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On Phenomenal Functionalism about the Properties of Virtual and Non-virtual Objects 论虚拟与非虚拟对象属性的现象功能主义
IF 0.1
Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2019-0005
A. Ney
{"title":"On Phenomenal Functionalism about the Properties of Virtual and Non-virtual Objects","authors":"A. Ney","doi":"10.2478/disp-2019-0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2019-0005","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to phenomenal functionalism, whether some object or event has a given property is determined by the kinds of sensory experiences such objects or events typically cause in normal perceivers in normal viewing conditions. This paper challenges this position and, more specifically, David Chalmers’s use of it in arguing for what he calls virtual realism.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"22 1","pages":"399 - 410"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89468681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Agnosticism, Inquiry, and Unanswerable Questions 不可知论、探究和无法回答的问题
IF 0.1
Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2019-11-01 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2019-0012
A. Archer
{"title":"Agnosticism, Inquiry, and Unanswerable Questions","authors":"A. Archer","doi":"10.2478/disp-2019-0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2019-0012","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In her paper “Why Suspend Judging?” Jane Friedman has argued that being agnostic about some question entails that one has an inquiring attitude towards that question. Call this the agnostic-as-inquirer thesis. I argue that the agnostic-as-inquirer thesis is implausible. Specifically, I maintain that the agnostic-as-inquirer thesis requires that we deny the existence of a kind of agent that plausibly exists; namely, one who is both agnostic about Q because they regard their available evidence as insufficient for answering Q and who decides not to inquire into Q because they believe Q to be unanswerable. I claim that it is not only possible for such an agent to exist, but that such an agent is also epistemically permissible.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"125 1","pages":"63 - 88"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89131057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
Employing Robots 使用机器人
IF 0.1
Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2019-11-01 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2019-0013
C. Mildenberger
{"title":"Employing Robots","authors":"C. Mildenberger","doi":"10.2478/disp-2019-0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2019-0013","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I am concerned with what automation—widely considered to be the “future of work”—holds for the artificially intelligent agents we aim to employ. My guiding question is whether it is normatively problematic to employ artificially intelligent agents like, for example, autonomous robots as workers. The answer I propose is the following. There is nothing inherently normatively problematic about employing autonomous robots as workers. Still, we must not put them to perform just any work, if we want to avoid blame. This might not sound like much of a limitation. Interestingly, however, we can argue for this claim based on metaphysically and normatively parsimonious grounds. Namely, all I rely on when arguing for my claim is that the robots we aim to employ exhibit a kind of autonomy.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"37 1","pages":"110 - 89"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78773389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Frustrating Absences 令人沮丧的缺席
IF 0.1
Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2019-11-01 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2019-0011
A. Abath
{"title":"Frustrating Absences","authors":"A. Abath","doi":"10.2478/disp-2019-0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2019-0011","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Experiences of absence are common in everyday life, but have received little philosophical attention until recently, when two positions regarding the nature of such experiences surfaced in the literature. According to the Perceptual View, experiences of absence are perceptual in nature. This is denied by the Surprise-Based View, according to which experiences of absence belong together with cases of surprise. In this paper, I show that there is a kind of experience of absence—which I call frustrating absences—that has been overlooked by the Perceptual View and by the Surprise Based-View and that cannot be adequately explained by them. I offer an alternative account to deal with frustrating absences, one according to which experiencing frustrating absences is a matter of subjects having desires for something to be present frustrated by the world. Finally, I argue that there may well be different kinds of experiences of absence.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"8 1","pages":"45 - 62"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79481424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
John Searle’s Naturalism as a Hybrid (Property-Substance) Version of Naturalistic Psychophysical Dualism 约翰·塞尔的自然主义是自然主义心理物理二元论的混合(属性-物质)版本
IF 0.1
Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2019-05-01 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2019-0003
D. Sepetyi
{"title":"John Searle’s Naturalism as a Hybrid (Property-Substance) Version of Naturalistic Psychophysical Dualism","authors":"D. Sepetyi","doi":"10.2478/disp-2019-0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2019-0003","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The article discusses the relationship between John Searle’s doctrine of naturalism and various forms of materialism and dualism. It is argued that despite Searle’s protestations, his doctrine is not substantially differ- ent from the epiphenomenalistic property dualism, except for the admis- sion, in his later works, of the existence of an irreducible non-Humean self. In particular, his recognition that consciousness is unique in having an irreducible first-person ontology makes his disavowal of property du- alism purely verbalistic. As for epiphenomenalism, Searle’s explanation of how consciousness can be efficacious without violating the causal clo- sure of the physical, by analogy with the causal efficacy of the higher level properties of physical objects that are supervenient on the microphysical, confuses causality and constitution (causal and constitutive superve- nience). It is also argued that Searle’s recognition of the existence of an irreducible non-Humean self that is responsible for decision-making sits badly both with his (property dualistic) view that conscious mental states are irreducibly first-personal states of the brain (rather than of the self) and with his (epiphenomenalistic) view that consciousness has no causal power in addition to that of the underlying neurobiology.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"11 1","pages":"23 - 44"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85620798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do We Need Propositions? 我们需要命题吗?
IF 0.1
Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2019-05-01 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2019-0002
Gordon Barnes
{"title":"Do We Need Propositions?","authors":"Gordon Barnes","doi":"10.2478/disp-2019-0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2019-0002","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Trenton Merricks argues that we need propositions to serve as the premises and conclusions of modally valid arguments (Merricks 2015). A modally valid argument is an argument in which, necessarily, if the premises are true, then the conclusion is also true. According to Mer- ricks, the premises and conclusions of modally valid arguments have their truth conditions essentially, and they exist necessarily. Sentences do not satisfy these conditions. Thus, we need propositions. Merricks’ argument adds a new chapter to the longstanding debate over the exis- tence of propositions. However, I argue that Merricks’ argument does not quite succeed. Merricks has overlooked one viable alternative to pos- tulating propositions. However, this alternative employs the relation of being true-at-a-world, which is difficult to analyze. Thus, the soundness of Merricks’ argument ultimately depends on the comparative merits of accepting propositions as abstract entities, versus accepting truth-at-a- world as an unanalyzed relation between sentences and possible worlds.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"7 1","pages":"1 - 8"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72468925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Personal Identity: The Simple and Complex Views Revisited 个人同一性:简单与复杂观点的重新审视
IF 0.1
Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2019-02-21 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2019-0001
H. Noonan
{"title":"Personal Identity: The Simple and Complex Views Revisited","authors":"H. Noonan","doi":"10.2478/disp-2019-0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2019-0001","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Eric Olson has argued, startlingly, that no coherent account can be giv- en of the distinction made in the personal identity literature between ‘complex views’ and ‘simple views’. ‘We tell our students,’ he writes, ‘that accounts of personal identity over time fall into [these] two broad categories’. But ‘it is impossible to characterize this distinction in any satisfactory way. The debate has been systematically misdescribed’. I argue, first, that, for all Olson has said, a recent account by Noonan provides the coherent characterization he claims impossible. If so we have not been wrong all along in the way he says in what we have been telling our students. I then give an account of the distinction between the reductionist and non-reductionist positions which makes it differ- ent from the complex/simple distinction. The aim is to make clear sense of the notion of a not simple but non-reductionist position — which seems an eminently reasonable possibility and something it may also be useful to tell our students about.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"549 1","pages":"22 - 9"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78015727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11
How Propaganda Works: An Introduction 宣传是如何起作用的:介绍
IF 0.1
Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2018-12-01 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2018-0016
Dan Zeman
{"title":"How Propaganda Works: An Introduction","authors":"Dan Zeman","doi":"10.2478/disp-2018-0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2018-0016","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This is the editor’s introduction to the book symposium on Jason Stanley’s influential book How Propaganda Words (Oxford University Press, 2015). After a few brief remarks situating the book in the landscape of current analytic philosophy, I offer a detailed presentation of each chapter of the book, in order to familiarize the reader with its main tenets and with the author’s argumentative strategy. I flag the issues that the contributors to the symposium discuss, and describe their main points. I end with expressing hope that the symposium will help continue the conversation around ideology and propaganda within analytic philosophy.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"45 1","pages":"275 - 288"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79711030","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Replies to Cepollaro and Torrengo, Táíwò, and Amoretti 回复Cepollaro和Torrengo, Táíwò和Amoretti
IF 0.1
Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2018-12-01 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2018-0017
J. Stanley
{"title":"Replies to Cepollaro and Torrengo, Táíwò, and Amoretti","authors":"J. Stanley","doi":"10.2478/disp-2018-0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2018-0017","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this short piece belonging to a book symposium on my book How Propaganda Works (Oxford University Press, 2015), I reply to the objections, comments and suggestions provided by the contributors: Bianca Cepollaro and Giuliano Torrengo, Olúfémi O. Táíwò, and Maria Cristina Amoretti. I show how some of the objections can be accommodated by the framework adopted in the book, but also how various comments and suggestions have contributed to the development, in future work, of several threads pertaining to the general view put forward in How Propaganda Works.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"124 1","pages":"345 - 359"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77336430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
On Haslanger’s Meta-Metaphysics: Social Structures and Metaphysical Deflationism 论哈斯兰格的元形而上学:社会结构与形而上学紧缩主义
IF 0.1
Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2018-12-01 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2018-0013
E. Díaz-León
{"title":"On Haslanger’s Meta-Metaphysics: Social Structures and Metaphysical Deflationism","authors":"E. Díaz-León","doi":"10.2478/disp-2018-0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2018-0013","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The metaphysics of gender and race is a growing area of concern in contemporary analytic metaphysics, with many different views about the nature of gender and race being submitted and discussed. But what are these debates about? What questions are these accounts trying to answer? And is there real disagreement between advocates of differ- ent views about race or gender? If so, what are they really disagreeing about? In this paper I want to develop a view about what the debates in the metaphysics of gender and race are about, namely, a version of metaphysical deflationism, according to which these debates are about how we actually use or should use the terms ‘gender’ and ‘race’ (and other related terms), where moral and political considerations play a central role. I will also argue that my version of the view can overcome some recent and powerful objections to metaphysical deflationism of- fered by Elizabeth Barnes (2014, 2017).","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"31 1","pages":"201 - 216"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81700986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
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