{"title":"From the harmony to the tension: Helmuth Plessner and Kurt Goldstein's readings of Jakob von Uexküll.","authors":"Matteo Pagan, Marco Dal Pozzolo","doi":"10.1007/s40656-024-00607-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s40656-024-00607-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This paper investigates the reception and discussion of Jakob von Uexküll's biological theory by two German thinkers of his time, Helmuth Plessner and Kurt Goldstein. It demonstrates how their bio-philosophical perspectives are on the one hand indebted to Uexküll's theory and, on the other, critical of its tendency to excessively harmonize the relationship between living beings and their environment. This original critical reading of the Umweltlehre is rooted in ambiguities within Uexküll's own thought - between a dynamic conception of the organism-environment relationship and the idea of \"conformity to a plan\" -, , which is here examined in the second section. In the third and fourth sections we will then focus on Plessner and Goldstein respectively, demonstrating how for these two authors the harmony between organism and environment is not an original state, but only reveals itself against the background of a tension; as such, it can only be partial, unstable and always changing. The two thinkers avoid the rigid alternative between Darwin's concept of adaptation (Anpassung) and Uexküll's \"fitting into\" (Einpassung) by theorizing the ideal state of the relationship between organism and environment in terms of \"adequacy\" (Adäquatheit) and \"adaptability\" (Adaptiertheit). Between organism and environment there is neither absolute separation nor perfect harmony, but rather a gap which can never be definitively fixed.</p>","PeriodicalId":56308,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences","volume":"46 1","pages":"9"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10811164/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139547875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reappraising Claude Bernard's legacy: an introduction.","authors":"Laurent Loison","doi":"10.1007/s40656-024-00612-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s40656-024-00612-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":56308,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences","volume":"46 1","pages":"8"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139547892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Jacob Stegenga, Care & Cure. An introduction to philosophy of medicine, Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 2018, 288 pp.","authors":"Isabella Sarto-Jackson","doi":"10.1007/s40656-023-00605-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s40656-023-00605-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":56308,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences","volume":"46 1","pages":"7"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139543613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How should we distinguish between selectable and circumstantial traits?","authors":"Ciprian Jeler","doi":"10.1007/s40656-023-00604-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s40656-023-00604-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>There is surprisingly little philosophical work on conceptually spelling out the difference between the traits on which natural selection may be said to act (e.g. \"having a high running speed\") and mere circumstantial traits (e.g. \"happening to be in the path of a forest fire\"). I label this issue the \"selectable traits problem\" and, in this paper, I propose a solution for it. I first show that, contrary to our first intuition, simply equating selectable traits with heritable ones is not an adequate solution. I then go on to argue that two recent philosophical solutions to this problem-due to Peter Godfrey-Smith and Pierrick Bourrat-are unconvincing because they cannot accommodate frequency-dependent selection. The way out of this difficulty is, I argue, to accept that extrinsic properties dependent on relations between intrinsic properties of the population members should also count as selectable traits. I then show that my proposal is legitimized by more than the simple accommodation of frequency-dependent selection.</p>","PeriodicalId":56308,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences","volume":"46 1","pages":"6"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139418724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When remediating one artifact results in another: control, confounders, and correction.","authors":"David Colaço","doi":"10.1007/s40656-023-00606-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s40656-023-00606-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Scientists aim to remediate artifacts in their experimental datasets. However, the remediation of one artifact can result in another. Why might this happen, and what does this consequence tell us about how we should account for artifacts and their control? In this paper, I explore a case in functional neuroimaging where remediation appears to have caused this problem. I argue that remediation amounts to a change to an experimental arrangement. These changes need not be surgical, and the arrangement need not satisfy the criterion of causal modularity. Thus, remediation can affect more than just the factor responsible for the artifact. However, if researchers can determine the consequences of their remediation, they can make adjustments that control for the present artifact as well as for previously controlled ones. Current philosophical accounts of artifacts and the factors responsible for them cannot adequately address this issue, as they do not account for what is needed for artifact remediation (and specifically correction). I support my argument by paralleling it with ongoing concerns regarding the transparency of complex computational systems, as near future remediation across the experimental life sciences will likely make greater use of AI tools to correct for artifacts.</p>","PeriodicalId":56308,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences","volume":"46 1","pages":"5"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10784372/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139418725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How is who: evidence as clues for action in participatory sustainability science and public health research.","authors":"Guido Caniglia, Federica Russo","doi":"10.1007/s40656-023-00603-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s40656-023-00603-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Participatory and collaborative approaches in sustainability science and public health research contribute to co-producing evidence that can support interventions by involving diverse societal actors that range from individual citizens to entire communities. However, existing philosophical accounts of evidence are not adequate to deal with the kind of evidence generated and used in such approaches. In this paper, we present an account of evidence as clues for action through participatory and collaborative research inspired by philosopher Susan Haack's theory of evidence. Differently from most accounts of evidence for use in policies and interventions, our account combines action-oriented (the how) and actors-oriented (the who) considerations. We build on Haack's theory and on the analysis of examples of participatory and collaborative research in sustainability science and public health research to flesh out six procedural criteria for the generation and mobilization of evidence in and from participatory research. Action-oriented criteria invite to look at evidence from a (a) foundherentist, (b) gradational and (c) quasi-holistic perspective. Actors-oriented criteria point out that evidence generation and utilization are (d) social, (e) personal, and (f) embedded. We suggest that these criteria may reinforce participatory and collaborative approaches to evidence co-production when addressing complex problems in sustainability science and public health allowing for the generation of a kind of practical objectivity.</p>","PeriodicalId":56308,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences","volume":"46 1","pages":"4"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10776828/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139405457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the nature of evolutionary explanations: a critical appraisal of Walter Bock's approach with a new revised proposal.","authors":"Marcelo Domingos de Santis","doi":"10.1007/s40656-023-00601-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s40656-023-00601-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Walter Bock was committed to developing a framework for evolutionary biology. Bock repeatedly discussed how evolutionary explanations should be considered within the realm of Hempel's deductive-nomological model of scientific explanations. Explanation in evolution would then consist of functional and evolutionary explanations, and within the latter, an explanation can be of nomological-deductive and historical narrative explanations. Thus, a complete evolutionary explanation should include, first, a deductive functional analysis, and then proceed through nomological and historical evolutionary explanations. However, I will argue that his views on the deductive proprieties of functional analysis and the deductive-nomological parts of evolution fail because of the nature of evolution, which contains a historical element that the logic of deduction and Hempel's converting law model do not compass. Conversely, Bock's historical approach gives a critical consideration of the historical narrative element of evolutionary explanation, which is fundamental to the methodology of the historical nature of evolutionary theory. Herein, I will expand and discuss a modern view of evolutionary explanations of traits that includes the currentacknowledgement of the differences between experimental and the historical sciences, including the token and type event dichotomy, that mutually illuminate each other in order to give us a well confirmed and coherent hypothesis for evolutionary explanations. Within this framework, I will argue that the duality of evolutionary explanations is related to two components of character evolution: origin, with its evolutionary pathways along with the history, and maintenance, the function (mainly a current function) for the character being selected.</p>","PeriodicalId":56308,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences","volume":"46 1","pages":"3"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10774170/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139378887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Resilience and the shift of paradigm in ecology: a new name for an old concept or a different explanatory tool?","authors":"Lara Barbara","doi":"10.1007/s40656-023-00600-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s40656-023-00600-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In the shift from the balance of nature to the flux of nature paradigm, the concept of resilience has gained great traction in ecology. While it has been suggested that the concept of resilience does not imply a genuine departure from the balance of nature paradigm, I shall argue against this stance. To do so, I first show that the balance of nature paradigm and the related conception of a single-state equilibrium relies on what Eliot Sober has named the \"Natural State Model (NSM)\", suggesting that the NSM has instead been dismissed in the flux of nature paradigm. I then focus on resilience as the main explanatory concept of the flux paradigm. After distinguishing between two main different understandings of \"resilience\", namely engineering resilience and ecological resilience, I argue that the former is close to the concept of balance or stability and still part of the NSM, while the latter is not. Finally, I claim that ecological resilience is inconsistent with the NSM, concluding that this concept-being incompatible with the NSM-is not part of the balance of nature paradigm but rather a genuinely new explanatory tool.</p>","PeriodicalId":56308,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences","volume":"46 1","pages":"2"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139049831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jaya Keaney, Henrietta Byrne, Megan Warin, Emma Kowal
{"title":"Refusing epigenetics: indigeneity and the colonial politics of trauma","authors":"Jaya Keaney, Henrietta Byrne, Megan Warin, Emma Kowal","doi":"10.1007/s40656-023-00596-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40656-023-00596-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Environmental epigenetics is increasingly employed to understand the health outcomes of communities who have experienced historical trauma and structural violence. Epigenetics provides a way to think about traumatic events and sustained deprivation as biological “exposures” that contribute to ill-health across generations. In Australia, some Indigenous researchers and clinicians are embracing epigenetic science as a framework for theorising the slow violence of colonialism as it plays out in intergenerational legacies of trauma and illness. However, there is dispute, contention, and caution as well as enthusiasm among these research communities.</p><p>In this article, we trace strategies of “refusal” (Simpson, 2014) in response to epigenetics in Indigenous contexts. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Australia with researchers and clinicians in Indigenous health, we explore how some construct epigenetics as useless knowledge and a distraction from implementing anti-colonial change, rather than a tool with which to enact change. Secondly, we explore how epigenetics narrows definitions of colonial harm through the optic of molecular trauma, reproducing conditions in which Indigenous people are made intelligible through a lens of “damaged” bodies. Faced with these two concerns, many turn away from epigenetics altogether, refusing its novelty and supposed benefit for Indigenous health equity and resisting the pull of postgenomics.</p>","PeriodicalId":56308,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences","volume":"140 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138741841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A fetus in the world: Physiology, epidemiology, and the making of fetal origins of adult disease","authors":"Tatjana Buklijas, Salim Al-Gailani","doi":"10.1007/s40656-023-00598-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40656-023-00598-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Since the late 1980s, the <i>fetal origins of adult disease</i>, from 2003 <i>developmental origins of health and disease</i> (DOHaD), has stimulated significant interest in and an efflorescence of research on the long-term effects of the intrauterine environment. From the start, this field has been interdisciplinary, using experimental animal, clinical and epidemiological tools. As the influence of DOHaD on public health and policy expanded, it has drawn criticism for reducing the complex social and physical world of early life to women’s reproductive bodies as drivers of intergenerational ills. This paper explains this narrowing of focus in terms of a formative and consequential exchange between David Barker, the British epidemiologist whose work is credited with establishing the field, and the discipline of fetal physiology. We suggest that fetal physiologists were a crucial constituency of support for Barker’s hypothesis about early life origins of disease. Their collaborations with Barker helped secure and sustain the theory amid considerable controversy. The trajectory of DOHaD and its focus on the maternal body can be understood, we argue, as a consequence of this alliance, which brought together two distinct conceptualizations of the intrauterine environment, one from epidemiology and the other from fetal physiology. Along the way, we trace the histories of these conceptualizations, both of which were products of mid-to-late twentieth century British science, and show how Barker’s early emphasis on social and economic conditions was superseded by a narrower focus on physiological mechanisms acting upon the autonomous fetus.</p>","PeriodicalId":56308,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138630823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}