniques to formally analyse these models. This provides a means to both verify formally specified security properties of the attack-defence scenarios and, dually, to synthesise strategies for attackers or defenders which guarantee or optimise some quantitative property, such as the probability of a successful attack, the expected cost incurred, or some multi-objective trade-off between the two. We implement our approach, building upon the PRISM-games model checker, and apply it to a case study of an RFID goods management system.","PeriodicalId":6500,"journal":{"name":"2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":"8 1","pages":"105-119"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74957572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 66

Modular Verification for Computer Security 计算机安全的模块化验证

2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2016-06-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2016.8

A. Appel

引用次数: 11

Fault-Resilient Non-interference Fault-Resilient不干涉

2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2016-06-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2016.35

F. Tedesco, David Sands, Alejandro Russo

{"title":"Fault-Resilient Non-interference","authors":"F. Tedesco, David Sands, Alejandro Russo","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2016.35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2016.35","url":null,"abstract":"Environmental noise (e.g. heat, ionized particles, etc.) causes transient faults in hardware, which lead to corruption of stored values. Mission-critical devices require such faults to be mitigated by fault-tolerance - a combination of techniques that aim at preserving the functional behaviour of a system despite the disruptive effects of transient faults. Fault-tolerance typically has a high deployment cost - special hardware might be required to implement it - and provides weak statistical guarantees. It is also based on the assumption that faults are rare. In this paper, we consider scenarios where security, rather than functional correctness, is the main asset to be protected. Our main contribution is a theory for expressing confidentiality of data in the presence of transient faults. We show that the natural probabilistic definition of security in the presence of faults can be captured by a possibilistic definition. Furthermore, the possibilistic definition is implied by a known bisimulation-based property, called Strong Security. We illustrate the utility of these results for a simple RISC architecture for which only the code memory and program counter are assumed fault-tolerant. We present a type-directed compilation scheme that produces RISC code from a higher-level language for which Strong Security holds - i.e. well-typed programs compile to RISC code which is secure despite transient faults. In contrast with fault-tolerance solutions, our technique assumes relatively little special hardware, gives formal guarantees, and works in the presence of an active attacker who aggressively targets parts of a system and induces faults precisely.","PeriodicalId":6500,"journal":{"name":"2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":"88 1","pages":"401-416"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79653587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 6

Modeling Human Errors in Security Protocols 安全协议中的人为错误建模

2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2016-06-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2016.30

D. Basin, S. Radomirovic, Lara Schmid

引用次数: 38

On Modular and Fully-Abstract Compilation 论模块化和全抽象编译

2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2016-06-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2016.9

Marco Patrignani, Dominique Devriese, F. Piessens

{"title":"On Modular and Fully-Abstract Compilation","authors":"Marco Patrignani, Dominique Devriese, F. Piessens","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2016.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2016.9","url":null,"abstract":"Secure compilation studies compilers that generate target-level components that are as secure as their source-level counterparts. Full abstraction is the most widely-proven property when defining a secure compiler. A compiler is modular if it allows different components to be compiled independently and then to be linked together to form a whole program. Unfortunately, many existing fully-abstract compilers to untyped machine code are not modular. So, while fully-abstractly compiled components are secure from malicious attackers, if they are linked against each other the resulting component may become vulnerable to attacks. This paper studies how to devise modular, fully-abstract compilers. It first analyses the attacks arising when compiled programs are linked together, identifying security threats that are due to linking. Then, it defines a compiler from an object-based language with method calls and dynamic memory allocation to untyped assembly language extended with a memory isolation mechanism. The paper provides a proof sketch that the defined compiler is fully-abstract and modular, so its output can be linked together without introducing security violations.","PeriodicalId":6500,"journal":{"name":"2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":"47 1","pages":"17-30"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73524545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 32

Are the Real Limits to Scale a Matter of Science, or Engineering, or of Something Else? (Abstract only) 尺度的真正极限是科学问题、工程问题还是其他问题?(抽象)

2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2016-06-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2016.41

Ross J. Anderson

{"title":"Are the Real Limits to Scale a Matter of Science, or Engineering, or of Something Else? (Abstract only)","authors":"Ross J. Anderson","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2016.41","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2016.41","url":null,"abstract":"Summary form only given. As people get excited about the latest idea for \"Big Data\" and the \"Internet of Things\", computer people often shake our heads and say \"It won't scale.\" Pessimism isn't always justified: we have been able to scale up quite a number of tasks, from connectivity through search to social media. But other applications are recalcitrant, from energy management to medical records. The conventional computer-science view is that scaling systems is about computational complexity; about whether the storage or communications required for a task grows more than linearly in the number of users. Over the past thirty years we've developed a pretty good theory of that, but we're learning that it's nowhere near enough. In this talk I present a complementary view, based on over thirty years' experience of security engineering, that the real limits to scale are usually elsewhere. Even where the data are manageable and the algorithms straightforward, things can fail because of the scaling properties of the social context, the economic model or the regulatory environment. This makes some automation projects much harder than they seem. When it comes to safety and privacy many of the attacks that are easy to do in the lab are rare in the wild, as they don't scale either. But others surprise us; no-one in the intelligence community anticipated a leak on the Snowden scale. In short, scaling is now a problem not of computer science but of systems engineering, economics, governance and much else. Conceiving problems too narrowly makes failure likely, while good engineering will require ever more awareness of context. The implications for research, education and policy bear some thought.","PeriodicalId":6500,"journal":{"name":"2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":"144 1","pages":"16-16"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77941491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Non-interference with What-Declassification in Component-Based Systems 不干扰基于组件的系统中what -解密

2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2016-06-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2016.25

Simon Greiner, Daniel Grahl

引用次数: 13