Disputatio (Spain)最新文献_第2页

Can Constancy Mechanisms Draw the Limits of Intentionality? 恒常机制能否划定意向性的界限?

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Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2022-11-01 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2022-0008

Sérgio Farias de Souza Filho

引用次数: 0

Higher-Order Skolem’s Paradoxes and the Practice of Mathematics: a Note 高阶Skolem悖论与数学实践:注

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Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2022-05-01 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2022-0003

Davood Hosseini, Mansooreh Kimiagari

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Necessarily the Old Riddle Necessary Connections and the Problem of Induction 必然老谜、必然联系与归纳法问题

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Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2022-05-01 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2022-0001

Marius Backmann

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引用次数: 0

Three Arguments against Constitutive Norm Accounts of Assertion 反对构成规范断言的三个论点

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Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2022-05-01 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2022-0002

M. Cull

引用次数: 0

In Defence of Discrete Plural Logic (or How to Avoid Logical Overmedication When Dealing with Internally Singularized Pluralities) 捍卫离散多元逻辑(或如何避免处理内部单一多元时的逻辑过度用药)

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Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2022-05-01 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2022-0004

Gustavo Picazo

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引用次数: 0

Relative Truth 相对真理

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Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2022-01-31 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2010-0008

Filippo Ferrari

引用次数: 0

John Gower’s Rhetoric 约翰·高尔的《修辞学

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Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1484/m.disput-eb.5.124729

Georgiana Donavin

引用次数: 0

Learning to Be Noble in the Middle Ages 在中世纪学习成为贵族

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Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1484/m.disput-eb.5.123774

Claudia Wittig

引用次数: 1

Plenty to Come: Making Sense of Correia & Rosenkranz’s Growing Block 未来还有很多:理解Correia和Rosenkranz的成长块

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Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2021-12-01 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2021-0019

Natalja Deng

{"title":"Plenty to Come: Making Sense of Correia & Rosenkranz’s Growing Block","authors":"Natalja Deng","doi":"10.2478/disp-2021-0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2021-0019","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Fabrice Correia and Sven Rosenkranz’s book Nothing to Come: a Defence of the Growing Block Theory of Time offers an incredibly rich and skillful defense of the growing block theory (GBT), a view of time that arguably has much intuitive appeal, and which has been under attack from many sides. Nonetheless, I have to report that the book’s tense-logical course of treatment has not worked for me; I still struggle with making sense of the GBT. This article begins by drawing out some implications of the book’s set up. First, the notion of existence in play here is not interpretable on the basis of ordinary usage. Second, it would be a mistake to take the tense-logical framework to have any metaphysical significance. I then articulate two main worries about their version of the GBT. The first worry takes a familiar shape: it is just hard to see how their view is dynamic in the relevant sense. The second worry is that the topic seems to have been changed. C&R’s logical system helps itself to key notions whose intended interpretation includes a solution to every metaphysical puzzle about the GBT, so that these puzzles are not so much addressed as enshrined in a formal system. That is, their view seems to answer the question of how language should behave, if the GBT were (somehow) true.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"7 1","pages":"363 - 372"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78813185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Aesthetic Understanding and Epistemic Agency in Art 艺术中的审美理解与认知能动性

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Disputatio (Spain) Pub Date : 2021-12-01 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2021-0014

Guy Dammann, E. Schellekens

{"title":"Aesthetic Understanding and Epistemic Agency in Art","authors":"Guy Dammann, E. Schellekens","doi":"10.2478/disp-2021-0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2021-0014","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Recently, cognitivist accounts about art have come under pressure to provide stronger arguments for the view that artworks can yield genuine insight and understanding. In Gregory Currie’s Imagining and Knowing: Learning from Fiction, for example, a convincing case is laid out to the effect that any knowledge gained from engaging with art must “be judged by the very standards that are used in assessing the claim of science to do the same” (Currie 2020: 8) if indeed it is to count as knowledge. Cognitivists must thus rally to provide sturdier grounds for their view. The revived interest in this philosophical discussion targets not only the concept of knowledge at the heart of cognitivist and anti-cognitivist debate, but also highlights a more specific question about how, exactly, some artworks can (arguably) afford cognitive import and change how we think about the world, ourselves and the many events, persons and situations we encounter. This paper seeks to explore some of the ways in which art is capable of altering our epistemic perspectives in ways that might count as knowledge despite circumventing some standards of evidential requirement. In so doing we will contrast two alternative conceptions of how we stand to learn from art. Whereas the former is modelled on the idea that knowledge is something that can be “extracted” from our experience of particular works of art, the latter relies on a notion of such understanding as primarily borne out of a different kind of engagement with art. We shall call this the subtractive conception and cumulative conception respectively. The cumulative conception, we shall argue, better explains why at least some insights and instances of knowledge gained from art seem to elude the evidential standards called for by sceptics of cognitivism.","PeriodicalId":52369,"journal":{"name":"Disputatio (Spain)","volume":"29 1","pages":"265 - 282"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90592708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0