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Journal of Risk and Insurance最新文献

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Membership Benefits 会员福利
IF 2.1 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2024-08-20 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12488
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引用次数: 0
Loan guarantees and SMEs' investments under asymmetric information and Bayesian learning 不对称信息和贝叶斯学习条件下的贷款担保和中小企业投资
IF 2.1 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2024-07-11 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12485
Pengfei Luo, Huamao Wang, Zhaojun Yang
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引用次数: 0
On the efficiency of insurance institutions under interdependent risks 论相互依存风险下保险机构的效率
IF 2.1 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2024-06-25 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12484
S. Hun Seog
{"title":"On the efficiency of insurance institutions under interdependent risks","authors":"S. Hun Seog","doi":"10.1111/jori.12484","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jori.12484","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We theoretically investigate the equilibria and efficiencies of public and market insurance institutions within a framework where loss probabilities are interdependently influenced by the efforts of individuals and institutions (firms). We highlight the multilateral nature of interdependency, which exists within individuals, within firms, and between them. Our analysis reveals that both public and market institutions fall short of achieving first-best efficiency, and that the relative efficiencies between the two are indeterminate, due to the externalities. Regarding effort levels, we find that under the public institution, individual efforts are lower while institutional efforts are higher compared with the social optimum and the market institution. We also find that individual and/or institutional efforts are lower under the market institution than the social optimum, with both efforts lower under severe externalities.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 4","pages":"1025-1048"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141502285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does inequality impede risk management? Evidence from a lab experiment in Ghana 不平等会阻碍风险管理吗？来自加纳实验室实验的证据
IF 2.1 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2024-06-10 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12480
Richard A. Gallenstein
{"title":"Does inequality impede risk management? Evidence from a lab experiment in Ghana","authors":"Richard A. Gallenstein","doi":"10.1111/jori.12480","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jori.12480","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Low income households in agrarian developing economies face considerable livelihood risks, which have negative impacts on welfare. A growing literature focuses on internal constraints on development, which can negatively affect saving and investment behavior. Here I propose that internal constraints may also hinder risk management. Specifically, I present a theoretical model that explores how fairness preferences may create an internal constraint on risk sharing, particularly in a context of wealth inequality, and thereby also affect demand for formal insurance. To test this theory, I utilize a lab experiment, conducted in Ghana, to investigate the impact of wealth inequality on utilization of risk-management tools, interpersonal risk sharing and formal insurance, and explore how fairness preferences may mediate this effect. I find that inequality reduces risk sharing and increases demand for insurance. Moreover, I find suggestive evidence that fairness preferences create an internal constraint on risk sharing under inequality.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 3","pages":"499-528"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141360541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
ARIA 2024 Annual Meeting ARIA 2024 年会
IF 1.9 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2024-05-31 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12482
{"title":"ARIA 2024 Annual Meeting","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jori.12482","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12482","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 2","pages":"491"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.12482","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141187535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Data Policy 数据政策
IF 1.9 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2024-05-31 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12483
{"title":"Data Policy","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jori.12483","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12483","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 2","pages":"493-494"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.12483","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141187536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Issue Information: Journal of Risk and Insurance 2/2024 发行信息：风险与保险》杂志 2/2024
IF 1.9 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2024-05-31 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12479
{"title":"Issue Information: Journal of Risk and Insurance 2/2024","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jori.12479","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12479","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 2","pages":"251-253"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.12479","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141187537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Membership Benefits 会员福利
IF 1.9 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2024-05-31 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12481
{"title":"Membership Benefits","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jori.12481","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12481","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 2","pages":"489"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.12481","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141187526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Special issue on climate change and natural disasters 气候变化与自然灾害特刊
IF 1.9 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2024-05-29 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12474
Alejandro H. Drexler, Ralf Meisenzahl
{"title":"Special issue on climate change and natural disasters","authors":"Alejandro H. Drexler,&nbsp;Ralf Meisenzahl","doi":"10.1111/jori.12474","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12474","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 2","pages":"255-261"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141187655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Insurers' climate change risk management quality and natural disasters 保险公司的气候变化风险管理质量与自然灾害
IF 1.9 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2024-05-28 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12472
Thomas R. Berry-Stölzle, Simon Fritzsch, Philipp Scharner, Gregor Weiß
{"title":"Insurers' climate change risk management quality and natural disasters","authors":"Thomas R. Berry-Stölzle,&nbsp;Simon Fritzsch,&nbsp;Philipp Scharner,&nbsp;Gregor Weiß","doi":"10.1111/jori.12472","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12472","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We perform a textual analysis of insurers' climate risk disclosures and construct a climate change risk management quality index. Our index captures to what extent insurers identify, manage, and adjust their business model to climate change risk. We find that natural disasters in an insurer's home state lead to an increase in climate change risk management quality. The effect of natural disasters in an insurer's geographic markets on climate change risk management seems to be less pronounced. Overall, these results are consistent with salience theories of choice.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 2","pages":"263-298"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.12472","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141187555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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