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Journal of Risk and Insurance最新文献

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Insurance demand experiments: Comparing crowdworking to the lab 保险需求实验:众筹与实验室的比较
IF 1.9 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2022-09-01 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12402
Johannes G. Jaspersen, Marc A. Ragin, Justin R. Sydnor
{"title":"Insurance demand experiments: Comparing crowdworking to the lab","authors":"Johannes G. Jaspersen,&nbsp;Marc A. Ragin,&nbsp;Justin R. Sydnor","doi":"10.1111/jori.12402","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12402","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We analyze an insurance demand experiment conducted in two different settings: in-person at a university laboratory and online using a crowdworking platform. Subject demographics differ across the samples, but average insurance demand is similar. However, choice patterns suggest online subjects are less cognitively engaged—they have more variation in their demand and react less to changes in exogenous factors of the insurance situation. Applying data quality filters does not lead to more comparable demand patterns between the samples. Additionally, while online subjects pass comprehension questions at the same rate as in-person subjects, they show more random behavior in other questions. We find that online subjects are more likely to engage in “coarse thinking,” choosing from a reduced set of options. Our results justify caution in using crowdsourced subjects for insurance demand experiments. We outline some best practices which may help improve data quality from experiments conducted via crowdworking platforms.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"89 4","pages":"1077-1107"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.12402","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"137630261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Risk pooling and solvency regulation: A policyholder's perspective 风险分担和偿付能力监管:一个保单持有人的视角
IF 1.9 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2022-08-23 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12392
Markus Huggenberger, Peter Albrecht
{"title":"Risk pooling and solvency regulation: A policyholder's perspective","authors":"Markus Huggenberger,&nbsp;Peter Albrecht","doi":"10.1111/jori.12392","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jori.12392","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate the benefits of risk pooling for the policyholders of stock insurance companies under different solvency standards. Using second-degree stochastic dominance, we document that the utility of risk-averse policyholders is increasing in the pool size if the equity capital is proportional to the premiums written. To the contrary, an increase in the pool size can reduce the policyholders' utility if the equity capital is determined using the Value-at-Risk (VaR). We show that pooling with a larger number of risks is also beneficial for all risk-averse policyholders under a VaR-based regulation if the pool satisfies an excess tail risk restriction. Our analysis provides new insights for the design of solvency standards and reveals a potential disadvantage of risk-based capital requirements for policyholders.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"89 4","pages":"907-950"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.12392","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42925960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Data Policy 数据策略
IF 1.9 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2022-08-12 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12401
{"title":"Data Policy","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jori.12401","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12401","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"89 3","pages":"865-866"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.12401","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"137819258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Issue Information: Journal of Risk and Insurance 3/2022 发行信息:Journal of Risk and Insurance 3/2022
IF 1.9 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2022-08-12 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12350
{"title":"Issue Information: Journal of Risk and Insurance 3/2022","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jori.12350","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jori.12350","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"89 3","pages":"549-552"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.12350","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44297569","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do time preferences explain low health insurance take-up? 时间偏好是否解释了健康保险的低覆盖率?
IF 1.9 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2022-08-10 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12395
Aurélien Baillon, Owen O'Donnell, Stella Quimbo, Kim van Wilgenburg
{"title":"Do time preferences explain low health insurance take-up?","authors":"Aurélien Baillon,&nbsp;Owen O'Donnell,&nbsp;Stella Quimbo,&nbsp;Kim van Wilgenburg","doi":"10.1111/jori.12395","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jori.12395","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Low insurance take-up in low-income populations is not easily explained by the standard single-period expected utility model of insurance that overlooks the relevance of time preference when liquidity is constrained. We design field survey instruments to elicit quasi-hyperbolic time preferences, as well as prospect theory risk preferences, and use them to examine whether time preferences explain health insurance behavior of low-income Filipinos. Consistent with theory, those with stronger parameterized time preference are less likely to insure and the partial association is most pronounced at low wealth where liquidity is most likely to be constrained. Among those with better understanding of insurance, lower take-up is also associated with present bias. We do not find that insurance is significantly associated with risk preferences.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"89 4","pages":"951-983"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.12395","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45503297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Opaque liabilities, learning, and the cost of equity capital for insurers 保险公司的不透明负债、学习和股本成本
IF 1.9 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2022-08-07 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12397
Chia-Chun Chiang, Hugh Hoikwang Kim, Greg Niehaus
{"title":"Opaque liabilities, learning, and the cost of equity capital for insurers","authors":"Chia-Chun Chiang,&nbsp;Hugh Hoikwang Kim,&nbsp;Greg Niehaus","doi":"10.1111/jori.12397","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12397","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Analyzing major US property–liability insurers, we find that their cost of equity capital is negatively associated with their underwriting performance, but not with their investment performance. We provide cross-sectional evidence that the difference is attributable, at least in part, to investor learning about opaque insurer liabilities. We also find that capital market and product market imperfections are important determinants of insurers' cost of equity capital. Overall, our evidence contributes to the important literature examining insurers' cost of equity capital, and it suggests that opaque liabilities are a distinguishing feature of insurers in determining their cost of equity capital.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"89 4","pages":"1031-1076"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"137648380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cheaper by the bundle: The interaction of frictions and option exercise in variable annuities 捆绑作弊：可变年金中摩擦与期权行使的相互作用
IF 1.9 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2022-08-05 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12393
Daniel Bauer, Thorsten Moenig
{"title":"Cheaper by the bundle: The interaction of frictions and option exercise in variable annuities","authors":"Daniel Bauer,&nbsp;Thorsten Moenig","doi":"10.1111/jori.12393","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12393","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Typical Variable Annuity products combine complex baseline contracts at substantial fees with optional guarantees. We argue this product design aligns with the benefits of bundling to the provider, to the extent that the baseline option features can <i>reduce</i> total replication value. This is possible due to market frictions, and particularly taxation rules, affecting policyholder exercise behavior. We demonstrate the relevance of this mechanism in the context of popular withdrawal guarantees, both theoretically and empirically. Specifically, we show that in the presence of personal taxes, adding on a common death benefit at baseline may decrease the total contract value to the provider.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"90 2","pages":"459-486"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50129758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Wait your turn: Pension incentives, workplace rules, and labor supply among Philadelphia municipal workers 等待轮到你:费城市政工人的养老金激励、工作场所规则和劳动力供应
IF 1.9 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2022-08-05 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12396
David G. McCarthy, Po-Lin Wang
{"title":"Wait your turn: Pension incentives, workplace rules, and labor supply among Philadelphia municipal workers","authors":"David G. McCarthy,&nbsp;Po-Lin Wang","doi":"10.1111/jori.12396","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jori.12396","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Little academic work has examined the labor supply response to pension incentives at the intensive margin. We explore this issue using individual-level administrative and pension data for Philadelphia city employees, where workers have some choice about whether or not to perform overtime, which is pensionable. We document large variations across workers in the incentives to do overtime provided by pension rules. Although standard regressions show that worker overtime is positively associated with own expected pension compensation, a robust nonparametric approach that exploits the discontinuities in expected wages due to pensions shows that the elasticity of worker labor supply to expected pension compensation is likely zero: Our standard regression results are likely the consequence of the rule by which overtime is allocated in Philadelphia. We estimate that this rule adds 4% to pension costs and raises total compensation costs by around 0.7% of payroll, and examine the implications for pension underfunding.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"89 4","pages":"985-1029"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48308115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The interplay between risk adjustment and risk rating in voluntary health insurance 自愿健康保险风险调整与风险评级的相互作用
IF 1.9 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2022-07-31 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12394
Peter Paul Klein, Richard van Kleef, Josefa Henriquez, Francesco Paolucci
{"title":"The interplay between risk adjustment and risk rating in voluntary health insurance","authors":"Peter Paul Klein,&nbsp;Richard van Kleef,&nbsp;Josefa Henriquez,&nbsp;Francesco Paolucci","doi":"10.1111/jori.12394","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jori.12394","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many regulated health insurance markets include risk adjustment (aka risk equalization) to mitigate selection incentives for insurers. Empirical studies on the design and evaluation of risk-adjustment algorithms typically focus on <i>mandatory</i> health insurance schemes. This paper considers risk adjustment in the context of <i>voluntary</i> health insurance, as found in Chile, Ireland, and Australia. In addition to the challenge of mitigating selection by insurers, regulators of these voluntary schemes have to deal with selection by consumers in and out of the market. A strategy for mitigating selection by consumers is to apply some form of risk rating. Our paper shows how risk adjustment and risk rating interact: (1) risk rating reduces the need for risk adjustment and (2) risk adjustment reduces premium variation across rating factors, thereby increasing incentives for consumers to select in and out of the market.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"90 1","pages":"59-91"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43354054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Why do insurers fail? A comparison of life and nonlife insurance companies from an international database 为什么保险公司会失败?来自国际数据库的寿险和非寿险公司的比较
IF 1.9 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2022-07-01 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12391
Olivier de Bandt, George Overton
{"title":"Why do insurers fail? A comparison of life and nonlife insurance companies from an international database","authors":"Olivier de Bandt,&nbsp;George Overton","doi":"10.1111/jori.12391","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jori.12391","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper tests the claim that insurers often engage in risk-shifting years before the materialization of a failure. It compares the mechanisms of insurance insolvency across different jurisdictions, using a first-of-its-kind international database assembled by the authors, merging individual financial data together with information on impairments over the last 30 years in four of the largest insurance markets in the world (France, Japan, the UK, and the United States). Results show evidence that low profitability is a leading indicator of failures. Further, there is an asymmetry between life insurance, where bond investment is highly significant, and nonlife insurance sectors, where operating inefficiency plays a larger role. Moreover, this paper highlights differences across countries: a stronger reaction to operating inefficiency in nonlife insurance in France and a less positive impact of bond investment in life insurance in Japan. Both results are linked to differences in the functioning of insurance markets.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"89 4","pages":"871-905"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47447586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
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