Quarterly Journal of Political Science最新文献

{"title":"The Manchin Paradox","authors":"Keith Krehbiel, Sara Krehbiel","doi":"10.1561/100.00021165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00021165","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135470422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Social Conflict and the Predatory State","authors":"Brenton Kenkel","doi":"10.1561/100.00020116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00020116","url":null,"abstract":"Conventional wisdom and existing research suggest that a predatory state benefits from divide-and-rule politics, as competition among political factions distracts them from collective action against expropriation. Historically, however, predatory states vary in whether they seek to heighten or reduce internal tensions. Using a formal model, I develop a political economy theory of how social conflict affects the policy choices and overall revenue of a rent-seeking ruler. I show that the profitability of divide-and-rule politics depends critically on the nature of the state’s revenue base. Internal conflict does not just reduce subjects’ incentive to resist, but also to engage in economically productive activity. On the whole, a regime that taxes the products of the society’s labor will profit from promoting social order. Conversely, a state whose objective is to control a fixed stock of wealth, such as natural resources, benefits from internal divisions. ∗I thank Scott Abramson, Phil Arena, Jeff Arnold, Nicole Audette, Brett Benson, Cristina Bodea, Rob Carroll, Clifford Carrubba, Dave Conner, Tom Dolan, Mark Fey, Michael Gibilisco, Hein Goemans, Jeremy Kedziora, Bethany Lacina, Jeff Marshall, Jack Paine, Mattias Polborn, Kristopher Ramsay, Miguel Rueda, Peter Schram, Curt Signorino, Brad Smith, Matt Testerman, and Alan Wiseman for helpful discussions and comments. †Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University. Email: brenton.kenkel@ vanderbilt.edu. The object of a predatory state, such as a colonial empire or a kleptocratic dictatorship, is to profit from power. Collective resistance by the subject population against a predatory regime or its extractive policies threatens the profitability of rule. Therefore, conventional wisdom at least since the Roman empire has held that a predatory state benefits from a policy of divide et impera, or divide and rule. When ethnic groups, religious factions, or other social subgroups are in conflict with each other, they have less time and manpower left over for collective resistance against government predation. Even in the absence of open conflict, the incentives for collective action may be weak in fractionalized societies (see Habyarimana et al. 2007), meaning ruling regimes face a relatively low internal threat to their position. Indeed, divide and rule has been a guiding policy for predatory regimes across time and space: military conquerors like Hernán Cortés in Mexico (Burkholder and Johnson 2015), global empires like the British in India (Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan 2005), and contemporary kleptocrats as in the post-Soviet republics (Driscoll 2015). Yet not all predatory regimes exploit internal divisions. In fact, some do the opposite, promoting internal order over conflict. For example, when the Dutch East India Company arrived in the northern Sulawesi region of present-day Indonesia in the 17th century, the region was beset with raiding and other violence, largely bet","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67072748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Political Interventions in the Administration of Justice","authors":"Carlo M. Horz, H. Simpson","doi":"10.1561/100.00020181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00020181","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67072866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How Does Kompromat Affect Politics? A Model of Transparency Regimes","authors":"Monika Nalepa, Konstantin Sonin","doi":"10.1561/100.00021017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00021017","url":null,"abstract":"Why are transparency regimes so rare? When some politicians have something to conceal, why would their opponents not press for transparency? To analyze transitional justice, we build a model that explains why uncompromised politicians might avoid a transparency regime, which could signal to the voters that they are clean. We model the interaction between an incumbent, an opposition leader, a strategic blackmailer, and voters who know that the opposition politician may be compromised. The incumbent can implement a transparency regime, which would force out a compromised opponent and thus make blackmail impossible. We show that, instead, she might strategically opt for no transparency that keeps all skeletons of the ancient regime in the closet, as it is easier to defeat a potentially compromised opponent. We corroborate our results using original data from the Global Transitional Justice Dataset combined with data on elections, incumbency, and successor autocrat status in post-communist Europe.","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135784815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Social Norms and Social Change","authors":"Ethan BUENO DE MESQUITA, Mehdi Shadmehr","doi":"10.1561/100.00021153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00021153","url":null,"abstract":"We study how social norms affect social change in a setting where people have both internal motivations and a desire to conform. We distinguish two kinds of internal motivations: common values in which people wish to behave consistent with some evolving, uncertain ground truth and private values in which individuals genuinely disagree about proper behavior for non-informational reasons. In both settings aggregate behavior changes more slowly than beliefs about proper behavior, and increased information reduces such inertia. Inertia is a more severe problem, but information is more effective, when values are common rather than private. In this common-values setting, we identify conditions under which increased information leads to a normative improvement. Finally, we elucidate empirical implications for the relationships between measures of attitudes, behavior, and descriptive norms. The average perceived descriptive norm is lower than the average action which is lower than the average belief about the right action (injunctive norm). Thus, behavioral forecasts based on survey answers about perceived descriptive or injunctive norms are under-and over-estimates, respectively.","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67073004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Lobbyists into Government","authors":"Benjamin C. K. Egerod, Joshua McCrain","doi":"10.1561/100.00021196","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00021196","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67073064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Letter from the Editors-in-Chief","authors":"Anthony Fowler, Stephane Wolton","doi":"10.1561/100.00022138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00022138","url":null,"abstract":"The Editorial Board is thrilled to present the 2014 -2015 edition of the Evans School Review, a student led and peer reviewed academic journal. Evans School Review is a student run academic journal that provides an excellent opportunity for students in the Evans community to share their creative research with a wide audience to further research innovation within the area of public policy and administration. In the five years of this journal, we have been lucky enough to have Editorial Boards with the passion and clear vision to make the review what it is today. We are grateful to be at an institution that has supported their students and our desire to present public policy work that is of great interest to us.","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67072668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Reputation Politics of the Filibuster","authors":"Daniel Gibbs","doi":"10.1561/100.00020109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00020109","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67072634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Democracy and its Vulnerabilities: Dynamics of Democratic Backsliding","authors":"Zhaotian Luo, Adam Przeworski","doi":"10.1561/100.00021112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00021112","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136008976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Ruling the Ruling Coalition: Information Control and Authoritarian Power-Sharing","authors":"Zhaotian Luo, Arturas Rozenas","doi":"10.1561/100.00021094","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00021094","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51622,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135470421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}