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The auditing game: the dark side of the private provision of a public good 审计游戏:私人提供公共产品的阴暗面
IF 1.3 3区 社会学
European Journal of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-16 DOI: 10.1007/s10657-023-09785-6
Thomas Ehrmann, Aloys Prinz
{"title":"The auditing game: the dark side of the private provision of a public good","authors":"Thomas Ehrmann, Aloys Prinz","doi":"10.1007/s10657-023-09785-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-023-09785-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The aim of auditing is to protect active and potential investors from accounting fraud. Nevertheless, as many auditing scandals have demonstrated, auditing has a dark side. Correct auditing is a public good provided by private auditing firms, but these firms are paid by the enterprise being audited. Therefore, audit firms may be dubbed as agents of two principals, the audited firm and the public. Reputation theory conjectures that auditors are disincentivized from performing shallow and fraudulent auditing because of reputational concerns and associated reputational costs. However, empirical evidence does not support this claim. While it may be irrational for a large audit firm (such as Arthur Andersen LLP) to sacrifice its reputational capital for a single client by doing superficial audits (such as WorldCom), it may be quite rational for the auditing firm’s engagement partners to do so. The result might be a conspiracy against the public and investors. Because of an inelastic supply of experienced auditors and a highly concentrated market of big auditing firms, reputational losses due to auditing scandals for the audit firms’ local partners and staff seem to be rather small. With a game theoretic model, we argue here that neither higher transparency nor higher fines for auditing failures may prevent such conspiracies. Therefore, legal regulations and court rulings can only change the expected fines for audit fraud, but they cannot solve the general problems arising from the symbiotic relationship between auditors and their client firms. As auditing firms may use the so-called expectation gap to protect themselves against legal claims of wrongdoing, avenues more suitable to deterring conspiracies by auditors and their client firms might include whistleblowing, short-selling investors and investigative journalism.</p>","PeriodicalId":51664,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138524460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Plea bargaining and investigation effort: inquisitorial criminal procedure as a three-player game 辩诉交易和调查努力:作为一个三人游戏的刑事调查程序
3区 社会学
European Journal of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-31 DOI: 10.1007/s10657-023-09782-9
Robin Christmann
{"title":"Plea bargaining and investigation effort: inquisitorial criminal procedure as a three-player game","authors":"Robin Christmann","doi":"10.1007/s10657-023-09782-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-023-09782-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51664,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135765837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The flip side of the coin: how entrepreneurship-oriented insolvency laws can complicate access to debt financing for growth firms 硬币的另一面:面向创业的破产法如何使成长型公司获得债务融资变得复杂
3区 社会学
European Journal of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-29 DOI: 10.1007/s10657-023-09783-8
Maren Forier, Nadine Lybaert, Maarten Corten, Niels Appermont, Tensie Steijvers
{"title":"The flip side of the coin: how entrepreneurship-oriented insolvency laws can complicate access to debt financing for growth firms","authors":"Maren Forier, Nadine Lybaert, Maarten Corten, Niels Appermont, Tensie Steijvers","doi":"10.1007/s10657-023-09783-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-023-09783-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51664,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"44 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136135273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The anti-steering provision of Article 5 (4) of the DMA: a law and economics assessment on the business model of gatekeepers and business users DMA第5(4)条的反导向条款:对看门人和业务用户商业模式的法律和经济学评估
3区 社会学
European Journal of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-26 DOI: 10.1007/s10657-023-09784-7
Christian Rusche, Jeanne Mouton
{"title":"The anti-steering provision of Article 5 (4) of the DMA: a law and economics assessment on the business model of gatekeepers and business users","authors":"Christian Rusche, Jeanne Mouton","doi":"10.1007/s10657-023-09784-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-023-09784-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51664,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134907896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Data portability and interoperability: An E.U.-U.S. comparison 数据可移植性和互操作性:欧盟和美国的比较
3区 社会学
European Journal of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-09-20 DOI: 10.1007/s10657-023-09781-w
Daniel Rubinfeld
{"title":"Data portability and interoperability: An E.U.-U.S. comparison","authors":"Daniel Rubinfeld","doi":"10.1007/s10657-023-09781-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-023-09781-w","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Data portability (the ability to transfer data without affecting its content) and interoperability (the ability to integrate two or more datasets) significantly affect the use of data, with important implications for antitrust policy. Allowing for improved data portability can facilitate interoperability, which, in turn, will enable consumers to switch services, thereby substantially increasing competition. However, barriers to data portability and interoperability can increase market power and be a major source of social inefficiency. This paper lays out the pros and cons of a move towards requirements of data interoperability and portability and contrasts the move in the U.S. and in the EU.","PeriodicalId":51664,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"173 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136309247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the sociology of cartels 卡特尔社会学研究
IF 1.3 3区 社会学
European Journal of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-29 DOI: 10.1007/s10657-023-09780-x
Justus Haucap, C. Heldman
{"title":"On the sociology of cartels","authors":"Justus Haucap, C. Heldman","doi":"10.1007/s10657-023-09780-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-023-09780-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51664,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Law and Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47853416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Corporate criminals in a market context: enforcement and optimal sanctions 市场背景下的企业犯罪:执行和最佳制裁
3区 社会学
European Journal of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-18 DOI: 10.1007/s10657-023-09773-w
Emmanuelle Auriol, Erling Hjelmeng, Tina Søreide
{"title":"Corporate criminals in a market context: enforcement and optimal sanctions","authors":"Emmanuelle Auriol, Erling Hjelmeng, Tina Søreide","doi":"10.1007/s10657-023-09773-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-023-09773-w","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract By combining approaches from the economic theory of crime and of industrial organization, this paper analyzes optimal enforcement for three different forms of corporate misconduct that harm competition. The analysis shows why corporate crime is more harmful in large markets, why governments have a disinclination to sanction firms whose crime materializes abroad, and why leniency for those who self-report their crime is a complement, and not a substitute, to independent investigation and enforcement. As public authorities rely increasingly on self-reporting by companies to detect cartels, the number of leniency applications is likely to decline, and this is borne out by data. Upon a review of 50 cases of corporate liability from five European countries, competition law enforcement, governed by a unified legal regime, is more efficient than enforcement in bribery and money laundering cases, governed by disparate criminal law regimes. Sanction predictability and transparency are higher when governments cooperate closely with each other in law enforcement, when there are elements of supra-national authority, and when the offense is regulated by a separate legal instrument. Given our results, Europe would benefit from stronger supra-national cooperation in regulation and enforcement of transnational corporate crime, especially for the sake of deterrent penalties against crime committed abroad.","PeriodicalId":51664,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136019779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Litigation and settlement under loss aversion 损失规避下的诉讼与和解
3区 社会学
European Journal of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-15 DOI: 10.1007/s10657-023-09777-6
Cedric Argenton, Xiaoyu Wang
{"title":"Litigation and settlement under loss aversion","authors":"Cedric Argenton, Xiaoyu Wang","doi":"10.1007/s10657-023-09777-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-023-09777-6","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, we investigate how loss aversion affects people’s behavior in private litigation. We find that a loss-averse plaintiff demands a higher settlement for intermediate claims to maintain her threat to proceed to trial following rejection compared to a loss-neutral plaintiff. For larger claims, a loss-averse plaintiff demands a lower offer to increase the settlement probability as loss pains her extra in trial. We also investigate how various policies affect loss-averse litigants’ settlement decisions. Only a reduction in the asymmetry of information about trial odds uniformly leads to higher settlement rates.","PeriodicalId":51664,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135063292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does criminalizing the purchase of sex reduce sex-buying? Evidence from a European survey on prostitution 将购买性行为定为犯罪会减少购买性行为吗?来自欧洲卖淫调查的证据
IF 1.3 3区 社会学
European Journal of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-13 DOI: 10.1007/s10657-023-09778-5
S. Jonsson
{"title":"Does criminalizing the purchase of sex reduce sex-buying? Evidence from a European survey on prostitution","authors":"S. Jonsson","doi":"10.1007/s10657-023-09778-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-023-09778-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51664,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Law and Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44828876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Law, human capital, and the emergence of free city-states in medieval Italy 法律，人力资本，以及中世纪意大利自由城邦的出现
3区 社会学
European Journal of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-06 DOI: 10.1007/s10657-023-09779-4
Marianna Belloc, Francesco Drago, Roberto Galbiati
{"title":"Law, human capital, and the emergence of free city-states in medieval Italy","authors":"Marianna Belloc, Francesco Drago, Roberto Galbiati","doi":"10.1007/s10657-023-09779-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-023-09779-4","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper considers how the foundation of the first universities in Italy affected the emergence of free city-states (the communes) in the period 1000–1300 CE. Exploiting a panel dataset of 121 cities, we show that the time variant distance of the sample cities to their closest university is inversely correlated with the probability of their transition to communal institutions. Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the medieval universities provided the useful juridical knowledge and skills for building legal capacity and developing communal institutions.","PeriodicalId":51664,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135999498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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