植物会感到疼痛吗?

IF 0.1 Q3 Arts and Humanities
A. Hamilton, Justin P. McBrayer
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引用次数: 6

摘要

许多人都被这样一种观点所吸引,即植物会经历痛苦、感官意识或恐惧等显著的意识状态。如果这是真的,这将对人类行为产生广泛的道德影响,包括土地开发、农业、素食主义等等。确定植物是否有思想依赖于经验学科和哲学的工作。认识论应该为其他思想的证据确定标准,科学应该告诉我们是否有植物符合这些标准。我们认为,其他思想的证据要么来自证词,行为,解剖学/生理学,或系统发育。然而,这些都不能证明植物有有意识的精神状态。因此,我们得出结论,没有证据表明植物具有与道德相关的思想。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Do Plants Feel Pain?
Abstract Many people are attracted to the idea that plants experience phenomenal conscious states like pain, sensory awareness, or emotions like fear. If true, this would have wide-ranging moral implications for human behavior, including land development, farming, vegetarianism, and more. Determining whether plants have minds relies on the work of both empirical disciplines and philosophy. Epistemology should settle the standards for evidence of other minds, and science should inform our judgment about whether any plants meet those standards. We argue that evidence for other minds comes either from testimony, behavior, anatomy/physiology, or phylogeny. However, none of these provide evidence that plants have conscious mental states. Therefore, we conclude that there is no evidence that plants have minds in the sense relevant for morality.
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来源期刊
Disputatio (Spain)
Disputatio (Spain) Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
审稿时长
35 weeks
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