{"title":"The machine-organism relation revisited.","authors":"Maurizio Esposito, Lorenzo Baravalle","doi":"10.1007/s40656-023-00587-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s40656-023-00587-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This article addresses some crucial assumptions that are rarely acknowledged when organisms and machines are compared. We begin by presenting a short historical reconstruction of the concept of \"machine.\" We show that there has never been a unique and widely accepted definition of \"machine\" and that the extant definitions are based on specific technologies. Then we argue that, despite the concept's ambiguity, we can still defend a more robust, specific, and useful notion of machine analogy that accounts for successful strategies in connecting specific devices (or mechanisms) with particular living phenomena. For that purpose, we distinguish between what we call \"generic identity\" and proper \"machine analogy.\" We suggest that \"generic identity\"-which, roughly stated, presumes that some sort of vague similarity might exist between organisms and machines-is a source of the confusion haunting many persistent disagreements and that, accordingly, it should be dismissed. Instead, we endorse a particular form of \"machine analogy\" where the relation between organic phenomena and mechanical devices is not generic but specific and grounded on the identification of shared \"invariants.\" We propose that the machine analogy is a kind of analogy as proportion and we elucidate how this is used or might be used in scientific practices. We finally argue that while organisms are not machines in a generic sense, they might share many robust \"invariants,\" which justify the scientists' use of machine analogies for grasping living phenomena.</p>","PeriodicalId":56308,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences","volume":"45 3","pages":"34"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10174289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cropping synonymy: varietal standardization in the United States, 1900-1970.","authors":"Tad Brown","doi":"10.1007/s40656-023-00574-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s40656-023-00574-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This article examines crop varietal standardization in the United States. Numerous committees formed in the early twentieth century to address the problem of nomenclatural rules in the horticultural and agricultural industries. Making shared reference to a varietal name proved a difficult proposition for seed-borne crops because plant conformity tended to change in the hands of different breeders. Moreover, scientific and commercial opinions diverged on the value of deviations within crop varieties. I review the function of descriptive difference in the seed trade and in the framework of evolutionary theory before examining the institutional history of varietal standardization. Pimento peppers are used to represent how vegetables were treated differently than cereals. Lack of stability within a popular pimento variety caused problems for food packers in middle Georgia, which public breeders addressed by releasing new peppers. To conclude, the article questions the role of taxonomy in intellectual property, as breeding history and yield became defining attributes for making varietal distinctions.</p>","PeriodicalId":56308,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences","volume":"45 3","pages":"33"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10338580/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9815549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Maya J. Goldenberg, Vaccine Hesitancy: Public Trust, Expertise, and the War on Science, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2021.","authors":"Soumya Swain","doi":"10.1007/s40656-023-00583-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40656-023-00583-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":56308,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences","volume":"45 3","pages":"32"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9799660","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Claude Bernard's non reception of Darwinism.","authors":"Ghyslain Bolduc, Caroline Angleraux","doi":"10.1007/s40656-023-00588-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s40656-023-00588-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The aim of this paper is to explain why, while Charles Darwin was well recognized as a scientific leader of his time, Claude Bernard never really regarded Darwinism as a scientific theory. The lukewarm reception of Darwin at the Académie des Sciences of Paris and his nomination to a chair only after 8 years contrasts with his prominence, and Bernard's attitude towards Darwin's theory of species evolution belongs to this French context. Yet we argue that Bernard rejects the scientific value of Darwinian principles mainly for epistemological reasons. Like Darwin, Bernard was interested in hereditary processes, and planned to conduct experiments on these processes that could lead to species transformation. But the potential creation of new forms of life would not vindicate Darwinism since biologists can only explain the origin of morphotypes and morphological laws by the means of untestable analogies. Because it can be the object neither of experiments nor of any empirical observation, phylogeny remains out of science's scope. Around 1878 Bernard foresaw a new general physiology based on the study of protoplasm, which he saw as the agent of all basic living phenomena. We will analyze why Bernard regarded Darwinism as part of metaphysics, yet still referred to Darwinians in his latter works in 1878. Basically, the absence of a scientific reception of Darwinism in Bernard's work should not obscure its philosophical reception, which highlights the main principles of Bernard's epistemology.</p>","PeriodicalId":56308,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences","volume":"45 3","pages":"29"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9739376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cailin O'Connor and James Owen Weatherall, The Misinformation Age: How False Beliefs Spread, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018.","authors":"Davis Kuykendall","doi":"10.1007/s40656-023-00585-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40656-023-00585-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":56308,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences","volume":"45 3","pages":"30"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9733862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Georg Striedter, Model Systems in Biology: History, Philosophy, and Practical Concerns, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2022.","authors":"Nina Atanasova","doi":"10.1007/s40656-023-00584-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40656-023-00584-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":56308,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences","volume":"45 3","pages":"31"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9734839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ben Bradley, Darwin's psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.","authors":"Greg Priest","doi":"10.1007/s40656-023-00586-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40656-023-00586-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":56308,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences","volume":"45 3","pages":"28"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9697788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Alfredo Bueno-Hernández, Ana Barahona, Juan J Morrone, David Espinosa, Fabiola Juárez-Barrera
{"title":"Historiographical approaches to biogeography: a critical review.","authors":"Alfredo Bueno-Hernández, Ana Barahona, Juan J Morrone, David Espinosa, Fabiola Juárez-Barrera","doi":"10.1007/s40656-023-00580-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s40656-023-00580-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>We performed a critical review of the historiographical studies on biogeography. We began with the pioneering works of Augustin and Alphonse de Candolle. Then, we analyzed the historical accounts of biogeography developed by (1) Martin Fichman and his history on the extensionism-permanentism debate; (2) Gareth Nelson and his critique of the Neo-Darwinian historiography of biogeography; (3) Ernst Mayr, with his dispersalist viewpoint; (4) Alan Richardson, who wrote a microhistory on the biogeographic model constructed by Darwin; (5) Michael Paul Kinch and the ideas discussed in the 19th century about the geographical distribution of living beings; (6) Janet Browne, who highlighted the importance of the pre-Darwinian naturalists; (7) Peter Bowler, who focused mainly on the influence of paleontology on biogeography; (8) James Larson, who looked into the practices of the naturalists of Northern Europe in the late 18th century; and (9) Malte Ebach, who like Larson, was more interested in analysing the practices rather than the ideas of naturalists who studied the geographical distribution of organisms. Finally, these works are compared with each other. There has not been a dominant paradigm in the construction of historical narratives of biogeography; however, they provide a useful context for understanding problems of biogeography that continue to be debated to this day.</p>","PeriodicalId":56308,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences","volume":"45 3","pages":"27"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10287814/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9709818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Correction to: From technique to normativity: the influence of Kant on Georges Canguilhem's philosophy of life.","authors":"Emiliano Sfara","doi":"10.1007/s40656-023-00589-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40656-023-00589-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":56308,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences","volume":"45 3","pages":"26"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10284725/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9700992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hodgkin's and Huxley's own assessments of their \"quantitative description\" of nerve membrane current.","authors":"John Bickle","doi":"10.1007/s40656-023-00582-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40656-023-00582-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Alan Hodgkin's and Andrew Huxley's mid-20th century work on the ionic currents generating neuron action potentials stands among that century's great scientific achievements. Unsurprisingly, that case has attracted widespread attention from neuroscientists, historians and philosophers of science. In this paper, I do not propose to add any new insights into the vast historical treatment of Hodgkin's and Huxley's scientific discoveries in that much- discussed episode. Instead, I focus on an aspect of it that hasn't received much attention: Hodgkin's and Huxley's own assessments about what their famous \"quantitative description\" accomplished. The \"Hodgkin-Huxley model\" is now widely recognized as a foundation of contemporary computational neuroscience. Yet Hodgkin and Huxley expressed serious caveats about their model and what it added to their scientific discoveries, as far back as their (1952d), in which they first presented their model. They were even more critical of its accomplishments in their Nobel Prize addresses a decade later. Most notably, as I argue here, some worries they raised about their quantitative description seem still to be relevant to current work in ongoing computational neuroscience.</p>","PeriodicalId":56308,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences","volume":"45 3","pages":"25"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9661091","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}