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Journal of Risk and Insurance最新文献

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The risk screening effect of digital insurance distribution 数字保险分销的风险筛选效应
IF 2.1 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2024-11-04 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12496
Finbarr Murphy, Wei Xu, Xian Xu
{"title":"The risk screening effect of digital insurance distribution","authors":"Finbarr Murphy,&nbsp;Wei Xu,&nbsp;Xian Xu","doi":"10.1111/jori.12496","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12496","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Extant research holds that digital sales channels advance competition and service or goods availability but rarely details the attendant information asymmetry. Leveraging a large unique dataset, this study examines a specific case in which consumers have a choice between offline and digital channels for insurance purchases. We find that digital channels screen in consumers with lower unobserved risk. For term life, endowment and disease insurance products, the average risks of the policies purchased through digital channels were significantly lower than those purchased offline after controlling for all observed risk characteristics. This risk screening effect mainly comes from the inclusion of new low-risk enrollees. As a consequence, digital channels exhibit lower information asymmetry and greater profitability compared to offline channels.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 4","pages":"841-866"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142685304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Utilizing large-scale insurance data sets to calibrate sub-county level crop yields
IF 2.1 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2024-10-25 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12494
Francis Tsiboe, Dylan Turner, Jisang Yu
{"title":"Utilizing large-scale insurance data sets to calibrate sub-county level crop yields","authors":"Francis Tsiboe,&nbsp;Dylan Turner,&nbsp;Jisang Yu","doi":"10.1111/jori.12494","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12494","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Crop yields are crucial for research on agricultural risk and productivity but are typically only available at highly aggregated levels. Yield data at more granular levels of observation have the potential to enhance econometric identification and improve statistical power but are typically inaccessible. Crop insurance contracts offered via the US Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCIP) are priced, in part, based on past yields of the farm meaning year-to-year variation in premium rates has the potential to provide insight into how yields vary over time. This paper introduces methods to use observed FCIP rating parameters to calibrate yields for insurance transactions lacking such data. These methods are validated with 148,243 farm-level observations from Kansas for which yields are known. The calibrated yields are applied empirically to examine the impact of asymmetric information in the FCIP via choice of insurance unit structure and the extent to which legislative changes mitigated this effect.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"92 1","pages":"139-165"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143481399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Market discipline and government guarantees: Evidence from the insurance industry
IF 2.1 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2024-10-09 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12493
Yiling Deng, J. Tyler Leverty, Kenny Wunder, George Zanjani
{"title":"Market discipline and government guarantees: Evidence from the insurance industry","authors":"Yiling Deng,&nbsp;J. Tyler Leverty,&nbsp;Kenny Wunder,&nbsp;George Zanjani","doi":"10.1111/jori.12493","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12493","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We identify the effect of public guarantees on market discipline by exploiting the variation in US state guarantees of property–casualty insurer obligations. We find that guaranty funds have little effect on the risk-sensitivity of insurer financing overall, with the exception of rating changes at the key threshold level of A.M. Best's A− rating. For insurers rated A− before a downgrade, we find that premium growth in business not covered by state guarantees falls in relation to growth in business covered by state guarantees. We estimate this difference in growth to be as high as 14.9% for commercial insurers.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"92 1","pages":"76-115"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143481454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Children as insurance revisited: Impact of children on private insurance adoption among older parents
IF 2.1 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2024-09-25 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12492
Zhaoxue Ci
{"title":"Children as insurance revisited: Impact of children on private insurance adoption among older parents","authors":"Zhaoxue Ci","doi":"10.1111/jori.12492","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12492","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The old-age security motive for fertility implies that children are substitutes for parents' old-age insurance. However, demographic dynamics and the evolution of social welfare schemes may challenge this notion. Meanwhile, as population aging is placing heavy pressure on the social security systems, private insurance has become a crucial supplement for hedging risks. In light of the present trends, this research examines the impact of the number of children on private insurance adoption among older parents in China. This research exploits the “Later, Longer, Fewer” campaign to instrument variations in the number of children. Instrumental variable estimates reveal that the likelihood of older parents having private insurance increases with the number of children they have. The positive effect is more pronounced among older adults, who are less reliant on children and have more access to alternative resources. Further analyses indicate that adverse selection and information channels are potential mechanisms.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"92 1","pages":"116-138"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143481400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Insurtech, sensor data, and changes in customers' coverage choices: Evidence from usage-based automobile insurance 保险科技、传感器数据和客户保险选择的变化：基于使用的汽车保险的证据
IF 2.1 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2024-09-09 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12490
Miremad Soleymanian, Charles B. Weinberg, Ting Zhu
{"title":"Insurtech, sensor data, and changes in customers' coverage choices: Evidence from usage-based automobile insurance","authors":"Miremad Soleymanian,&nbsp;Charles B. Weinberg,&nbsp;Ting Zhu","doi":"10.1111/jori.12490","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jori.12490","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we examine the role of usage-based auto insurance on customers' decisions to change their insurance coverage at the renewal. Using a sample of 135,540 customers, we study whether usage-based insurance (UBI) can facilitate the upselling and cross-selling efforts of the firm, possibly leading to higher coverage choices and additional insurance product purchases. Our results suggest that UBI customers are more likely to change their coverage choice than non-UBI customers at first (but not second) renewal. Both price discounts and the information provided by UBI affect the customers' coverage changes. Among UBI customers, those who get higher UBI discounts are more likely to both increase their insurance coverage (upselling) and add the comprehensive coverage option (cross-selling), which is not directly related to driving behavior at the time of first (annual) renewal. Moreover, customers who have received more negative feedback (daily hard brakes) are more likely to increase their insurance coverage.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"92 1","pages":"227-256"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.12490","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142225761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Issue Information: Journal of Risk and Insurance 3/2024 发行信息：风险与保险》杂志 3/2024
IF 2.1 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2024-08-20 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12486
{"title":"Issue Information: Journal of Risk and Insurance 3/2024","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jori.12486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12486","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 3","pages":"495-497"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.12486","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142013519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Membership Benefits 会员福利
IF 2.1 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2024-08-20 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12488
{"title":"Membership Benefits","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jori.12488","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12488","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 3","pages":"803-804"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jori.12488","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142013518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Loan guarantees and SMEs' investments under asymmetric information and Bayesian learning 不对称信息和贝叶斯学习条件下的贷款担保和中小企业投资
IF 2.1 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2024-07-11 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12485
Pengfei Luo, Huamao Wang, Zhaojun Yang
{"title":"Loan guarantees and SMEs' investments under asymmetric information and Bayesian learning","authors":"Pengfei Luo,&nbsp;Huamao Wang,&nbsp;Zhaojun Yang","doi":"10.1111/jori.12485","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jori.12485","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We develop a dynamic investment model with loan guarantees wherein insurers face information disadvantages and learn about borrower quality. Borrowers signal their qualities through investment timing, which is characterized by the investment threshold and elapsed time. We derive the conditions for separating or pooling equilibria. We show that the separating investment threshold is constant and determined mainly by the maximum threshold preventing mimicry. If project risk is higher (lower) than the market growth rate, the pooling investment threshold declines (increases) with elapsed time, and learning enhances (reduces) the willingness of high-quality borrowers to wait. Learning alleviates adverse selection and reduces guarantee costs. These effects are more pronounced with a greater uncertainty of the insurer on borrower quality. We reveal dual effects of waiting. The worse the market prospect, the higher the value of waiting in pooling outcomes. Fee-for-guarantee swaps are superior to equity-for-guarantee swaps in environments with marked information asymmetry.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 3","pages":"567-598"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141612880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the efficiency of insurance institutions under interdependent risks 论相互依存风险下保险机构的效率
IF 2.1 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2024-06-25 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12484
S. Hun Seog
{"title":"On the efficiency of insurance institutions under interdependent risks","authors":"S. Hun Seog","doi":"10.1111/jori.12484","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jori.12484","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We theoretically investigate the equilibria and efficiencies of public and market insurance institutions within a framework where loss probabilities are interdependently influenced by the efforts of individuals and institutions (firms). We highlight the multilateral nature of interdependency, which exists within individuals, within firms, and between them. Our analysis reveals that both public and market institutions fall short of achieving first-best efficiency, and that the relative efficiencies between the two are indeterminate, due to the externalities. Regarding effort levels, we find that under the public institution, individual efforts are lower while institutional efforts are higher compared with the social optimum and the market institution. We also find that individual and/or institutional efforts are lower under the market institution than the social optimum, with both efforts lower under severe externalities.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 4","pages":"1025-1048"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141502285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does inequality impede risk management? Evidence from a lab experiment in Ghana 不平等会阻碍风险管理吗？来自加纳实验室实验的证据
IF 2.1 3区 经济学
Journal of Risk and Insurance Pub Date : 2024-06-10 DOI: 10.1111/jori.12480
Richard A. Gallenstein
{"title":"Does inequality impede risk management? Evidence from a lab experiment in Ghana","authors":"Richard A. Gallenstein","doi":"10.1111/jori.12480","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jori.12480","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Low income households in agrarian developing economies face considerable livelihood risks, which have negative impacts on welfare. A growing literature focuses on internal constraints on development, which can negatively affect saving and investment behavior. Here I propose that internal constraints may also hinder risk management. Specifically, I present a theoretical model that explores how fairness preferences may create an internal constraint on risk sharing, particularly in a context of wealth inequality, and thereby also affect demand for formal insurance. To test this theory, I utilize a lab experiment, conducted in Ghana, to investigate the impact of wealth inequality on utilization of risk-management tools, interpersonal risk sharing and formal insurance, and explore how fairness preferences may mediate this effect. I find that inequality reduces risk sharing and increases demand for insurance. Moreover, I find suggestive evidence that fairness preferences create an internal constraint on risk sharing under inequality.</p>","PeriodicalId":51440,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","volume":"91 3","pages":"499-528"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141360541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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