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The Honest Weasel A Guide for Successful Weaseling 诚实的黄鼠狼:成功的黄鼠狼指南
IF 0.1
Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2020-05-01 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2020-0002
Patrick Dieveney
{"title":"The Honest Weasel A Guide for Successful Weaseling","authors":"Patrick Dieveney","doi":"10.2478/disp-2020-0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2020-0002","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Indispensability arguments are among the strongest arguments in support of mathematical realism. Given the controversial nature of their conclusions, it is not surprising that critics have supplied a number of rejoinders to these arguments. In this paper, I focus on one such rejoinder, Melia’s ‘Weasel Response’. The weasel is someone who accepts that scientific theories imply that there are mathematical objects, but then proceeds to ‘take back’ this commitment. While weaseling seems improper, accounts supplied in the literature have failed to explain why. Drawing on examples of weaseling in more mundane contexts, I develop an account of the presumption against weaseling as grounded in a misalignment between two types of commitments. This is good news to the weasel’s opponents. It reinforces that they were right to question the legitimacy of weaseling. This account is also beneficial to the weasel. Uncovering the source of the presumption against weaseling also serves to draw out the challenge that the weasel must meet to override this presumption—what is required to be an ‘honest weasel’.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"20 1","pages":"41 - 69"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73840567","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Human Plight, Kantian as if, and Public Reasons in Korsgaard’s Moral Theory 人类的困境，康德的仿佛，以及科斯加德道德理论中的公共理性
IF 0.1
Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2020-05-01 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2020-0004
Vitaly Kiryushchenko
{"title":"Human Plight, Kantian as if, and Public Reasons in Korsgaard’s Moral Theory","authors":"Vitaly Kiryushchenko","doi":"10.2478/disp-2020-0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2020-0004","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The conception of two kinds of practical identities, which Korsgaard introduces in the Sources of Normativity, helps her explain how universal categorical reasoning is compatible with the moral content of individual practical decisions. Based on this conception, she devises an interpretation of the Kantian as if principle amended by her argument for the public shareability of reasons. I suggest that, in doing so, Korsgaard steps too far away from Kant’s architectonic approach to the question of why moral norms bind us, and that, as a result, the Korsgaardian explanation, as it stands, cannot be accomplished.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"17 1","pages":"119 - 99"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78927629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How Friendship doesn’t Contribute to Happiness: A Reply to Leibowitz 友谊为何不能带来幸福:对莱博维茨的回复
IF 0.1
Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2020-05-01 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2020-0005
Diana Sofronieva
{"title":"How Friendship doesn’t Contribute to Happiness: A Reply to Leibowitz","authors":"Diana Sofronieva","doi":"10.2478/disp-2020-0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2020-0005","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Friendship and happiness are intimately connected. According to a recent account provided in Leibowitz (2018) friendship contributes to happiness because friends value each other and communicate this valuation to each other, which increases their self-worth, and this in turn increases their happiness. In this paper I argue that Leibowitz’s account of how friendship contributes to happiness is mistaken. I first present Leibowitz’s view, and then argue against it. I have two main worries with his account. One worry is that increase in self-worth is not characteristic of friendship and hence it is problematic to use it for explaining the connection between friendship and happiness. The other worry is that the distinctive way in which increase in self-worth contributes to happiness seems to be in an important way different from the distinctive way in which friendship contributes to happiness. Finally, I point to what I take to be the right direction in explaining the connection between friendship and happiness.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"200 1 1","pages":"121 - 136"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85613236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Frege’s Puzzle and Cognitive Relationism: An Essay on Mental Files and Coordination 弗雷格的谜题与认知关系主义:论心理档案与协调
IF 0.1
Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2020-05-01 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2020-0001
P. Bonardi
{"title":"Frege’s Puzzle and Cognitive Relationism: An Essay on Mental Files and Coordination","authors":"P. Bonardi","doi":"10.2478/disp-2020-0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2020-0001","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper will critically examine two solutions to Frege’s puzzle: the Millian-Russellian solution proposed by Salmon and Braun, which invokes non-semantic modes of presentation (guises, ways of believing or the like); and Fine’s relationalist solution, which appeals to semantic coordination. Special attention will be devoted to discussing the conception of modes of presentation as mental files and to elucidating the nature of coordination. A third solution to Frege’s puzzle will be explored which, like Salmon’s and Braun’s, adopts the Millian-Russellian semantics but, like Fine’s, involves coordination instead of modes of presentation; however, coordination will not be conceived as a semantic relation but as a cognitive and subjective relation, which provides no contribution to semantic content. This novel Millian-Russellian account involving cognitive coordination will be labelled cognitive relationism.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"75 1","pages":"1 - 40"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86286824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do Plants Feel Pain? 植物会感到疼痛吗?
IF 0.1
Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2020-05-01 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2020-0003
A. Hamilton, Justin P. McBrayer
{"title":"Do Plants Feel Pain?","authors":"A. Hamilton, Justin P. McBrayer","doi":"10.2478/disp-2020-0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2020-0003","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Many people are attracted to the idea that plants experience phenomenal conscious states like pain, sensory awareness, or emotions like fear. If true, this would have wide-ranging moral implications for human behavior, including land development, farming, vegetarianism, and more. Determining whether plants have minds relies on the work of both empirical disciplines and philosophy. Epistemology should settle the standards for evidence of other minds, and science should inform our judgment about whether any plants meet those standards. We argue that evidence for other minds comes either from testimony, behavior, anatomy/physiology, or phylogeny. However, none of these provide evidence that plants have conscious mental states. Therefore, we conclude that there is no evidence that plants have minds in the sense relevant for morality.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"5 1","pages":"71 - 98"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86742445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Virtual Reality: Fictional all the Way Down (and that’s OK) 虚拟现实:完全是虚构的(这没关系)
IF 0.1
Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2019-0010
Jesper Juul
{"title":"Virtual Reality: Fictional all the Way Down (and that’s OK)","authors":"Jesper Juul","doi":"10.2478/disp-2019-0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2019-0010","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Are virtual objects real? I will claim that the question sets us up for the wrong type of conclusion: Chalmers (2017) argues that a virtual calculator (like other entities) is a real calculator when it is “organizationally invariant” with its non-virtual counterpart—when it performs calculation. However, virtual reality and games are defined by the fact that they always selectively implement their source material. Even the most detailed virtual car will still have an infinite range of details which are missing (gas, engines, pistons, fuel, chemical reactions, molecules, atoms). This means that even the most detailed virtual object will still have fictional aspects. Rather than argue that virtual objects are, or aren’t, real, it is preferable to think of overlaps and continuities between the fictional and the real, where even the most painstakingly detailed virtual reality implementation of a non-virtual object is still art: a human process of selection and interpretation. Virtual reality should therefore not be philosophically understood just as a technological implementation on a trajectory to perfection, but as a cultural artifact which derives its value in part from its simplification and difference from its source material.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"24 1","pages":"333 - 343"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82189861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Reference in Fiction 小说中的参考文献
IF 0.1
Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2019-0016
Stacie Friend
{"title":"Reference in Fiction","authors":"Stacie Friend","doi":"10.2478/disp-2019-0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2019-0016","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Most discussions of proper names in fiction concern the names of fictional characters, such as ‘Clarissa Dalloway’ or ‘Lilliput.’ Less attention has been paid to referring names in fiction, such as ‘Napoleon’ (in Tolstoy’s War and Peace) or ‘London’ (in Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four). This is because many philosophers simply assume that such names are unproblematic; they refer in the usual way to their ordinary referents. The alternative position, dubbed Exceptionalism by Manuel García-Carpintero, maintains that referring names make a distinctive semantic contribution in fiction. In this paper I offer a positive argument for Non-Exceptionalism, relying on the claim that works of both fiction and non-fiction can express the same singular propositions. I go on to defend my account against García-Carpintero’s objections.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"61 1","pages":"179 - 206"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76195273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Singular Reference in Fictional Discourse? 虚构话语中的单数指称?
IF 0.1
Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2019-0015
M. García‐Carpintero
{"title":"Singular Reference in Fictional Discourse?","authors":"M. García‐Carpintero","doi":"10.2478/disp-2019-0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2019-0015","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Singular terms used in fictions for fictional characters raise well-known philosophical issues, explored in depth in the literature. But philosophers typically assume that names already in use to refer to “moderatesized specimens of dry goods” cause no special problem when occurring in fictions, behaving there as they ordinarily do in straightforward assertions. In this paper I continue a debate with Stacie Friend, arguing against this for the exceptionalist view that names of real entities in fictional discourse don’t work there as they do in simple-sentence assertions, but rather as fictional names do.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"4 1","pages":"143 - 177"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84717340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Fictional Content 虚构的内容
IF 0.1
Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2019-0019
E. Paganini
{"title":"Fictional Content","authors":"E. Paganini","doi":"10.2478/disp-2019-0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2019-0019","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract It is usually taken for granted that a necessary condition for knowing that P is the truth of P. It may therefore be claimed that if we assume that we gain some kind of knowledge through fiction (let us call it fictional knowledge) of P*, then P* should be true—in at least a certain sense. My hypothesis is that this assumption grounds the different ways adopted by philosophers for attributing truth-conditions to fictional sentences. My claim in this work is that fictional sentences do not have truth-values and truth-conditions, but I want to maintain that we gain some kind of knowledge through fiction: to this aim, I will characterize the objective content of fictional sentences not in terms of truth-conditions (which are usually described by appealing to rules of the language or rules of interpretation of language independent of the actual users), but in dispositional terms and I will define a necessary condition for fictional knowledge accordingly.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"17 1","pages":"255 - 269"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77165571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Virtual Realism: Really Realism or only Virtually so? A Comment on D. J. Chalmers’s Petrus Hispanus Lectures 虚拟现实主义:真正的现实主义还是虚拟的现实主义?D. J.查尔默斯的《佩特鲁斯·伊斯帕努斯讲座》评析
IF 0.1
Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2019-0008
C. Beisbart
{"title":"Virtual Realism: Really Realism or only Virtually so? A Comment on D. J. Chalmers’s Petrus Hispanus Lectures","authors":"C. Beisbart","doi":"10.2478/disp-2019-0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2019-0008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract What is the status of a cat in a virtual reality environment? Is it a real object? Or part of a fiction? Virtual realism, as defended by D. J. Chalmers, takes it to be a virtual object that really exists, that has properties and is involved in real events. His preferred specification of virtual realism identifies the cat with a digital object. The project of this paper is to use a comparison between virtual reality environments and scientific computer simulations to critically engage with Chalmers’s position. I first argue that, if it is sound, his virtual realism should also be applied to objects that figure in scientific computer simulations, e.g. to simulated galaxies. This leads to a slippery slope because it implies an unreasonable proliferation of digital objects. A philosophical analysis of scientific computer simulations suggests an alternative picture: The cat and the galaxies are parts of fictional models for which the computer provides model descriptions. This result motivates a deeper analysis of the way in which Chalmers builds up his realism. I argue that he buys realism too cheap. For instance, he does not really specify what virtual objects are supposed to be. As a result, rhetoric aside, his virtual realism isn’t far from a sort of fictionalism.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"14 1","pages":"297 - 331"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83833988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
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