Management Accounting Research最新文献

{"title":"Performance measurement in dynamic environments","authors":"Paula M.G. Dirks, Marc Wouters","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100941","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100941","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"67 ","pages":"Article 100941"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144204899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Shaping innovation portfolios: The effect of interactive and diagnostic control use on organizational politics and agility","authors":"Tobias Roeth ,&nbsp;Patrick Spieth ,&nbsp;Haris Dzomba","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100934","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100934","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Innovation portfolio management (IPM) involves complex decision-making processes to achieve agility. However, although management control guides IPM, organizational politics often intersects with IPM. This study examines how management control moderates the relationship between organizational politics and IPM agility. Drawing on the literature on diagnostic and interactive control usage, we conducted a multiple-informant survey across 133 strategic business units. Results indicate that organizational politics are positively related with IPM agility, which, in turn, has a positive association with firm performance. Moreover, interactive IPM control use strengthens the effect of organizational politics on IPM agility, while diagnostic IPM control usage does not interact. Interestingly, the absence of interactive IPM control usage diminishes the effect of organizational politics on IPM agility. This research enhances understanding of how management control shapes the impact of politics on IPM agility and firm performance, contributing to both theoretical and practical domains.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"66 ","pages":"Article 100934"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144116670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Performance measure use and product innovation in R&D teams: The role of leadership style","authors":"Nina Detzen ,&nbsp;Frank H.M. Verbeeten","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100932","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100932","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Manufacturing firms frequently rely on R&amp;D teams for product innovation, and generally use performance measures to guide team decision making and to motivate R&amp;D team members. We argue that it depends upon leadership style whether the use of performance measures affects product innovativeness in R&amp;D teams. If the project leader uses performance measures to guide R&amp;D team member efforts and displays a consideration leadership style that integrates their suggestions in decision making and helps team members internalise the objectives underlying the performance measures to align these with individual contributions, product innovativeness can be improved. We test our hypotheses based on survey responses of 150 R&amp;D team members. We find no evidence for a direct association of the use of performance measures with product innovativeness. As expected, a consideration leadership style positively moderates the impact of all considered uses of performance measures (for attention focusing, strategic decision making and evaluation) on product innovativeness.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"66 ","pages":"Article 100932"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143928232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Collective wages and incentive contracts: On the role of envy and worker diversity","authors":"Benjamin Bental ,&nbsp;Jenny Kragl","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100930","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100930","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In many countries, collective agreements tend to equalize wages across workers in the same sector and job. We analyze the impact of imposing wage equality on incentive contracts and firms’ hiring policies. In our setting, an employer considers hiring two envious workers who differ only in their productivities. The employer offers the workers incentive contracts with identical fixed wages and potentially individualized bonuses. In this environment, we highlight the interaction between worker characteristics, optimal incentive contracts, and the employer’s hiring policy. We find that, when the collective wage does not constrain the employer, fixed-wage equality implies bonus equality. Moreover, once the workers’ sensitivity to disadvantageous inequality becomes sufficiently high, the optimal contract deters the low-productivity worker from accepting it, even if productivity differences between the workers are small. Finally, where the agreed-upon fixed wage binds the employer, bonus pay is tailored to the workers’ productivity. In that case, the presence of social preferences allows the employer to exploit the intrinsic incentives arising from the workers’ relative-income concerns. Furthermore, in this scenario, it is more likely that both workers will be hired.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"66 ","pages":"Article 100930"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143885976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Executive pay restrictions and R&D investment","authors":"Ziwei Song ,&nbsp;Lin Wang ,&nbsp;Dengjin Zheng","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100929","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100929","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In response to the debate on restricting executive compensation, this study investigates the impact of executive pay caps on investments in research and development (R&amp;D). Exploiting the 2014 pay restriction scheme for SOEs in China as a natural experiment, we find that R&amp;D investment in SOEs grow slower than in non-SOEs following the scheme’s implementation, with the effect mainly observed in the expensed component of R&amp;D. Consequently, SOEs experience a decrease in innovation quality and firm value after the executive pay restriction is imposed. Reflecting the role of political advancement as a substitutive incentive device in SOEs, we find the negative impacts of the pay restriction are lessened by political promotion incentives. Overall, our findings suggest policymakers should be cautious when implementing restrictive pay policies, as it may reduce executives’ incentive to pursue innovation efforts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"66 ","pages":"Article 100929"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143642824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Announcement: David Solomons Prize Supported by CIMA","authors":"Wim A. Van der Stede (Editor-in-Chief)","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100928","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100928","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"66 ","pages":"Article 100928"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143579335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How the realized measure of a worker’s performance affects their perception of their compensation","authors":"Jeremy Douthit ,&nbsp;Michael Majerczyk ,&nbsp;Bei Shi ,&nbsp;Tyler Thomas","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100927","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100927","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Workers often struggle to fully appreciate the quality of their performance. Rather, workers use the measure of their performance that is realized from their firm’s measurement system, which is typically imperfect, as a guide to do so. This study examines how workers’ perceptions about their compensation depend on the realized measure of their performance. Our experimental results suggest that before performing a task, workers display a fairness sentiment whereby they expect compensation to decrease as the measure of performance suggests worse performance. However, once the measure of their performance is realized, workers’ fairness sentiments weaken, and they request higher-than-expected compensation, with this deviation increasing as the realized measure worsens. Thus, a realized measure of performance distorts workers’ perceptions about their compensation and their fairness sentiments. This suggests that the benefits of perceived “fair” worker compensation are less likely to occur once workers have realized measures of performance.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"66 ","pages":"Article 100927"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143437732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Decoding effort: Toward a measure – and a new understanding – of effort intensity in accounting research","authors":"Gary Hecht ,&nbsp;Kristian Rotaru ,&nbsp;Axel K.-D. Schulz ,&nbsp;Kristy L. Towry ,&nbsp;Alan Webb","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100926","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100926","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study introduces pupillometry – the measurement of pupil diameter changes – as a direct approach to capturing effort intensity in management accounting research. Traditional approaches using self-reports or performance-based proxies have limited researchers’ ability to study how management control systems influence behavior through effort. Using a controlled experiment with a decoding task, we examine how piece-rate versus flat-wage compensation influences effort intensity and performance. Our findings show that pupil dilation partially mediates the relationship between incentives and performance, with this mediation strongest in early experimental rounds before weakening over time. This dynamic pattern suggests that while incentives initially influence performance through effort intensity, other mechanisms such as implicit learning emerge in later rounds. Beyond demonstrating pupillometry’s validity for measuring effort intensity, we highlight its potential applications across management accounting research streams, enabling researchers to better understand how control system elements influence behavior through effort.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"66 ","pages":"Article 100926"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143419838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Exploring the tensions within and among management control elements from a paradox perspective","authors":"Erik Strauss ,&nbsp;Sophie Tessier ,&nbsp;Marjo Väisänen","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100925","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100925","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines the inner tensions within MC elements, as well as how these inner tensions influence the tensions among MC elements. To accomplish this, we draw on a qualitative case study of an international organisation, focusing on a newly acquired division and the new MC elements implanted during the integration process. By mobilising concepts from paradox theory and ideas concerning the interdependency of management control (MC) elements to analyse our data, we are able to explain that MC elements can embed various paradoxical tensions, which are interwoven, resulting in various cross-level competing or complementary effects among the MC elements. In this way, we provide a new theoretical explanation for the emergence of dynamic tensions among MC elements. Moreover, we determine that MC elements can render the opposing poles of a paradoxical tension recognisable and, therefore, manageable for actors. Thus, our results elucidate the role that MC elements can play in managing tensions within organisations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"66 ","pages":"Article 100925"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143162273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Integrating the balanced scorecard and enterprise risk management: Exploring the dynamics between management control anchor practices and subsidiary practices","authors":"Christian Huber ,&nbsp;Kalle Kraus ,&nbsp;Anita Meidell","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2024.100924","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2024.100924","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper analyses the interplay between the balanced scorecard (BSC) and enterprise risk management (ERM) by employing a longitudinal case study of a large energy corporation (Global Energy). In contrast to prior research largely focusing on the ‘why’ question of BSC-ERM integration (i.e., benefits and potential pitfalls), we shift our attention to the ‘how’ question – unpacking processes underlying BSC-ERM integration over time, and the potential difficulties experienced by organisational actors during such processes. At the heart of our empirical findings was a hierarchically arranged management control infrastructure. The BSC served as the management control anchor practice (Ahrens, 2018), which was highly visible, including at the local business unit level. ERM, in comparison, assumed the role of a subsidiary practice struggling to gain visibility and traction, especially at the local level. BSC-ERM integration efforts spurred antagonistic social relationships among different actors, with our case highlighting two key additional factors – organisational structure and common mindset – that were of importance in analysing how BSC-ERM integration played out. Whilst prior work cautions that integration between ERM and other control practices may suppress alternative and potentially useful perspectives on risk, we found no such ill effects. Instead, ERM as a subsidiary control practice significantly increased its impact in Global Energy when integrated with the more established and impactful BSC anchor practice. We also extend prior literature on management control anchor practices by showing how ERM, as the subsidiary practice, did not simply execute predefined scripts determined by the anchor practice, but substantially influenced and changed the BSC anchor practice. The literature generally assumes that the anchor practice remains stable. However, in our case, input from ERM managers and the ERM practice led to significant changes in BSC performance evaluation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"66 ","pages":"Article 100924"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2024-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143162246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}