{"title":"Executive pay restrictions and R&D investment","authors":"Ziwei Song , Lin Wang , Dengjin Zheng","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2025.100929","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In response to the debate on restricting executive compensation, this study investigates the impact of executive pay caps on investments in research and development (R&D). Exploiting the 2014 pay restriction scheme for SOEs in China as a natural experiment, we find that R&D investment in SOEs grow slower than in non-SOEs following the scheme’s implementation, with the effect mainly observed in the expensed component of R&D. Consequently, SOEs experience a decrease in innovation quality and firm value after the executive pay restriction is imposed. Reflecting the role of political advancement as a substitutive incentive device in SOEs, we find the negative impacts of the pay restriction are lessened by political promotion incentives. Overall, our findings suggest policymakers should be cautious when implementing restrictive pay policies, as it may reduce executives’ incentive to pursue innovation efforts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"66 ","pages":"Article 100929"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2000,"publicationDate":"2025-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Management Accounting Research","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1044500525000058","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In response to the debate on restricting executive compensation, this study investigates the impact of executive pay caps on investments in research and development (R&D). Exploiting the 2014 pay restriction scheme for SOEs in China as a natural experiment, we find that R&D investment in SOEs grow slower than in non-SOEs following the scheme’s implementation, with the effect mainly observed in the expensed component of R&D. Consequently, SOEs experience a decrease in innovation quality and firm value after the executive pay restriction is imposed. Reflecting the role of political advancement as a substitutive incentive device in SOEs, we find the negative impacts of the pay restriction are lessened by political promotion incentives. Overall, our findings suggest policymakers should be cautious when implementing restrictive pay policies, as it may reduce executives’ incentive to pursue innovation efforts.
期刊介绍:
Management Accounting Research aims to serve as a vehicle for publishing original research in the field of management accounting. Its contributions include case studies, field work, and other empirical research, analytical modelling, scholarly papers, distinguished review articles, comments, and notes. It provides an international forum for the dissemination of research, with papers written by prestigious international authors discussing and analysing management accounting in many different parts of the world.