{"title":"Radical multiculturalism versus Liberal Pluralism","authors":"M. Dusche","doi":"10.2143/EP.11.4.519089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/EP.11.4.519089","url":null,"abstract":"Radical multiculturalism claims that cultural groups, not the individual, should be the yardstick for considerations of justice, because the group offers the individual the indispensable good of being rooted in a community and since membership in a culture is not voluntary, abolition of culture would lead to uprooting of individuals. Thus, by taking this good away on grounds of justice, liberalism perpetrates another injustice. Against this, liberalism upholds the principle of normative methodological individualism, arguing that groups cannot be defined without recourse to the individual. Furthermore, the concept of cultural group is notoriously vague and not suitable to replace normative methodological individualism. Moreover, radical multiculturalism risks falling prey to self-defeating normative relativism. Since there is also a danger for the liberal to fall prey to culture-centrism, both parties agree on internal universalism. They also agree on the difference between membership in an association and membership in a cultural community. However, the liberal concludes that the state must not add its might to cultural dependence, but enable the individual to grow out of it. Furthermore, liberalism maintains that normative methodological individualism is sufficient for even group-related needs provided the group conforms to basic principles of justice. To this, radical multiculturalism objects that even if all cultural groups abide by the principles of justice of the larger society, liberalism still produces injustices for those whose language is not among the official languages of the polity. Since any democratic polity needs a medium of debate and deliberation that is universally understood, liberalism has to grant this point. Liberalism can only diminish its impact through intermediate levels of government and subsidiarity.","PeriodicalId":54109,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Perspectives","volume":"11 1","pages":"238-249"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2004-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2143/EP.11.4.519089","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67959783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Re-sourcing the Self?","authors":"I. Berlin, Charles Taylor, T. Nys","doi":"10.2143/EP.11.4.519087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/EP.11.4.519087","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this article is to compare the theories of Isaiah Berlin and Charles Taylor with regard to the topic of freedom. I will argue that Berlin’s famous positive-negative distinction still serves an important purpose by maintaining a crucial tension within the concept of liberty. This tension allows ethical pluralism to be taken seriously instead of being covered up by ideological rhetoric. Berlin held that the implementation of positive liberty – defining the boundaries of true liberty – is always problematic. Taylor, however, tries to bypass the gap between negative and positive liberty by means of his concept of authenticity. I will argue that this notion is a sound descriptive term for an individual’s entrenchment in community, but that the normative appeal from authenticity amounts to a project of ‘re-sourcing the self’ which is ultimately rooted in an optimistic perspective on pluralism and multiculturalism. However, to the extent that there are indeed different communities with different values and different ways of being authentic, it is worthwhile to repeat the Berlinian Grundgedanke that human beings should cope with the inexorable and irreducible tragedy in moral life.","PeriodicalId":54109,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Perspectives","volume":"11 1","pages":"215-227"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2004-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2143/EP.11.4.519087","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67958593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Regrounding the just war's 'presumption against violence' in light of George Weigel","authors":"J. Hymers","doi":"10.2143/EP.11.2.504941","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/EP.11.2.504941","url":null,"abstract":"The so-called war on terror has recently revived interest in the just-war tradition (JWT). George Weigel has played an important role in this renaissance, and his recent article on JWT (“Moral Clarity in a Time of War”) has occasioned a new debate concerning its merits. At the heart of this debate is the nature of violence. Weigel holds that the JWT is not based on a presumption against violence, whereas his critics (esp. Rowan Williams) argue that it is. After critically summarizing Weigel’s position, I counter his divorcing of the JWT from the presumption against violence. By looking closely at the terms used in the debate concerning this presumption, I show that violence, in the scholastic tradition that nurtured the JWT, is understood as disordered force. As disordered, violence is contrary to reason, and thus also to justice (i.e. rational order). If just war aims at order, it itself may not be disordered. Thus, I argue that the JWT is best described as a two-fold presumption against violence: a just war is waged to counter violence, and a just war may not itself use violence. Consequently, since the JWT, grasped as a presumption against violence, concludes the link between justice and ordered force as the link between end and means, it avoids abstract ethical intentionalism: the proper end of the just war, as opposed to a mere intention, dictates the means that it has at its disposal.","PeriodicalId":54109,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Perspectives","volume":"11 1","pages":"111-121"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2004-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2143/EP.11.2.504941","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67958498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Combatant, noncombatant, criminal: The importance of distinctions","authors":"Michael W. Brough","doi":"10.2143/EP.11.2.504946","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/EP.11.2.504946","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54109,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Perspectives","volume":"11 1","pages":"176-188"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2004-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2143/EP.11.2.504946","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67958472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Can War Be a Moral Action","authors":"R. Schmücker","doi":"10.2143/EP.11.2.504945","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/EP.11.2.504945","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54109,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Perspectives","volume":"11 1","pages":"162-175"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2004-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2143/EP.11.2.504945","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67958415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mediums and messages: an argument against biotechnical enhancement of soldiers in the armies of liberal democracies.","authors":"Jeffrey S Wilson","doi":"10.2143/ep.11.2.504947","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/ep.11.2.504947","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Assuming that one believes that individuals and states can morally defend values, beliefs, and institutions with force (in short, that just wars are morally possible), one logically wants just combatants to possess the physical, mental, and spiritual capacities that will enable them to win the war. On the other hand, being a just combatant in a just war does not morally entitle that combatant to do anything to win that war. The moral requirement for just combatants to fight justly is codified in international law of war and in state-specific legal documents such as the United States Uniform Code of Military Justice. While it is almost unequivocally clear to soldiers and civilians who soldiers cannot harm in the performance of their duties, and why these people are exempt from harm, it is less clear what the state itself (assuming throughout the discussion that the state is a just combatant in a just war) can morally do to its own soldiers to enhance their chances of victory: can the state do anything to soldiers to give them an advantage on the field of battle? For United States soldiers and their counterparts in most Western liberal democracies, the answer is obviously no. Deeply embedded social and cultural norms in Western democracies mandate that the state set and enforce rigid lines which drill sergeants and earnest commanders cannot cross, even in the name of combat readiness, grounding these norms in notion of basic rights appealed to in the U.S. Constitution. In this essay, I argue against some types of drug-induced internal biotechnical enhancement of soldiers on the grounds that, in the present state of technology, it is not reasonable to suppose that the military can perform such enhancement operations on soldiers without causing irrevocable psychological damage that would certainly and unjustifiably alienate the soldiers from the very society they serve.</p>","PeriodicalId":54109,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Perspectives","volume":"11 2-3","pages":"189-97"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2143/ep.11.2.504947","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"25252587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Terrorist Threat: A Postmodern Kind of Threat","authors":"H. D. Dijn","doi":"10.2143/EP.11.2.504942","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/EP.11.2.504942","url":null,"abstract":"After a brief sketch of kinds of threat typical respectively for pre-modern and modern societies, an attempt is made to describe and understand the kinds of threat which are typical of post-modern societies in a globalised world. Terrorism, the post-modern threat par excellence, depends on the dangerous mixture and clash of elements characteristic of these societies and of the endeavour of traditional groups inside and outside of them to preserve their identity and prepared and capable to use high tech weaponry for this aim.","PeriodicalId":54109,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Perspectives","volume":"11 1","pages":"122-129"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2143/EP.11.2.504942","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67958622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A defence of common sense: a reply to David Heyd's \"The ethics of sex selection for non-medical reasons\".","authors":"Bart Engelen, Antoon Vandevelde","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54109,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Perspectives","volume":"11 1","pages":"84-7"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"24898775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Diane Pretty case and the occasional impotence of justification in ethics.","authors":"Christopher Cowley","doi":"10.2143/ep.11.4.519090","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2143/ep.11.4.519090","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Most discussions in ethics argue that a certain practice or act is morally justified, with any underlying theory taken as supporting a guide to general action by aiding discovery of the objectively and singularly right thing to do. I suggest that this oversimplifies the agent's own experience of the moral dilemma, and I take the recent English case of Diane Pretty's request for assisted suicide as an example. The law refused, despite the obvious sympathy many felt for her. This only appears paradoxical, I suggest, because too much is expected of the concept of justification, and because moral understanding of a particular case is too often reduced to the legalistic search for general justificatory reasons. The starting point should be, I conclude, a full awareness of the phrase \"there but for the grace of God go I\".</p>","PeriodicalId":54109,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Perspectives","volume":"11 4","pages":"250-8"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2143/ep.11.4.519090","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"25214129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}