Charles Dickie, Stefan Lauren, Francesco Belardinelli, Antonio Rago, Francesca Toni
{"title":"Aggregating bipolar opinions through bipolar assumption-based argumentation","authors":"Charles Dickie, Stefan Lauren, Francesco Belardinelli, Antonio Rago, Francesca Toni","doi":"10.1007/s10458-024-09684-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10458-024-09684-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We introduce a novel method to aggregate bipolar argumentation frameworks expressing opinions of different parties in debates. We use Bipolar Assumption-based Argumentation (ABA) as an all-encompassing formalism for bipolar argumentation under different semantics. By leveraging on recent results on judgement aggregation in social choice theory, we prove several preservation results for relevant properties of bipolar ABA using quota and oligarchic rules. Specifically, we prove (positive and negative) results about the preservation of conflict-free, closed, admissible, preferred, complete, set-stable, well-founded and ideal extensions in bipolar ABA, as well as the preservation of acceptability, acyclicity and coherence for individual assumptions. Finally, we illustrate our methodology and results in the context of a case study on opinion aggregation for the treatment of long COVID patients.\u0000</p></div>","PeriodicalId":55586,"journal":{"name":"Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10458-024-09684-3.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142694773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Information gathering in POMDPs using active inference","authors":"Erwin Walraven, Joris Sijs, Gertjan J. Burghouts","doi":"10.1007/s10458-024-09683-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10458-024-09683-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Gathering information about the environment state is the main goal in several planning tasks for autonomous agents, such as surveillance, inspection and tracking of objects. Such planning tasks are typically modeled using a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP), and in the literature several approaches have emerged to consider information gathering during planning and execution. Similar developments can be seen in the field of active inference, which focuses on active information collection in order to be able to reach a goal. Both fields use POMDPs to model the environment, but the underlying principles for action selection are different. In this paper we create a bridge between both research fields by discussing how they relate to each other and how they can be used for information gathering. Our contribution is a tailored approach to model information gathering tasks directly in the active inference framework. A series of experiments demonstrates that our approach enables agents to gather information about the environment state. As a result, active inference becomes an alternative to common POMDP approaches for information gathering, which opens the door towards more cross cutting research at the intersection of both fields. This is advantageous, because recent advancements in POMDP solvers may be used to accelerate active inference, and the principled active inference framework may be used to model POMDP agents that operate in a neurobiologically plausible fashion.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":55586,"journal":{"name":"Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142595293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Alexandra Kuncová, Jan Broersen, Hein Duijf, Aldo Iván Ramírez Abarca
{"title":"Ability and knowledge: from epistemic transition systems to labelled stit models","authors":"Alexandra Kuncová, Jan Broersen, Hein Duijf, Aldo Iván Ramírez Abarca","doi":"10.1007/s10458-024-09661-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10458-024-09661-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>It is possible to know that one can guarantee a certain result and yet not know how to guarantee it. In such cases one has the ability to guarantee something in a causal sense, but not in an epistemic sense. In this paper we focus on two formalisms used to model both conceptions of ability: one formalism based on epistemic transition systems and the other on labelled stit models. We show a strong correspondence between the two formalisms by providing mappings from the former to the latter for both the languages and the structures. Moreover, we demonstrate that our extension of labelled stit logic is more expressive than the logic of epistemic transition systems.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":55586,"journal":{"name":"Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10458-024-09661-w.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142587726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Epistemic selection of costly alternatives: the case of participatory budgeting","authors":"Simon Rey, Ulle Endriss","doi":"10.1007/s10458-024-09677-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10458-024-09677-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We initiate the study of voting rules for participatory budgeting using the so-called epistemic approach, where one interprets votes as noisy reflections of some ground truth regarding the objectively best set of projects to fund. Using this approach, we first show that both the most studied rules in the literature and the most widely used rule in practice cannot be justified on epistemic grounds: they cannot be interpreted as maximum likelihood estimators, whatever assumptions we make about the accuracy of voters. Focusing then on welfare-maximising rules, we obtain both positive and negative results regarding epistemic guarantees.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":55586,"journal":{"name":"Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10458-024-09677-2.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142565824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Andreas Haupt, Phillip Christoffersen, Mehul Damani, Dylan Hadfield-Menell
{"title":"Formal contracts mitigate social dilemmas in multi-agent reinforcement learning","authors":"Andreas Haupt, Phillip Christoffersen, Mehul Damani, Dylan Hadfield-Menell","doi":"10.1007/s10458-024-09682-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10458-024-09682-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) is a powerful tool for training autonomous agents acting independently in a common environment. However, it can lead to sub-optimal behavior when individual incentives and group incentives diverge. Humans are remarkably capable at solving these social dilemmas. It is an open problem in MARL to replicate such cooperative behaviors in selfish agents. In this work, we draw upon the idea of formal contracting from economics to overcome diverging incentives between agents in MARL. We propose an augmentation to a Markov game where agents voluntarily agree to binding transfers of reward, under pre-specified conditions. Our contributions are theoretical and empirical. First, we show that this augmentation makes all subgame-perfect equilibria of all Fully Observable Markov Games exhibit socially optimal behavior, given a sufficiently rich space of contracts. Next, we show that for general contract spaces, and even under partial observability, richer contract spaces lead to higher welfare. Hence, contract space design solves an exploration-exploitation tradeoff, sidestepping incentive issues. We complement our theoretical analysis with experiments. Issues of exploration in the contracting augmentation are mitigated using a training methodology inspired by multi-objective reinforcement learning: Multi-Objective Contract Augmentation Learning. We test our methodology in static, single-move games, as well as dynamic domains that simulate traffic, pollution management, and common pool resource management.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":55586,"journal":{"name":"Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems","volume":"38 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10458-024-09682-5.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142447433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Finding middle grounds for incoherent horn expressions: the moral machine case","authors":"Ana Ozaki, Anum Rehman, Marija Slavkovik","doi":"10.1007/s10458-024-09681-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10458-024-09681-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Smart devices that operate in a shared environment with people need to be aligned with their values and requirements. We study the problem of multiple stakeholders informing the same device on what the right thing to do is. Specifically, we focus on how to reach a middle ground among the stakeholders inevitably incoherent judgments on what the rules of conduct for the device should be. We formally define a notion of middle ground and discuss the main properties of this notion. Then, we identify three sufficient conditions on the class of Horn expressions for which middle grounds are guaranteed to exist. We provide a polynomial time algorithm that computes middle grounds, under these conditions. We also show that if any of the three conditions is removed then middle grounds for the resulting (larger) class may not exist. Finally, we implement our algorithm and perform experiments using data from the Moral Machine Experiment. We present conflicting rules for different countries and how the algorithm finds the middle ground in this case.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":55586,"journal":{"name":"Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems","volume":"38 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10458-024-09681-6.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142443252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Richard Willis, Yali Du, Joel Z. Leibo, Michael Luck
{"title":"Resolving social dilemmas with minimal reward transfer","authors":"Richard Willis, Yali Du, Joel Z. Leibo, Michael Luck","doi":"10.1007/s10458-024-09675-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10458-024-09675-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Social dilemmas present a significant challenge in multi-agent cooperation because individuals are incentivised to behave in ways that undermine socially optimal outcomes. Consequently, self-interested agents often avoid collective behaviour. In response, we formalise social dilemmas and introduce a novel metric, the <i>general self-interest level</i>, to quantify the disparity between individual and group rationality in such scenarios. This metric represents the maximum proportion of their individual rewards that agents can retain while ensuring that a social welfare optimum becomes a dominant strategy. Our approach diverges from traditional concepts of altruism, instead focusing on strategic reward redistribution. By transferring rewards among agents in a manner that aligns individual and group incentives, rational agents will maximise collective welfare while pursuing their own interests. We provide an algorithm to compute efficient transfer structures for an arbitrary number of agents, and introduce novel multi-player social dilemma games to illustrate the effectiveness of our method. This work provides both a descriptive tool for analysing social dilemmas and a prescriptive solution for resolving them via efficient reward transfer contracts. Applications include mechanism design, where we can assess the impact on collaborative behaviour of modifications to models of environments.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":55586,"journal":{"name":"Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems","volume":"38 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10458-024-09675-4.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142411510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jan de Mooij, Tabea Sonnenschein, Marco Pellegrino, Mehdi Dastani, Dick Ettema, Brian Logan, Judith A. Verstegen
{"title":"GenSynthPop: generating a spatially explicit synthetic population of individuals and households from aggregated data","authors":"Jan de Mooij, Tabea Sonnenschein, Marco Pellegrino, Mehdi Dastani, Dick Ettema, Brian Logan, Judith A. Verstegen","doi":"10.1007/s10458-024-09680-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10458-024-09680-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Synthetic populations are representations of actual individuals living in a specific area. They play an increasingly important role in studying and modeling individuals and are often used to build agent-based social simulations. Traditional approaches for synthesizing populations use a detailed sample of the population (which may not be available) or combine data into a single joint distribution, and draw individuals or households from these. The latter group of existing sample-free methods fail to integrate (1) the best available data on spatial granular distributions, (2) multi-variable joint distributions, and (3) household level distributions. In this paper, we propose a sample-free approach where synthetic individuals and households directly represent the estimated joint distribution to which attributes are iteratively added, conditioned on previous attributes such that the relative frequencies within each joint group of attributes are maintained and fit granular spatial marginal distributions. In this paper we present our method and test it for the Zuid-West district of The Hague, the Netherlands, showing that spatial, multi-variable and household distributions are accurately reflected in the resulting synthetic population.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":55586,"journal":{"name":"Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems","volume":"38 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10458-024-09680-7.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142409656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The complexity of verifying popularity and strict popularity in altruistic hedonic games","authors":"Anna Maria Kerkmann, Jörg Rothe","doi":"10.1007/s10458-024-09679-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10458-024-09679-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We consider average- and min-based altruistic hedonic games and study the problem of verifying popular and strictly popular coalition structures. While strict popularity verification has been shown to be coNP-complete in min-based altruistic hedonic games, this problem has been open for equal- and altruistic-treatment average-based altruistic hedonic games. We solve these two open cases of strict popularity verification and then provide the first complexity results for popularity verification in (average- and min-based) altruistic hedonic games, where we cover all three degrees of altruism.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":55586,"journal":{"name":"Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems","volume":"38 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10458-024-09679-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142409340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Theoretical properties of the MiCRO negotiation strategy","authors":"Dave de Jonge","doi":"10.1007/s10458-024-09678-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10458-024-09678-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Recently, we have introduced a new algorithm for automated negotiation, called MiCRO, which, despite its simplicity, outperforms many state-of-the-art negotiation strategies (de Jonge, in: Raedt (ed) Proceedings of the thirty-first international joint conference on artificial intelligence, ijcai.org, Vienna, Austria, 2022). Furthermore, we claimed that under certain conditions which typically hold in the Automated Negotiating Agents Competition (ANAC), it is a game-theoretically optimal strategy. The goal of this paper is to formally prove those claims. Specifically, we define ‘negotiation’ as an extensive-form game and define the class of <i>consistent</i> strategies for this game, which consists of those strategies that satisfy a number of rationality criteria. We then prove that under the above mentioned conditions MiCRO is a best response against itself among all consistent negotiation strategies. Furthermore, we define the notion of a <i>balanced</i> negotiation domain, which is a domain in which two MiCRO agents would always come to an optimal agreement. Finally, we show that many of the domains used in ANAC indeed happen to be (approximately) balanced. The importance of this work is that if we know under which conditions MiCRO is theoretically optimal, then we can use this to test to what extent other negotiation algorithms are able to achieve similar results to MiCRO when applied under those same conditions. Furthermore, it would help researchers to design more challenging test cases for automated negotiation in which MiCRO is not optimal.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":55586,"journal":{"name":"Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems","volume":"38 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10458-024-09678-1.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142415178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}