{"title":"Annuity selection in the presence of insurer default risk and government guarantees","authors":"Pamela Searle, Peter Ayton, Iain Clacher","doi":"10.1111/jori.12457","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jori.12457","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate whether individuals correctly assess the risk of default of annuity providers and incorporate this information into their decision-making when purchasing an annuity. To do so, we analyze actual retirement product choices from a large administrative data set from Chile and exploit an exogenous change that decreased the coverage of government guarantees against annuity provider default. If individuals are rational and properly incorporate default risk into their decision process then, before this change, individuals should choose riskier providers that give higher annuity payments. However, we find that individuals' decisions are not influenced by changes in their protection against the risk of provider default. It seems that individuals have been unnecessarily reducing their annuity payments by not incorporating crucial information about their actual risk exposure to default when selecting annuities at retirement.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 1","pages":"161-192"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.12457","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139372751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How does health spending among demographic groups compare to Affordable Care Act premium regulations?","authors":"Caroline Hanson, Alexandra Minicozzi","doi":"10.1111/jori.12455","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jori.12455","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The Affordable Care Act (ACA) substantially altered regulations in the nongroup and small group health insurance markets and those markets continue to receive significant policy attention. To understand how those markets have functioned in recent years and how they would be impacted by policy changes, we estimated enrollment and spending by age and sex using claims data covering enrollment in ACA risk-adjusted plans in 2017–2019 and compared spending to a federal default age-rating curve for premiums. Our results suggest that women aged 55–64 helped stabilize the nongroup market through high enrollment and relatively low spending. Men enrolled in the marketplace also subsidized other nongroup enrollees but to a lesser extent than expected. In fact, men aged25–50 enrolled in nongroup plans spent 18% more than their counterparts enrolled through a small employer. These unique spending patterns have interesting policy implications, including that lowering the Medicare eligibility age would likely increase premiums in the nongroup market.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 1","pages":"37-55"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138692991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Halefom Yigzaw Nigus, Eleonora Nillesen, Pierre Mohnen
{"title":"The effect of weather index insurance on social capital: Evidence from rural Ethiopia","authors":"Halefom Yigzaw Nigus, Eleonora Nillesen, Pierre Mohnen","doi":"10.1111/jori.12454","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jori.12454","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the effect of weather index insurance (WII) uptake on social capital. We measure individual social capital using experimental and survey-based measures and relate it to the actual purchase of WII. We use propensity score matching (PSM) and an instrumental variable (IV) to address endogeneity concerns. Our descriptive and PSM estimates show that WII uptake negatively and significantly affects social capital. We find that insured households contribute less to the public good than uninsured households. We also find qualitatively and quantitatively similar results using our IV approach, yet insufficient power renders most of our IV estimates insignificant. We however report robust significant effects of instrumented WII uptake on sociopsychological outcomes—WII uptake increases perceptions of self-sufficiency and free-riding behavior: these are potential channels through which a negative effect on social capital comes about. Although far from conclusive, our paper provides several pieces of evidence that suggest WII uptake negatively affects social capital.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 1","pages":"121-159"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.12454","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138561265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Practical guideline to efficiently detect insurance fraud in the era of machine learning: A household insurance case","authors":"Denisa Banulescu-Radu, Meryem Yankol-Schalck","doi":"10.1111/jori.12452","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jori.12452","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Identifying insurance fraud is a difficult task due to the complex nature of the fraud itself, the diversity of techniques employed, the rarity of fraud cases observed in data sets, and the relatively limited allocation of human, financial, and time resources to carry out investigations. The aim of this paper is to provide a clean and well structured study on modeling fraud on home insurance contracts, using real French data from 2013 to 2017. Several methods are developed to identify risk factors and unusual customer behaviors. Traditional econometric models as well as new machine-learning algorithms with good predictive performance and high operational efficiency are tested, while maintaining method interpretability. Each methodology is evaluated on the basis of adequate performance measures and the issue of imbalanced databases is also addressed. Finally, specific methods are applied to interpret the results of the machine-learning methods.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 4","pages":"867-913"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138524371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Lower disclosures from customers screened by financial advisors","authors":"Doron Samuell, Demetris Christodoulou","doi":"10.1111/jori.12453","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jori.12453","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We find that there are fewer disclosures of risk factors when customers for life insurance are screened by financial advisors, compared with when similar profile customers are screened directly by the insurer's telephone operators. The lower rate of disclosure is systematic across all medical and lifestyle risks and has a sizeable economic impact on customer premiums. As a result, customers screened by advisors enjoy unfairly cheaper and more favorable policies. We identify the key drivers of lower customer disclosures to be conflicted incentives and lower scrutiny. We assert that the fewer disclosures from customers screened by advisors may translate into noncaptured risk that could be cross-subsidized by customers who provide more complete disclosures through the insurer's telephone operators. On reviewing our findings, the participating insurer in the study calculated that removing advisors from the screening process could allow certain insurance products to be heavily discounted while maintaining profitability.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 1","pages":"93-120"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.12453","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138524367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information: Journal of Risk and Insurance 4/2023","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jori.12390","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12390","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"90 4","pages":"827-830"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.12390","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134799209","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kerstin Awiszus, Yannick Bell, Jan Lüttringhaus, Gregor Svindland, Alexander Voß, Stefan Weber
{"title":"Building resilience in cybersecurity: An artificial lab approach","authors":"Kerstin Awiszus, Yannick Bell, Jan Lüttringhaus, Gregor Svindland, Alexander Voß, Stefan Weber","doi":"10.1111/jori.12450","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jori.12450","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Based on classical contagion models we introduce an <i>artificial cyber lab</i>: the digital twin of a complex cyber system in which possible cyber resilience measures may be implemented and tested. Using the lab, in numerical case studies, we identify two classes of measures to control systemic cyber risks: security- and topology-based interventions. We discuss the implications of our findings on selected real-world cybersecurity measures currently applied in the insurance and regulation practice or under discussion for future cyber risk control. To this end, we provide a brief overview of the current cybersecurity regulation and emphasize the role of insurance companies as private regulators. Moreover, from an insurance point of view, we provide first attempts to design systemic cyber risk obligations and to measure the systemic risk contribution of individual policyholders.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 3","pages":"753-800"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.12450","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135992905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The peer effect in adverse selection: Evidence from the micro health insurance market in Pakistan","authors":"Xia Du, Wei Zheng, Yi Yao","doi":"10.1111/jori.12447","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12447","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The peer effect may amplify adverse selection in social networks, hampering the sustainable operation of microinsurance. This paper uses data from a micro health insurance program in Pakistan to test for the peer effect in renewal decisions and the role it plays in amplifying adverse selection within social networks. The paper finds evidence supporting that insurance renewal decisions are similar among peers in the same network, and the peer effect is stronger among households of the same risk type than households of different risk types, indicating that the heterogeneous peer effect acts as an amplifier for adverse selection. The paper provides policy implications for effective ways to mitigate the peer effect and adverse selection, based on the results of heterogeneity analyses. The policy recommendation is to enforce a minimum group enrollment rate requirement of at least 60% for large groups to mitigate the peer effect.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"90 4","pages":"1063-1100"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134815240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mitigating wildfire losses via insurance-linked securities: Modeling and risk management perspectives","authors":"Hong Li, Jianxi Su","doi":"10.1111/jori.12449","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jori.12449","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper investigates the use of catastrophe (CAT) bonds as a risk management tool for wildfires. We introduce a set of Bayesian dynamic models designed to accurately represent wildfire losses, allowing a thorough examination of wildfire CAT bond pricing and hedge effectiveness. Our model captures crucial attributes of wildfire data, such as zero inflation, overdispersion, temporal fluctuations, and spatial dependence. Employing extensive quantitative analyses of US wildfire data, we highlight that CAT bonds can substantially mitigate tail risk associated with insurers' liability. Importantly, index-based CAT bonds, drawing their payouts from aggregate wildfire losses over a larger geographical scope than an insurer's operational area, also provide effective hedges. Our research underscores the potential of wildfire CAT bonds as an enhancement to traditional reinsurance strategies, offering insurers an improved means to manage and mitigate wildfire exposures amidst inherent uncertainties.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 2","pages":"383-414"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2023-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.12449","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135385874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jingyi Cao, Dongchen Li, Virginia R. Young, Bin Zou
{"title":"Equilibrium reporting strategy: Two rate classes and full insurance","authors":"Jingyi Cao, Dongchen Li, Virginia R. Young, Bin Zou","doi":"10.1111/jori.12451","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jori.12451","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose a multiperiod insurance model under a bonus–malus system with two rate classes and consider an insured who has purchased full insurance for her losses. To explore the potential advantage of underreporting her insurable losses, the insured follows a barrier strategy and only reports lossses above the barrier to the insurer. We obtain a unique equilibrium declaration strategy in closed form for a risk-neutral insured who maximizes her expected wealth, and in semiclosed form for a risk-averse insured who maximizes her expected exponential utility of wealth, both over an exogenous random horizon. We find that the equilibrium barriers for the two classes are equal and strictly greater than zero, offering a theoretical explanation for the underreporting of insurable losses, a form of ex post moral hazard. Finally, we consider the case of three rate classes and show, through numerical examples, that the equilibrium barriers are not equal.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 3","pages":"721-752"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2023-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134960327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}