{"title":"Non-interference with What-Declassification in Component-Based Systems","authors":"Simon Greiner, Daniel Grahl","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2016.25","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we present a novel notion of compositional non-interference for component-based systems. Our specification mechanism for non-interference properties is based on equivalence relations, catering for a precise formalization of declassified information. It takes assumptions on the environment into consideration. We also present a new notion of non-interference for services provided by a component and prove that a component only providing non-interferent services is itself non-interferent. Using these properties, secure information flow in a component-based system can be proved by separately analyzing each of the services that are provided by the components. As a result, we gain modular, precise, and reusable information-flow specifications for component-based systems.","PeriodicalId":6500,"journal":{"name":"2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":"30 1","pages":"253-267"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"13","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2016.25","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 13
Abstract
In this paper, we present a novel notion of compositional non-interference for component-based systems. Our specification mechanism for non-interference properties is based on equivalence relations, catering for a precise formalization of declassified information. It takes assumptions on the environment into consideration. We also present a new notion of non-interference for services provided by a component and prove that a component only providing non-interferent services is itself non-interferent. Using these properties, secure information flow in a component-based system can be proved by separately analyzing each of the services that are provided by the components. As a result, we gain modular, precise, and reusable information-flow specifications for component-based systems.