2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)最新文献_第2页

A Verified Extensible Library of Elliptic Curves 一个验证的椭圆曲线可扩展库

2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2016-06-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2016.28

J. Zinzindohoué, Evmorfia-Iro Bartzia, K. Bhargavan

{"title":"A Verified Extensible Library of Elliptic Curves","authors":"J. Zinzindohoué, Evmorfia-Iro Bartzia, K. Bhargavan","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2016.28","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2016.28","url":null,"abstract":"In response to increasing demand for elliptic curve cryptography, and specifically for curves that are free from the suspicion of influence by the NSA, new elliptic curves such as Curve25519 and Curve448 are currently being standardized, implemented, and deployed in major protocols such as Transport Layer Security. As with all new cryptographic code, the correctness of these curve implementations is of concern, because any bug or backdoor in this code can potentially compromise the security of important Internet protocols. We present a principled approach towards the verification of elliptic curve implementations by writing them in the dependently-typed programming language F* and proving them functionally correct against a readable mathematical specification derived from a previous Coq development. A key technical innovation in our work is the use of templates to write and verify arbitrary precision arithmetic once and for all for a variety of Bignum representations used in different curves. We also show how to use abstract types to enforce a coding discipline that mitigates side-channels at the source level. We present a verified F* library that implements the popular curves Curve25519, Curve448, and NIST-P256, and we show how developers can add new curves to this library with minimal programming and verification effort.","PeriodicalId":6500,"journal":{"name":"2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":"6 1","pages":"296-309"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90819894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 27

A Certified Compiler for Verifiable Computing 可验证计算的认证编译器

2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2016-06-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2016.26

C. Fournet, C. Keller, Vincent Laporte

引用次数: 16

Runtime Verification of k-Safety Hyperproperties in HyperLTL HyperLTL中k-Safety超属性的运行时验证

2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2016-06-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2016.24

Shreya Agrawal, Borzoo Bonakdarpour

引用次数: 65

Resilient Delegation Revocation with Precedence for Predecessors Is NP-Complete 具有前任优先权的弹性委托撤销是np完全的

2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2016-06-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2016.37

M. Cramer, Pieter Van Hertum, Ruben Lapauw, Ingmar Dasseville, M. Denecker

{"title":"Resilient Delegation Revocation with Precedence for Predecessors Is NP-Complete","authors":"M. Cramer, Pieter Van Hertum, Ruben Lapauw, Ingmar Dasseville, M. Denecker","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2016.37","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2016.37","url":null,"abstract":"In ownership-based access control frameworks with the possibility of delegating permissions and administrative rights, chains of delegated accesses will form. There are different ways to treat these delegation chains when revoking rights, which give rise to different revocation schemes. One possibility studied in the literature is to revoke rights by issuing negative authorizations, meant to ensure that the revocation is resilient to a later reissuing of the rights, and to resolve conflicts between principals by giving precedence to predecessors, i.e. principals that come earlier in the delegation chain. However, the effects of negative authorizations have been defined differently by different authors. Having identified three definitions of this effect from the literature, the first contribution of this paper is to point out that two of these three definitions pose a security threat. However, avoiding this security threat comes at a price: We prove that with the safe definition of the effect of negative authorizations, deciding whether a principal does have access to a resource is an NP-complete decision problem. We discuss two limitations that can be imposed on an access-control system in order to reduce the complexity of the problem back to a polynomial complexity: Limiting the length of delegation chains to an integer m reduces the runtime complexity of determining access to O(nm), and requiring that principals form a hierarchy that graph-theoretically forms a rooted tree makes this decision problem solvable in quadratic runtime. Finally we discuss an approach that can mitigate the complexity problem in practice without fully getting rid of NP-completeness.","PeriodicalId":6500,"journal":{"name":"2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":"34 1","pages":"432-442"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87956006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

In the Nick of Time: Proactive Prevention of Obligation Violations 关键时刻:主动预防违反义务

2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2016-06-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2016.16

D. Basin, S. Debois, Thomas T. Hildebrandt

引用次数: 10

A Methodology for Formalizing Model-Inversion Attacks 一种形式化模型反转攻击的方法

2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2016-06-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2016.32

Xi Wu, Matt Fredrikson, S. Jha, J. Naughton

{"title":"A Methodology for Formalizing Model-Inversion Attacks","authors":"Xi Wu, Matt Fredrikson, S. Jha, J. Naughton","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2016.32","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2016.32","url":null,"abstract":"Confidentiality of training data induced by releasing machine-learning models, and has recently received increasing attention. Motivated by existing MI attacks and other previous attacks that turn out to be MI \"in disguise,\" this paper initiates a formal study of MI attacks by presenting a game-based methodology. Our methodology uncovers a number of subtle issues, and devising a rigorous game-based definition, analogous to those in cryptography, is an interesting avenue for future work. We describe methodologies for two types of attacks. The first is for black-box attacks, which consider an adversary who infers sensitive values with only oracle access to a model. The second methodology targets the white-box scenario where an adversary has some additional knowledge about the structure of a model. For the restricted class of Boolean models and black-box attacks, we characterize model invertibility using the concept of influence from Boolean analysis in the noiseless case, and connect model invertibility with stable influence in the noisy case. Interestingly, we also discovered an intriguing phenomenon, which we call \"invertibility interference,\" where a highly invertible model quickly becomes highly non-invertible by adding little noise. For the white-box case, we consider a common phenomenon in machine-learning models where the model is a sequential composition of several sub-models. We show, quantitatively, that even very restricted communication between layers could leak a significant amount of information. Perhaps more importantly, our study also unveils unexpected computational power of these restricted communication channels, which, to the best of our knowledge, were not previously known.","PeriodicalId":6500,"journal":{"name":"2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":"30 6","pages":"355-370"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91455157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 143

Correlated Secrets in Quantitative Information Flow 定量信息流中的相关秘密

2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2016-06-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2016.14

N. E. Bordenabe, Geoffrey Smith

引用次数: 8

Calculational Design of Information Flow Monitors 信息流监视器的计算设计

2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2016-06-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2016.22

Mounir Assaf, D. Naumann

引用次数: 9

Automated Reasoning for Equivalences in the Applied Pi Calculus with Barriers 带屏障的应用π微积分中等价的自动推理

2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2016-06-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2016.29

B. Blanchet, B. Smyth

{"title":"Automated Reasoning for Equivalences in the Applied Pi Calculus with Barriers","authors":"B. Blanchet, B. Smyth","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2016.29","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2016.29","url":null,"abstract":"Observational equivalence allows us to study important security properties such as anonymity. Unfortunately, the difficulty of proving observational equivalence hinders analysis. Blanchet, Abadi & Fournet simplify its proof by introducing a sufficient condition for observational equivalence, called diff-equivalence, which is a reachability condition that can be proved automatically by ProVerif. However, diff-equivalence is a very strong condition, which often does not hold even if observational equivalence does. In particular, when proving equivalence between processes that contain several parallel components, e.g., P | Q and P' | Q', diff-equivalence requires that P is equivalent to P' and Q is equivalent to Q'. To relax this constraint, Delaune, Ryan & Smyth introduced the idea of swapping data between parallel processes P' and Q' at synchronisation points, without proving its soundness. We extend their work by formalising the semantics of synchronisation, formalising the definition of swapping, and proving its soundness. We also relax some restrictions they had on the processes to which swapping can be applied. Moreover, we have implemented our results in ProVerif. Hence, we extend the class of equivalences that can be proved automatically. We showcase our results by analysing privacy in election schemes by Fujioka, Okamoto & Ohta and Lee et al., and in the vehicular ad-hoc network by Freudiger et al.","PeriodicalId":6500,"journal":{"name":"2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":"277 1","pages":"310-324"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73285224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 37

Static Detection of Collusion Attacks in ARBAC-Based Workflow Systems 基于arbac的工作流系统中串通攻击的静态检测

2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2016-06-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2016.39

Stefano Calzavara, Alvise Rabitti, Enrico Steffinlongo, M. Bugliesi

{"title":"Static Detection of Collusion Attacks in ARBAC-Based Workflow Systems","authors":"Stefano Calzavara, Alvise Rabitti, Enrico Steffinlongo, M. Bugliesi","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2016.39","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2016.39","url":null,"abstract":"Authorization in workflow systems is usually built on top of role-based access control (RBAC), security policies on workflows are then expressed as constraints on the users performing a set of tasks and the roles assigned to them. Unfortunately, when role administration is distributed and potentially untrusted users contribute to the role assignment process, like in the case of Administrative RBAC (ARBAC), collusions may take place to circumvent the intended workflow security policies. In a collusion attack, a set of users of a workflow system collaborates by changing the user-to-role assignment, so as to sidestep the security policies and run up to completion a workflow they could not complete otherwise. In this paper, we study the problem of collusion attacks in a formal model of workflows based on stable event structures and we define a precise notion of security against collusion. We then propose a static analysis technique based on a reduction to a role reachability problem for ARBAC, which can be used to prove or disprove security for a large class of workflow systems. We also discuss how to aggressively optimise the obtained role reachability problem to ensure its tractability. Finally, we implement our analysis in a tool, WARBAC, and we experimentally show its effectiveness on a set of publicly available examples, including a realistic case study.","PeriodicalId":6500,"journal":{"name":"2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":"1 1","pages":"458-470"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87036644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2