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A Theory of Subjective Well-Being, Mark Fabian. Oxford University Press, 2022, x + 305 pages. 主观幸福理论,马克·法比安。牛津大学出版社,2022,x+305页。
IF 1.2 2区 哲学
Economics and Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-08-07 DOI: 10.1017/s0266267123000214
G. Hersch
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引用次数: 2
EAP volume 39 issue 2 Cover and Front matter EAP第39卷第2期封面和封面问题
2区 哲学
Economics and Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1017/s0266267123000366
{"title":"EAP volume 39 issue 2 Cover and Front matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s0266267123000366","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267123000366","url":null,"abstract":"An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135806568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Tragic Science: How Economists Cause Harm (even as They Aspire to Do Good). George F. DeMartino. University of Chicago Press. xi + 265 pages 悲剧科学:经济学家如何造成伤害(即使他们渴望行善)。乔治·F·德马蒂诺。芝加哥大学出版社。xi+265页
IF 1.2 2区 哲学
Economics and Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-06-15 DOI: 10.1017/s0266267123000196
Lukas Beck
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引用次数: 1
Stratified social norms 分层社会规范
IF 1.2 2区 哲学
Economics and Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-06-05 DOI: 10.1017/s0266267123000159
Han van Wietmarschen
{"title":"Stratified social norms","authors":"Han van Wietmarschen","doi":"10.1017/s0266267123000159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267123000159","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article explains how social norms can help to distinguish and understand a range of different kinds of social inequality and social hierarchy. My aim is to show how the literature on social norms can provide crucial resources to relational egalitarianism, which has made social equality and inequality into a central topic of contemporary normative political theorizing. The hope is that a more discriminating and detailed picture of different kinds of social inequality will help relational egalitarians move beyond a discussion of the justice or injustice of social equality as a single general category.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42819392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Designing a just soda tax 设计汽水税
IF 1.2 2区 哲学
Economics and Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-06-01 DOI: 10.1017/s0266267123000172
Douglas MacKay, Alexandria Huber-Disla
{"title":"Designing a just soda tax","authors":"Douglas MacKay, Alexandria Huber-Disla","doi":"10.1017/s0266267123000172","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267123000172","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Soda taxes are controversial. While proponents point to their potential health benefits and the public projects that could be funded with their revenue, critics argue that they are paternalistic and regressive. In this paper, we explore the prospects for designing a just soda tax, one that appropriately balances the often-competing ethical considerations of promoting social welfare, respecting people’s autonomy and ensuring distributive fairness. We argue that policymakers have several paths forward for designing a just soda tax, but that the considerations relevant to ethical policy design are more complicated than is sometimes acknowledged.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48768231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract rationality: the ‘logical’ structure of attitudes 抽象理性:态度的“逻辑”结构
IF 1.2 2区 哲学
Economics and Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-05-19 DOI: 10.1017/s0266267123000020
F. Dietrich, A. Staras, R. Sugden
{"title":"Abstract rationality: the ‘logical’ structure of attitudes","authors":"F. Dietrich, A. Staras, R. Sugden","doi":"10.1017/s0266267123000020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267123000020","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We present an abstract model of rationality that focuses on structural properties of attitudes. Rationality requires coherence between your attitudes, such as your beliefs, values and intentions. We define three ‘logical’ conditions on attitudes: consistency, completeness and closedness. They parallel the familiar logical conditions on beliefs, but contrast with standard rationality conditions such as preference transitivity. We establish a formal correspondence between our logical conditions and standard rationality conditions. Addressing John Broome’s programme ‘rationality through reasoning’, we formally characterize how you can (not) become more logical by reasoning. Our analysis connects rationality with logic, and enables logical talk about multi-attitude psychology.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43857310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Reply to Hausman 回复豪斯曼
IF 1.2 2区 哲学
Economics and Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-05-05 DOI: 10.1017/s0266267123000147
J. Thoma
{"title":"Reply to Hausman","authors":"J. Thoma","doi":"10.1017/s0266267123000147","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267123000147","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43985801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Subjective total comparative evaluations 主观总比较评价
IF 1.2 2区 哲学
Economics and Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-05-05 DOI: 10.1017/s0266267122000311
D. Hausman
{"title":"Subjective total comparative evaluations","authors":"D. Hausman","doi":"10.1017/s0266267122000311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267122000311","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare, I argued, among other things, that preferences in economics are and ought to be total subjective comparative evaluations, that the theory of rational choice is a reformulation of everyday folk-psychological explanations and predictions of behaviour, and that revealed preference theory is completely untenable. All three of these theses have been challenged in essays by Erik Angner (2018), Francesco Guala (2019) and Johanna Thoma (2021a, 2021b). This essay responds to these criticisms and defends these three theses.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46054347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Identity, ethics and behavioural welfare economics 身份、道德和行为福利经济学
IF 1.2 2区 哲学
Economics and Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-04-27 DOI: 10.1017/s0266267123000123
Ivan Mitrouchev, V. Buonomo
{"title":"Identity, ethics and behavioural welfare economics","authors":"Ivan Mitrouchev, V. Buonomo","doi":"10.1017/s0266267123000123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267123000123","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Multiple selves is a conventional assumption in behavioural welfare economics for modelling intrapersonal well-being. Yet an important question is which self has normative authority over others. In this paper, we advance an argument for what we call the ‘ontological approach’ to personal identity in behavioural welfare economics. According to this approach, ethical questions – such as which preference should be granted normative authority over another – can be informed by the ontological criterion of personal persistence, which aims at determining what it takes for an individual to persist from one time to another.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43726363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Behavioural and heuristic models are as-if models too – and that’s ok 行为模型和启发式模型也是假设模型——这没关系
2区 哲学
Economics and Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-04-14 DOI: 10.1017/s0266267123000093
Ivan Moscati
{"title":"Behavioural and heuristic models are as-if models too – and that’s ok","authors":"Ivan Moscati","doi":"10.1017/s0266267123000093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267123000093","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I examine some behavioural and heuristic models of individual decision-making and argue that the diverse psychological mechanisms these models posit are too demanding to be implemented, either consciously or unconsciously, by actual decision makers. Accordingly, and contrary to what their advocates typically claim, behavioural and heuristic models are best understood as ‘as-if’ models. I then sketch a version of scientific antirealism that justifies the practice of as-if modelling in decision theory but goes beyond traditional instrumentalism. Finally, I relate my account of decision models to the recent controversy about mentalism versus behaviourism, reject both positions, and offer an alternative view.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134998891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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