{"title":"DEFLATIONISM AND THE FUNCTION OF TRUTH","authors":"L. Picollo, T. Schindler","doi":"10.1111/PHPE.12113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PHPE.12113","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PHPE.12113","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46414745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What is Super Semantics?\u0000 *","authors":"P. Schlenker","doi":"10.1111/phpe.12122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12122","url":null,"abstract":"Formal semantics was born from an attempt to state explicit rules to predict the truth conditions of natural language sentences. But this goal can be extended beyond language stricto sensu, to a variety of representational systems in nature. This was part of the program of semiotics (e.g. Morris 1938), construed as a general theory of signs; but it never got integrated to the research program of formal semantics. We argue for such an integration, on two general grounds. First, the class of objects that interact with or display uncontroversially linguistic properties is larger than was initially thought. Spoken and especially sign language make use of rich iconic resources which interact with logical structure but cannot be captured without a 'formal semantics with iconicity'. In addition, recent comparisons between sign, speech and gestures strongly suggest that language is multi-modal and that gestures are full citizens of the linguistic world: they trigger familiar inferential types (presuppositions or supplements) when they co-occur with or follow words; and when they fully replace words, their informational content gets divided among familiar slots of the inferential typology, and they even follow a 'gestural grammar' that is in part reminiscent of sign language grammar. Second, independently from these language-internal motivations, the proposed extension leads to a far broader typology of meaning operations in nature, one that includes animal meanings, pictorial meanings, musical meanings, and more. This makes it possible to explore new connections among these domains, for instance between vocal and gestural iconicity, between musical inferences and animal signals, or between visual narratives and music.","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/phpe.12122","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48102609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"TALKING ABOUT WORLDS*","authors":"M. Mandelkern","doi":"10.1111/PHPE.12112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PHPE.12112","url":null,"abstract":"I explore the logic of the conditional, using credence judgments to argue against Duality and in favor of Conditional Excluded Middle . I then explore how to give a theory of the conditional which validates the latter and not the former, developing a variant on Kratzer (1981)’s restrictor theory, as well as a proposal which combines Stalnaker (1968)’s theory of the conditional with the theory of epistemic modals I develop in Mandelkern 2019a. I argue that the latter approach fits naturally with a conception of conditionals as referential devices which allow us to talk about particular worlds.","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PHPE.12112","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47157207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"RADICAL ANTI‐DISQUOTATIONALISM","authors":"A. Bacon","doi":"10.1111/PHPE.12109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PHPE.12109","url":null,"abstract":"A number of ‘no-proposition’ approaches to the liar paradox find themselves implicitly committed to a moderate disquotational principle: the principle that if an utterance of the sentence ‘P ’ says anything at all, it says that P (with suitable restrictions). I show that this principle alone is responsible for the revenge paradoxes that plague this view. I instead propose a view in which there are several closely related language-world relations playing the ‘semantic expressing’ role, none of which is more central to semantic theorizing than any other. I use this thesis about language and the negative result about disquotation to motivate the view that people do say things with utterances of paradoxical sentences, although they do not say the proposition you’d always expect, as articulated with a disquotational principle. Consider a self-referential utterance, u, of the sentence ‘u is not true’. According to one widespread and appealing intuition when one makes a semantically paradoxical utterance such as u one simply does not succeed in saying anything. Call this the no proposition theory. No proposition theorists reject the disquotational assumption that utterances of ‘u is not true’ say that u is not true on the grounds that some utterances of ‘u is not true’ do not say anything at all. However, they may nonetheless subscribe to a qualified version of the principle that says that if an utterance of ‘u is not true’ says anything at all it says that u is not true. In this paper I shall show that such views are susceptible to a version of the revenge paradoxes. An examination of these paradoxes suggests a view in which paradoxical utterances such as u do say things, although they do not say what you might expect them to (in this case, that u is not true). I shall show, moreover, that this phenomena falls out of general considerations about the relation between language and the world, and is much more widespread than many have thought. In this paper we will be primarily be investigating the corner of philosophical space that accepts classical logic and that admits quantifiers that bind variables taking sentence position. Unless otherwise stated, that framework will be assumed throughout. 1 No Proposition Accounts of the Paradoxes The most straightforward version of the no proposition theory maintains that sentences like ‘u is not true’ are completely meaningless, and thus that any attempt to say something by making an utterance of this sentence would fail. Call this the non-contextual view. On the non-contextual view, then, all utterances of a paradoxical sentence are equally bad. ∗Thanks to ... 1Restrictions might exclude sentences which express different propositions in different contexts, such as sentences involving indexical expressions. 2Of course, neither of these assumptions are uncontentious; but see Prior [19] and Williamson [28] for a defense of the intelligibility of quantification into sentence position, and Williamson [29] for general","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PHPE.12109","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48676867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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