Philosophical Perspectives最新文献

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SNEAKY ASSERTIONS 狡猾的断言
IF 2 1区 哲学
Philosophical Perspectives Pub Date : 2018-12-01 DOI: 10.1111/phpe.12116
M. García‐Carpintero
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引用次数: 17
WHATmoreIS WHATmoreis
IF 2 1区 哲学
Philosophical Perspectives Pub Date : 2018-12-01 DOI: 10.1111/PHPE.12121
Alexis Wellwood
{"title":"WHATmoreIS","authors":"Alexis Wellwood","doi":"10.1111/PHPE.12121","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PHPE.12121","url":null,"abstract":"I present a biased look at data relating to the form, meaning, understanding, and acquisition of comparative sentences with more. I highlight two major points: (i) comparatives provide a potentially unique case study for examining the interplay of current ideas in formal semantics, generative syntax, and cognitive psychology; (ii) we can give unified explanations for the otherwise disparate phenomena observed here only by interpreting our semantic theory along explicitly cognitive lines. The upshot is not so much a rejection of more traditional views as providing a window on their scientific limitations.","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PHPE.12121","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48438110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Naturalizing Deontic Logic: Indeterminacy, Diagonalization, and Self‐Affirmation 自然化道义逻辑:不确定性、对角化和自我肯定
IF 2 1区 哲学
Philosophical Perspectives Pub Date : 2018-12-01 DOI: 10.1111/PHPE.12111
Melissa Fusco
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引用次数: 4
Provincialism in Pragmatics 语用学中的地方主义
IF 2 1区 哲学
Philosophical Perspectives Pub Date : 2018-12-01 DOI: 10.1111/PHPE.12114
Josh P. Armstrong
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引用次数: 3
Issue Information 问题信息
IF 2 1区 哲学
Philosophical Perspectives Pub Date : 2018-12-01 DOI: 10.1111/phpe.12089
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引用次数: 0
A Temporal Comparison Argument for Presentism 呈现主义的时间比较论证
IF 2 1区 哲学
Philosophical Perspectives Pub Date : 2018-06-20 DOI: 10.1111/phpe.12173
Daniel Marshall
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引用次数: 0
Consciousness and Content in Perception 知觉中的意识与内容
IF 2 1区 哲学
Philosophical Perspectives Pub Date : 2017-12-01 DOI: 10.1111/PHPE.12091
B. Brewer
{"title":"Consciousness and Content in Perception","authors":"B. Brewer","doi":"10.1111/PHPE.12091","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PHPE.12091","url":null,"abstract":"Citing this paper Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination, volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PHPE.12091","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49431983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
THE EVOLUTIONARY ARGUMENT FOR PHENOMENAL POWERS 非凡力量的进化论论证
IF 2 1区 哲学
Philosophical Perspectives Pub Date : 2017-12-01 DOI: 10.1111/PHPE.12096
Hedda Hassel Mørch
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引用次数: 32
SEEING THINGS: Seeing Things 看得见的东西:看得见的东西
IF 2 1区 哲学
Philosophical Perspectives Pub Date : 2017-12-01 DOI: 10.1111/PHPE.12101
Berit Brogaard
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引用次数: 0
DE SE PREFERENCES AND EMPATHY FOR FUTURE SELVES1 对未来自我的偏好和同理心1
IF 2 1区 哲学
Philosophical Perspectives Pub Date : 2017-12-01 DOI: 10.1111/PHPE.12090
L. Paul
{"title":"DE SE PREFERENCES AND EMPATHY FOR FUTURE SELVES1","authors":"L. Paul","doi":"10.1111/PHPE.12090","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PHPE.12090","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that we grasp distinctive, self-involving truths, or de se truths, through immersive experience. Drawing on examples involving gameplay and virtual reality, I defend the value of immersive exploration and virtual first personal perspectives, and explore the relation between a virtual first personal perspective and a real world first personal perspective. I then develop the connection between immersive modes of presentation, the de se, and transformative experience, and show how our grasp of qualitative truths in experience relates to our grasp of de se truths (and tensed truths) in experience. Tying the value of immersive gameplay and augmented reality to the value of gaining an immersive understanding of our future and possible selves, I argue that imaginative immersion in one’s future experience is a distinctive, experience-based way to discover de se truths. I close my discussion by exploring a case where an epistemic transformation scales up into a personal transformation. In such cases, the discovery of new phenomenal truths can lead to the discovery of new de se truths. When you face a life-defining change, you can ask yourself: Who will I become? This can be understood as a question about who you are and who you will become, asked from your first personal, subjective perspective. As such, it is also a question about the nature and character of your future lived experience, because the nature and character of your conscious, lived experience is a defining constituent of who you are. Framed this way, knowing your future lived experience is a way of knowing your future self. In this paper, I will explore this way of understanding one’s self, with a focus on understanding life-defining changes. “Who will I become?” when asked in high-stakes, life-defining contexts, connects the metaphysics of the self to the role of imagination, empathy, testimony, and the de se in self1 Thanks to Nilanjan Das, Josh Dever, Martin Glazier, Adam Lerner, Dilip Ninan, Simon Prosser, the St. Andrews metaphysics reading group, and the UNC transformative experience working group for discussion. 2 Life-defining choices, as self-involving choices, need not be self-interested in a selfish sense. Life-defining choices don’t even need to be self-involving choices. We often think about the futures of others who will be affected by our choices, and about how they will be formed. I will focus on self-involving choices for simplicity, but what I will say in much of this paper applies to the way we think of these choices for others as well as ourselves. 3 In this way, what I am saying has ideas in common with Chang (2015), Korsgaard (2009), and Bratman (1999): you make yourself into who you are partly because of your commitments and your choices. This partly defines who you are. But my focus is on the role of decision theory, new experience, the first person, and cognitive modeling in all of this, not on practical reasoning per se.","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PHPE.12090","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43052092","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 19
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