损失规避下的诉讼与和解

IF 1 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-15 DOI:10.1007/s10657-023-09777-6

Cedric Argenton, Xiaoyu Wang

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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要本文主要研究损失厌恶对私人诉讼行为的影响。我们发现，与损失中立的原告相比，厌恶损失的原告对中间索赔要求更高的和解，以维持她在被驳回后继续进行审判的威胁。对于较大的索赔，一个厌恶损失的原告要求一个较低的报价，以增加和解的可能性，因为损失在审判中使她更加痛苦。我们还研究了各种政策如何影响规避损失的诉讼当事人的和解决定。只有减少关于审判赔率的信息不对称性，才会导致更高的和解率。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

Litigation and settlement under loss aversion

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Litigation and settlement under loss aversion

Abstract In this paper, we investigate how loss aversion affects people’s behavior in private litigation. We find that a loss-averse plaintiff demands a higher settlement for intermediate claims to maintain her threat to proceed to trial following rejection compared to a loss-neutral plaintiff. For larger claims, a loss-averse plaintiff demands a lower offer to increase the settlement probability as loss pains her extra in trial. We also investigate how various policies affect loss-averse litigants’ settlement decisions. Only a reduction in the asymmetry of information about trial odds uniformly leads to higher settlement rates.

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来源期刊

European Journal of Law and Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

2.40

自引率

7.70%

发文量

期刊介绍： The European Journal of Law and Economics provides readers with high-quality theoretical and empirical research in which both the legal and economic dimensions merge and combine. The journal welcomes articles that promote a better understanding of legal phenomena, legal decisions made by judges, courts or regulatory agencies, and involving economic tools. Theoretical papers are welcome, provided they have a strong basis in law and economics. We also welcome case studies, as well as empirical analyses – including empirical legal studies – and experimental investigations. The European Journal of Law and Economics does not favor any particular topic, but does have a focus on new and emerging problems. European themes are particularly welcome, because we feel it is important to exploit Europe’s considerable institutional diversity in order to build a more robust body of theory and empirical evidence. However, the purpose of the journal is also to showcase the diversity of law and economics approaches, as supplied by an international mix of authors. Drawing on the support of respected scholars from around the world, who serve as consulting editors and editorial board members, the Editors wish to give contributing authors the opportunity to improve their papers, while also offering them a quick and efficient review process. Officially cited as: Eur J Law Econ