Is Reflection Real According to Abhinavagupta? Dynamic Realism Versus Naïve Realism

This essay is one more attempt of understanding the non-dual philosophical position of Abhinavagupta viz-a-viz the problem of reflection. Since when my first essay on ‘Abhinavagupta on Reflection’ appeared in JIP, I have once again focused on the non-dual Śaiva theory of reflection (pratibimbavāda) (3.1-65) as discussed by Abhinavagupta (fl.c. 975-1025 CE) in the Tantrāloka and his commentator Jayaratha (fl.c. 1225-1275 CE). The present attempt is to understand their philosophical position in the context of Nyāya realism where a reflection is simply caused by an erroneous apprehension of an entity. For Naiyāyikas, according to both Abhinavagupta and Jayaratha, a reflection (pratibimba) does not have a real existence at all. There are only two ways of looking at a reflection: it can either simply be an original image (bimba) or an illusion (bhrānti). There is no scope for any third entity apart from something being an error or a non-error. In contrast to this, establishing a Śaiva theory of reflection, Abhinavagupta is corroborating a valid ontological status for the seemingly illusory objects of perception or imagined objects, such as, to use Abhinavagupta’s own language, ‘an elephant with five trunks and four tusks who is running in the sky’. In other words, he is pleading for the valid cognition of objects which are otherwise deemed to be an error or external to consciousness. While Abhinavagupta’s system has generally been referred to as ‘idealism’, I argue that by establishing the dynamism of reflective awareness that is deemed to be absolutely real, his system should be referred to as ‘dynamic realism’ i.e., the ‘dynamism’ that is common to both ‘real’ and ‘ideal’. This is why he uses the metaphor consciousness-as-mirror (ciddarpaṇa) in establishing a non-erroneous ontological status for otherwise illusive idea of reflection.