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Measuring value-based management using natural language processing 使用自然语言处理测量基于价值的管理
IF 4 2区 管理学
Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-10-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.mar.2025.100946
Janice Wobst , Philipp Röttger , Rainer Lueg
{"title":"Measuring value-based management using natural language processing","authors":"Janice Wobst ,&nbsp;Philipp Röttger ,&nbsp;Rainer Lueg","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100946","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100946","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose an alternative approach to quantifying a firm’s value-based management (VBM) sophistication. The approach uses natural language processing (NLP) and builds on a newly developed, customised dictionary. We describe the development of this dictionary and validate the resulting measure for a large sample of European listed firms (STOXX Europe 600 Index) using tests of internal consistency, construct validity, and relevant robustness checks. In doing so, we present a novel application of NLP in management accounting. We also contribute a customised, open-source dictionary for the measurement of VBM sophistication thereby creating opportunities for future research.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"67 ","pages":"Article 100946"},"PeriodicalIF":4.0,"publicationDate":"2025-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145332289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What's in a face? CEO masculinity and cost behavior 脸是什么?CEO的男子气概和成本行为
IF 4 2区 管理学
Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-09-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.mar.2025.100945
John Daniel Eshleman , Cecilia (Qian) Feng , Hong You
{"title":"What's in a face? CEO masculinity and cost behavior","authors":"John Daniel Eshleman ,&nbsp;Cecilia (Qian) Feng ,&nbsp;Hong You","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100945","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100945","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the association between an “off-the-job” CEO characteristic—masculinity—and firm cost behavior. First, we analyze cost elasticity, defined as the responsiveness of costs to changes in sales volume, and find that masculine CEOs tend to be associated with firms with more elastic cost structures, characterized by a lower proportion of fixed costs. Second, we investigate cost stickiness, a phenomenon in which expenses decline less during sales downturns than they rise during periods of sales growth. Our evidence suggests that masculine CEOs are associated with lower cost stickiness, potentially leading to underinvestment due to aggressive cost-cutting in response to declining sales. These cuts often concentrate on non-value-enhancing expense categories. Finally, we find that masculine CEOs engage more in real earnings management through their influence on costs, reflecting an “achievement drive” incentive. This study adds to the broader understanding of how CEO personal characteristics shape firm-level operational decisions and financial outcomes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"67 ","pages":"Article 100945"},"PeriodicalIF":4.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145003848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Labour adjustment by employee type when sales change 销售变动时按员工类型调整用工
IF 4 2区 管理学
Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-08-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.mar.2025.100944
Junqin Sun , Fangjun Wang , Mark Anderson
{"title":"Labour adjustment by employee type when sales change","authors":"Junqin Sun ,&nbsp;Fangjun Wang ,&nbsp;Mark Anderson","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100944","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100944","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine how companies in China manage labour resources through sales upturns and downturns. We argue that managers make implicit commitments to retain some employees through downturns based on the nature of activities the employees engage in. We predict higher commitment in contracting (more stickiness) for employees who accumulate intangible asset value and engage in other long horizon activities. We associate employees with three primary business activities: sales and marketing (S&amp;M), accounting and financial management (A&amp;F) and production and operations (P&amp;O). Employees in S&amp;M acquire product knowledge and build relations with customers that benefit the firm over time. Employees in A&amp;F combine professional skills with knowledge of the firm to support current operations and plan for future demand. Employees in P&amp;O apply general and firm-specific skills to service current production and sales. We discriminate between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs in our analysis. For SOEs, there is stickiness in labour adjustment across all activities, consistent with political employment objectives of SOEs. For non-SOEs, firms add more employees for S&amp;M and A&amp;F when sales increase than they remove when sales decrease but adjustments to labour for P&amp;O activities are symmetric with respect to increases and decreases in sales.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"67 ","pages":"Article 100944"},"PeriodicalIF":4.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144920213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The effect of within-domain task changes and compensation contracts on performance 领域内任务变更和薪酬契约对绩效的影响
IF 4 2区 管理学
Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-08-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.mar.2025.100943
Jeremy D. Douthit , Todd A. Thornock
{"title":"The effect of within-domain task changes and compensation contracts on performance","authors":"Jeremy D. Douthit ,&nbsp;Todd A. Thornock","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100943","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100943","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Workers’ learning, and attempts at learning, affect their current and future performance. However, attempts at learning and learning likely differ across operational settings. We experimentally examine how a setting with a within-domain task change, relative to a setting where the same task continues over time, affects these elements. We further examine how the form of compensation contract moderates this effect. We find that, relative to a continuing task setting, a within-domain task change decreases (increases) current (future) period performance, consistent with increased attempts at learning in the current period. The reduction in current performance from a within-domain task change is amplified for performance-based (piece rate or relative performance) contracts relative to flat wages. However, attempts at learning fail to improve future performance following a within-domain task change under piece rates. Our results suggest that firms should consider the task horizon, job environment, and importance of learning when designing contracts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"67 ","pages":"Article 100943"},"PeriodicalIF":4.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144879992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Digitalization of the finance function: Automation, analytics, and finance function effectiveness 财务职能的数字化:自动化、分析和财务职能的有效性
IF 4.2 2区 管理学
Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-07-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.mar.2025.100942
David S. Bedford , David Derichs , Sophie Hoozée , Teemu Malmi , Martin Messner , Vikash Kumar Sinha , Berend Van der Kolk , Frank Verbeeten
{"title":"Digitalization of the finance function: Automation, analytics, and finance function effectiveness","authors":"David S. Bedford ,&nbsp;David Derichs ,&nbsp;Sophie Hoozée ,&nbsp;Teemu Malmi ,&nbsp;Martin Messner ,&nbsp;Vikash Kumar Sinha ,&nbsp;Berend Van der Kolk ,&nbsp;Frank Verbeeten","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100942","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100942","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Contemporary digital technologies provide new opportunities for organizing work within the finance function. In this study, we examine two digital technologies that are particularly relevant to the operation of finance functions – automation and analytics. We argue that variation in the use of these technologies is related to the interplay between firm-level digitalization strategy and the objectives of the finance function. Drawing on prior literature, we distinguish between two finance function objectives: an efficiency objective and a business partnering objective. Based on survey responses from 137 finance function professionals and complementary insights from 11 interviews, we show that the use of digital technologies within the finance function is associated with both firm-level digitalization strategy and the specific objectives of the finance function. Specifically, we find a positive interaction between an emphasis on firm digitalization strategy and an efficiency objective on the use of both automation and analytics. In contrast, digitalization strategy and a business partnering objective have positive but independent effects on the use of analytics. We also find that finance functions that simultaneously use automation and analytics have lower effectiveness, which might be a result of resource constraints. Overall, our paper adds to our understanding of the drivers and consequences of digitalization in the finance function.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"67 ","pages":"Article 100942"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144596352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Performance measurement in dynamic environments 动态环境下的性能测量
IF 4.2 2区 管理学
Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-06-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.mar.2025.100941
Paula M.G. Dirks, Marc Wouters
{"title":"Performance measurement in dynamic environments","authors":"Paula M.G. Dirks,&nbsp;Marc Wouters","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100941","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100941","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"67 ","pages":"Article 100941"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144204899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Shaping innovation portfolios: The effect of interactive and diagnostic control use on organizational politics and agility 塑造创新组合:交互式和诊断控制对组织政治和敏捷性的影响
IF 4.2 2区 管理学
Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-05-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.mar.2025.100934
Tobias Roeth , Patrick Spieth , Haris Dzomba
{"title":"Shaping innovation portfolios: The effect of interactive and diagnostic control use on organizational politics and agility","authors":"Tobias Roeth ,&nbsp;Patrick Spieth ,&nbsp;Haris Dzomba","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100934","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100934","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Innovation portfolio management (IPM) involves complex decision-making processes to achieve agility. However, although management control guides IPM, organizational politics often intersects with IPM. This study examines how management control moderates the relationship between organizational politics and IPM agility. Drawing on the literature on diagnostic and interactive control usage, we conducted a multiple-informant survey across 133 strategic business units. Results indicate that organizational politics are positively related with IPM agility, which, in turn, has a positive association with firm performance. Moreover, interactive IPM control use strengthens the effect of organizational politics on IPM agility, while diagnostic IPM control usage does not interact. Interestingly, the absence of interactive IPM control usage diminishes the effect of organizational politics on IPM agility. This research enhances understanding of how management control shapes the impact of politics on IPM agility and firm performance, contributing to both theoretical and practical domains.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"66 ","pages":"Article 100934"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144116670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Performance measure use and product innovation in R&D teams: The role of leadership style 研发团队绩效测量与产品创新:领导风格的作用
IF 4.2 2区 管理学
Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-05-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.mar.2025.100932
Nina Detzen , Frank H.M. Verbeeten
{"title":"Performance measure use and product innovation in R&D teams: The role of leadership style","authors":"Nina Detzen ,&nbsp;Frank H.M. Verbeeten","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100932","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100932","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Manufacturing firms frequently rely on R&amp;D teams for product innovation, and generally use performance measures to guide team decision making and to motivate R&amp;D team members. We argue that it depends upon leadership style whether the use of performance measures affects product innovativeness in R&amp;D teams. If the project leader uses performance measures to guide R&amp;D team member efforts and displays a consideration leadership style that integrates their suggestions in decision making and helps team members internalise the objectives underlying the performance measures to align these with individual contributions, product innovativeness can be improved. We test our hypotheses based on survey responses of 150 R&amp;D team members. We find no evidence for a direct association of the use of performance measures with product innovativeness. As expected, a consideration leadership style positively moderates the impact of all considered uses of performance measures (for attention focusing, strategic decision making and evaluation) on product innovativeness.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"66 ","pages":"Article 100932"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143928232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Collective wages and incentive contracts: On the role of envy and worker diversity 集体工资和激励性合同:论嫉妒和工人多样性的作用
IF 4.2 2区 管理学
Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-04-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.mar.2025.100930
Benjamin Bental , Jenny Kragl
{"title":"Collective wages and incentive contracts: On the role of envy and worker diversity","authors":"Benjamin Bental ,&nbsp;Jenny Kragl","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100930","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100930","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In many countries, collective agreements tend to equalize wages across workers in the same sector and job. We analyze the impact of imposing wage equality on incentive contracts and firms’ hiring policies. In our setting, an employer considers hiring two envious workers who differ only in their productivities. The employer offers the workers incentive contracts with identical fixed wages and potentially individualized bonuses. In this environment, we highlight the interaction between worker characteristics, optimal incentive contracts, and the employer’s hiring policy. We find that, when the collective wage does not constrain the employer, fixed-wage equality implies bonus equality. Moreover, once the workers’ sensitivity to disadvantageous inequality becomes sufficiently high, the optimal contract deters the low-productivity worker from accepting it, even if productivity differences between the workers are small. Finally, where the agreed-upon fixed wage binds the employer, bonus pay is tailored to the workers’ productivity. In that case, the presence of social preferences allows the employer to exploit the intrinsic incentives arising from the workers’ relative-income concerns. Furthermore, in this scenario, it is more likely that both workers will be hired.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"66 ","pages":"Article 100930"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143885976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Executive pay restrictions and R&D investment 高管薪酬限制和研发投资
IF 4.2 2区 管理学
Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2025-03-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.mar.2025.100929
Ziwei Song , Lin Wang , Dengjin Zheng
{"title":"Executive pay restrictions and R&D investment","authors":"Ziwei Song ,&nbsp;Lin Wang ,&nbsp;Dengjin Zheng","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100929","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100929","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In response to the debate on restricting executive compensation, this study investigates the impact of executive pay caps on investments in research and development (R&amp;D). Exploiting the 2014 pay restriction scheme for SOEs in China as a natural experiment, we find that R&amp;D investment in SOEs grow slower than in non-SOEs following the scheme’s implementation, with the effect mainly observed in the expensed component of R&amp;D. Consequently, SOEs experience a decrease in innovation quality and firm value after the executive pay restriction is imposed. Reflecting the role of political advancement as a substitutive incentive device in SOEs, we find the negative impacts of the pay restriction are lessened by political promotion incentives. Overall, our findings suggest policymakers should be cautious when implementing restrictive pay policies, as it may reduce executives’ incentive to pursue innovation efforts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"66 ","pages":"Article 100929"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143642824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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