抽象理性:态度的“逻辑”结构

IF 1.2 2区哲学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Economics and Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-05-19 DOI:10.1017/s0266267123000020

F. Dietrich, A. Staras, R. Sugden

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引用次数: 1

摘要

我们提出了一个抽象的理性模型，它关注态度的结构属性。理性需要你的态度之间的一致性，比如你的信仰、价值观和意图。我们定义了态度的三个“逻辑”条件：一致性、完整性和封闭性。它们平行于人们熟悉的关于信仰的逻辑条件，但与偏好传递性等标准理性条件形成对比。我们在我们的逻辑条件和标准理性条件之间建立了形式上的对应关系。针对约翰·布鲁姆的“理性通过推理”计划，我们正式描述了你如何通过推理变得（不）更有逻辑。我们的分析将理性与逻辑联系起来，并使我们能够逻辑地谈论多态度心理学。

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Abstract rationality: the ‘logical’ structure of attitudes

We present an abstract model of rationality that focuses on structural properties of attitudes. Rationality requires coherence between your attitudes, such as your beliefs, values and intentions. We define three ‘logical’ conditions on attitudes: consistency, completeness and closedness. They parallel the familiar logical conditions on beliefs, but contrast with standard rationality conditions such as preference transitivity. We establish a formal correspondence between our logical conditions and standard rationality conditions. Addressing John Broome’s programme ‘rationality through reasoning’, we formally characterize how you can (not) become more logical by reasoning. Our analysis connects rationality with logic, and enables logical talk about multi-attitude psychology.

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来源期刊

Economics and Philosophy Multiple-

CiteScore

1.80

自引率

8.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The disciplines of economics and philosophy each possess their own special analytical methods, whose combination is powerful and fruitful. Each discipline can be enriched by the other. Economics and Philosophy aims to promote their mutual enrichment by publishing articles and book reviews in all areas linking these subjects. Topics include the methodology and epistemology of economics, the foundations of decision theory and game theory, the nature of rational choice in general, historical work on economics with a philosophical purpose, ethical issues in economics, the use of economic techniques in ethical theory, and many other subjects.