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Journal of Risk and Insurance最新文献

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Optimal insurance design under limited liability 有限责任下的最优保险设计
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2025-09-17 DOI: 10.1111/jori.70016
Andrea Bergesio, Pablo Koch-Medina, Cosimo Munari
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引用次数: 0
Market discipline in life insurance: Does public risk disclosure encourage less risky management actions? 人寿保险的市场纪律：公开风险披露是否鼓励低风险管理行为？
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2025-09-03 DOI: 10.1111/jori.70019
Moritz Hanika
{"title":"Market discipline in life insurance: Does public risk disclosure encourage less risky management actions?","authors":"Moritz Hanika","doi":"10.1111/jori.70019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.70019","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We analyze how public risk disclosure, specifically Solvency II, impacts life insurers' risk-taking behavior. Using data from 58 German life insurers from 2016 to 2023, we find that publicly reported solvency ratios can affect premium growth and surrender rates. Moreover, insurers appear to improve their solvency ratios following a decline in the previous year. To investigate whether policyholder behavior drives a life insurer's reduced risk-taking, we then develop a model in which a life insurer seeks to maximize shareholder value. Unlike previous research, we consider <i>annually</i> disclosed solvency ratios, affecting policyholders' <i>dynamic</i> purchase and surrender behavior. In our model, the insurer acts less riskily (e.g., holds more reserves and sells less-risky insurance portfolios) to maintain higher solvency ratios and mitigate policyholders' adverse reactions. Our findings motivate public risk disclosure to strengthen market discipline, but its level and design must be carefully calibrated to be effective and avoid undue costs.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"92 4","pages":"909-949"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.70019","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145533574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Membership Benefits 会员好处
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2025-08-27 DOI: 10.1111/jori.70017
{"title":"Membership Benefits","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jori.70017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.70017","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"92 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.70017","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144910176","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Annual Meeting 年度会议
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2025-08-27 DOI: 10.1111/jori.70018
{"title":"Annual Meeting","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jori.70018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.70018","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"92 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144910177","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Issue Information: Journal of Risk and Insurance 3/2025 发行信息：《风险与保险杂志》第3/2025期
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2025-08-27 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12477
{"title":"Issue Information: Journal of Risk and Insurance 3/2025","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jori.12477","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12477","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"92 3","pages":"577-579"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.12477","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144910178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Shared exposures or management fashions? Antecedents of convergence in the insurance and banking industries 共享公开还是管理模式？保险业和银行业融合的先兆
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2025-08-20 DOI: 10.1111/jori.70013
Lei Fang, Gianvito Lanzolla, Andreas Tsanakas
{"title":"Shared exposures or management fashions? Antecedents of convergence in the insurance and banking industries","authors":"Lei Fang,&nbsp;Gianvito Lanzolla,&nbsp;Andreas Tsanakas","doi":"10.1111/jori.70013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.70013","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study convergence in the attention of decision-makers across the insurance and banking industries. Our analysis is based on textual risk disclosures (10-K reports, 2006–2018), providing a snapshot of corporate priorities and contexts. We theoretically link convergence with decision-making contexts via the Attention-Based View. Leveraging strategic management theory, we identify antecedents of convergence in attention and, therefore, potentially, risk contagion. These include common trends in the macro-environment, substitution threats, and management fashions. We combine this theoretical framework with machine learning tools to create quantitative measures of convergence in attention and its antecedents. We find that the proposed measure of convergence is predictive of inter- and intra-industry stock correlations. Finally, based on regression and sensitivity analyses, we identify the relative importance of different antecedents, showing that shared risk management fashions largely drive Inter-industry convergence in attention. This highlights challenges when interpreting regulatory text data in the context of predicting contagion risk.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"92 3","pages":"818-850"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.70013","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144909966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal retirement with long-run income risk 具有长期收入风险的最优退休
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2025-08-12 DOI: 10.1111/jori.70014
Shan Huang, Seyoung Park, Jane Yoo
{"title":"Optimal retirement with long-run income risk","authors":"Shan Huang,&nbsp;Seyoung Park,&nbsp;Jane Yoo","doi":"10.1111/jori.70014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.70014","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine an optimal portfolio problem where an individual receives nontraded labor income and must decide how to allocate her wealth between a stock and a risk-free asset, while also determining the optimal time to retire. Specifically, we explore how incorporating long-run income risk by assuming that labor income and stock prices are cointegrated affects both the optimal asset allocation and retirement strategy. Our findings show that accounting for long-run income risk alters the optimal allocation to risky assets and the timing of retirement. This helps explain why younger individuals with limited wealth are less likely to participate in the stock market, whereas wealthier individuals tend to allocate more to risky assets. Moreover, our findings reveal a positive relationship between stock investment and retirement age, driven by the positive correlation between wealth at retirement and the chosen retirement age.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"92 3","pages":"581-626"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.70014","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144910019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Unresolved conflict in workers' compensation: The impact of legal representation on workers' compensation benefits 工伤赔偿中未解决的冲突：法律代理对工伤赔偿利益的影响
IF 1.7 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2025-05-26 DOI: 10.1111/jori.70010
Bogdan Savych, David Neumark
{"title":"Unresolved conflict in workers' compensation: The impact of legal representation on workers' compensation benefits","authors":"Bogdan Savych,&nbsp;David Neumark","doi":"10.1111/jori.70010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.70010","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We estimate the causal effect of attorney involvement on the indemnity benefits workers receive after their injuries. To address the fundamental challenge that claims and injuries may differ on unmeasured dimensions that affect both attorney involvement and benefits received, we propose and use two instruments. The first is the baseline local area attorney involvement rate derived from a subset of claims for fractures, lacerations, and contusions without permanent partial disability and/or lump-sum payments. The second instrument is a delay in the first indemnity payment. Our outcome is the total indemnity benefits that workers receive after their injuries, which captures payments to workers for time lost from work and other adverse effects of an injury. Our analysis of more than 950,000 claims with more than 7 days of lost time indicates that attorney involvement substantially increases total indemnity benefits paid to workers.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"93 1","pages":"5-40"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.70010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146193586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Membership Benefits
IF 2.1 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2025-05-13 DOI: 10.1111/jori.70011
{"title":"Membership Benefits","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jori.70011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.70011","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"92 2","pages":"575-576"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.70011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143944906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Issue Information: Journal of Risk and Insurance 2/2025
IF 2.1 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2025-05-13 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12476
{"title":"Issue Information: Journal of Risk and Insurance 2/2025","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jori.12476","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12476","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"92 2","pages":"259-261"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.12476","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143944664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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