JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY最新文献_第2页

A Buddhist Critique of Desire: The Notion of Kāma in Aśvaghoṣa’s Saundarananda 佛教对欲望的批判：阿笈摩《胜陀难陀》中的 "迦玛 "概念

IF 0.3 2区哲学

JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-04-20 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-024-09560-0

Nir Feinberg

引用次数: 0

Is Reflection Real According to Abhinavagupta? Dynamic Realism Versus Naïve Realism 阿毗那瓦古普塔认为反射是真实的吗？动态现实主义与天真现实主义

IF 0.3 2区哲学

JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-04-05 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-024-09562-y

Mrinal Kaul

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引用次数: 0

Candrakīrti on lokaprasiddhi: A Bad Hand, or an Ace in the Hole? Candrakīrti on lokaprasiddhi：一手烂牌，还是洞中王牌？

IF 0.3 2区哲学

JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-03-26 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-024-09557-9

{"title":"Candrakīrti on lokaprasiddhi: A Bad Hand, or an Ace in the Hole?","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s10781-024-09557-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-024-09557-9","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> The Indian Buddhist Mādhyamika master Candrakīrti (ca. 7th century CE) grounds his philosophy in lokaprasiddhi / -prasiddha, “that which is common knowledge / generally accepted among people in the world.” This raises the question of whether Candrakīrti accepts everything that is “common knowledge” or instead distinguishes and privileges certain justifiable beliefs within common knowledge. Tom J.F. Tillemans has argued that Candrakīrti advocates a “lowest common denominator” version of lokaprasiddhi instead of a model which promotes “in some areas at least, more of a qualitative hierarchy of opinions and thus criticism by optimally qualified, insightful individuals.” In this way Candrakīrti is characterized as a “typical Prāsaṅgika” who advocates “a populist lokaprasiddha and global error theory,” leading to “a dismal slough of relativism” in which Candrakīrti is compelled to uncritically acquise in the opinions of “average worldlings.” I argue that Candrakīrti instead employs a version of lokaprasiddhi that distinguishes expert knowledge from the untutored notions of the hoi polloi. This argument is based upon a new interpretation of āgama Candrakīrti twice quotes, and Candrakīrti’s usage of the terms lokaprasiddhi / -prasiddha, loka- / laukikavyavahāra, saṃvṛti and saṃvṛtisatya, and laukika paramārtha. I conclude that Candrakīrti presents himself as an expert in the determination of mundane affairs (laukikārthaviniścayanipuṇa), the foremost of which is the “mundane ultimate” (laukika paramārtha), the Buddha’s teaching of the path to liberation. Candrakīrti illucidates this for those following “the Victor’s path of reasoning” (jinasya yuktipathānuyāyin). He bases his philosophy in a position that is simply mundane (laukika eva pakṣe sthitvā), but which is nevertheless rationally demonstrable within the parameters of that which is common knowledge among people in the world (lokaprasiddhi).","PeriodicalId":51854,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140302814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

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‘Play’ of Meanings: Avivakṣitavācyadhvani, Vivakṣitavācyadhvani and Différance: Concordance or Conflict? 意义的'游戏'：Avivakṣitavācyadhvani, Vivakṣitavācyadhvani 和 Différance：一致还是冲突？

IF 0.3 2区哲学

JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-03-21 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-024-09559-7

Ashima Shrawan

引用次数: 0

Vedānta: A Survey of Recent Scholarship (II) 韦达：近代学术概览（二）

IF 0.3 2区哲学

JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-01-18 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09556-2

引用次数: 0

Contradiction, Negation, and the Catus. ṣko.tṭi: Just Several Passages from Dharmapāla’s Commentary on Āryadeva’s Catuh.ḥśataka 矛盾、否定和卡图斯。ṣko.tṭi：达摩帕拉对伊利耶德瓦的《卡图希斯达卡》的评论中的几个段落

IF 0.3 2区哲学

JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-01-02 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09554-4

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引用次数: 0

Discerning Philosophy in the Uttarāmnāya Liturgies of the Newars 从纽瓦尔斯人的 Uttarāmnāya 礼仪中辨析哲学

IF 0.3 2区哲学

JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-12-25 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09555-3

Pongsit Pangsrivongse

引用次数: 0

Vedānta: A Survey of Recent Scholarship (I) Vedānta:近期学术概况(一)

2区哲学

JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09551-7

Michael S. Allen

引用次数: 0

The Problem of Yogācāra Idealism Yogācāra理想主义的问题

2区哲学

JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-09-27 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09552-6

Fabien Muller

引用次数: 0

Yāska’s Theory of Meaning: An Overlooked Episode in the History of Semantics in India Yāska的意义理论:印度语义学史上被忽视的一段插曲

2区哲学

JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-09-25 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09553-5

Paolo Visigalli

引用次数: 0