JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY最新文献_第3页

Candrakīrti on lokaprasiddhi: A Bad Hand, or an Ace in the Hole? Candrakīrti on lokaprasiddhi：一手烂牌，还是洞中王牌？

IF 0.3 2区哲学

JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-03-26 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-024-09557-9

{"title":"Candrakīrti on lokaprasiddhi: A Bad Hand, or an Ace in the Hole?","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s10781-024-09557-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-024-09557-9","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> The Indian Buddhist Mādhyamika master Candrakīrti (ca. 7th century CE) grounds his philosophy in lokaprasiddhi / -prasiddha, “that which is common knowledge / generally accepted among people in the world.” This raises the question of whether Candrakīrti accepts everything that is “common knowledge” or instead distinguishes and privileges certain justifiable beliefs within common knowledge. Tom J.F. Tillemans has argued that Candrakīrti advocates a “lowest common denominator” version of lokaprasiddhi instead of a model which promotes “in some areas at least, more of a qualitative hierarchy of opinions and thus criticism by optimally qualified, insightful individuals.” In this way Candrakīrti is characterized as a “typical Prāsaṅgika” who advocates “a populist lokaprasiddha and global error theory,” leading to “a dismal slough of relativism” in which Candrakīrti is compelled to uncritically acquise in the opinions of “average worldlings.” I argue that Candrakīrti instead employs a version of lokaprasiddhi that distinguishes expert knowledge from the untutored notions of the hoi polloi. This argument is based upon a new interpretation of āgama Candrakīrti twice quotes, and Candrakīrti’s usage of the terms lokaprasiddhi / -prasiddha, loka- / laukikavyavahāra, saṃvṛti and saṃvṛtisatya, and laukika paramārtha. I conclude that Candrakīrti presents himself as an expert in the determination of mundane affairs (laukikārthaviniścayanipuṇa), the foremost of which is the “mundane ultimate” (laukika paramārtha), the Buddha’s teaching of the path to liberation. Candrakīrti illucidates this for those following “the Victor’s path of reasoning” (jinasya yuktipathānuyāyin). He bases his philosophy in a position that is simply mundane (laukika eva pakṣe sthitvā), but which is nevertheless rationally demonstrable within the parameters of that which is common knowledge among people in the world (lokaprasiddhi).","PeriodicalId":51854,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140302814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

‘Play’ of Meanings: Avivakṣitavācyadhvani, Vivakṣitavācyadhvani and Différance: Concordance or Conflict? 意义的'游戏'：Avivakṣitavācyadhvani, Vivakṣitavācyadhvani 和 Différance：一致还是冲突？

IF 0.3 2区哲学

JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-03-21 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-024-09559-7

Ashima Shrawan

引用次数: 0

Vedānta: A Survey of Recent Scholarship (II) 韦达：近代学术概览（二）

IF 0.3 2区哲学

JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-01-18 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09556-2

引用次数: 0

Contradiction, Negation, and the Catus. ṣko.tṭi: Just Several Passages from Dharmapāla’s Commentary on Āryadeva’s Catuh.ḥśataka 矛盾、否定和卡图斯。ṣko.tṭi：达摩帕拉对伊利耶德瓦的《卡图希斯达卡》的评论中的几个段落

IF 0.3 2区哲学

JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-01-02 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09554-4

{"title":"Contradiction, Negation, and the Catus. ṣko.tṭi: Just Several Passages from Dharmapāla’s Commentary on Āryadeva’s Catuh.ḥśataka","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s10781-023-09554-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-023-09554-4","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <?sps A3B2 twb=0.25w?>Using logic-laden terms to translate and interpret what the ancient Indian Buddhist thinkers said when we are not sure what they spoke about when they spoke about ‘contradictions’, etc. in natural languages can sometimes make things frustrating. Keeping in mind Wittgenstein’s exhortation, “don’t think, but look!”, I approach the issues of contradiction, negation, and the catuṣkoṭi via case-by-case study on several pertinent passages in Dharmapāla’s Dasheng Guangbailun Shilun. The following are some interrelated observations which should not be overgeneralized, especially considering the limited scope of this study and its methodological considerations. First, there is an implicit rule of non-opposition and there could be no real oppositions for apparent oppositions because of implicit qualifications. Moreover, these are not new since or after Dignāga. Second, Dharmapāla and his contemporaries are familiar with the two negative usages, and prasajya-pratiṣedha is used for negating the opponents’ theses and is related to the no-thesis view. It’s not a good idea to assign truth values to sentences using prasajya-pratiṣedha or to a thesis in which the terms have no real objects. And Dharmapāla’s theses are just therapeutic tools. Third, in Dharmapāla’s discussion of the negative catuṣkoṭi, one can see the rule of non-opposition, the strategy of qualifications, and the two negative usages. Although the four positions in the catuṣkoṭi are regarded as mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, they are jointly exhaustive in pragmatic context, and are mutually exclusive under some interpretations, but not all. My tentative suggestion is that the catuṣkoṭi is a loosely term-based way of categorization. Last but not least, in the text discussed, I do not see Buddhist thinkers endorsing any contradictions.","PeriodicalId":51854,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139079678","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Discerning Philosophy in the Uttarāmnāya Liturgies of the Newars 从纽瓦尔斯人的 Uttarāmnāya 礼仪中辨析哲学

IF 0.3 2区哲学

JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-12-25 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09555-3

Pongsit Pangsrivongse

引用次数: 0

Vedānta: A Survey of Recent Scholarship (I) Vedānta:近期学术概况(一)

2区哲学

JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09551-7

Michael S. Allen

引用次数: 0

The Problem of Yogācāra Idealism Yogācāra理想主义的问题

2区哲学

JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-09-27 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09552-6

Fabien Muller

引用次数: 0

Yāska’s Theory of Meaning: An Overlooked Episode in the History of Semantics in India Yāska的意义理论:印度语义学史上被忽视的一段插曲

2区哲学

JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-09-25 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09553-5

Paolo Visigalli

引用次数: 0

Who Identifies with the Aggregates? Philosophical Implications of the Selected Khandha Passages in the Nikāyas 谁认同聚合?< < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < > > > > > < < < > > > Nikāyas

2区哲学

JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-09-09 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09550-8

Grzegorz Polak

{"title":"Who Identifies with the Aggregates? Philosophical Implications of the Selected Khandha Passages in the Nikāyas","authors":"Grzegorz Polak","doi":"10.1007/s10781-023-09550-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-023-09550-8","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I discuss some philosophical problems connected with the notion of regarding the aggregates ( khandha ) as self in the Nikāyas. In particular, I focus on the attitude represented by the formula “I am this” ( esohamasmi ) which may be labeled as that of identifying with the aggregates. In the first part of the paper, I point out and analyze certain similes contained in the Nikāyas which may be read as implying the existence of a distinction between the aggregates and the individual who regards them as self. Then, I consider a hypothesis that the aggregates are not objective constituents of a human being but subjectively experienced representational phenomena. I argue that several Nikāya texts imply the existence of important aspects of a human being, in particular cognitive ones, which are not conceptualized in the terms of the five aggregates. I also discuss the possibility of interpreting khandha s as not active in character but as resultant of other cognitive processes. In the last part of the paper I offer a hypothesis that one of the key aspects of regarding the aggregates as self lies in the identification of a human individual with one’s own phenomenal self-representation which results in a mistaken projection of the notions of agency, identity and subjectivity onto something that is inherently devoid of it. I also consider certain parallels between the ideas present in the Nikāyas and the concepts of the modern philosophy of mind.","PeriodicalId":51854,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136107286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

The Conundrum of Kundakunda’s Status in the Digambara Tradition 昆达昆达在迪甘巴拉传统中的地位之谜

IF 0.3 2区哲学

JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-09-02 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09549-1

Jayandra Soni

引用次数: 0