Management Accounting Research最新文献_第10页

Subjective bonuses and target setting in budget-based incentive contracts 基于预算的激励合同中的主观奖金与目标设定

IF 4.6 2区管理学

Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2020-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mar.2020.100694

引用次数: 0

Financial reporting quality and peer group selection 财务报告质量与同行群体选择

IF 4.6 2区管理学

Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2020-06-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mar.2019.100675

Bart Dierynck , Arnt Verriest

{"title":"Financial reporting quality and peer group selection","authors":"Bart Dierynck , Arnt Verriest","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2019.100675","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2019.100675","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Similarity between a firm and a potential peer firm with respect to important economic characteristics is a first-order criterion to select peer firms. As economic characteristics are often captured through information disclosed in publicly available financial reports, financial reporting quality (FRQ) of a potential peer firm could influence peer group selection. We hypothesize that potential peer firms with higher FRQ are more likely to be included in the peer group of another firm because the reduced information asymmetry<span> and lower reputation costs connected to higher FRQ of potential peer firms can influence the board of directors’ evaluation of similarity between the firm and a potential peer firm. Analyzing the peer groups used by S&P 900 firms for benchmarking executive compensation packages, we find support for our hypothesis and the channels we specify in our theory. Our results are robust across several measures for FRQ, albeit they are somewhat weaker when FRQ is measured by means of internal control deficiencies, fraud, and AAERs. Using alternative specifications to define the potential peer group and controlling for corporate governance strength does not change our inferences and our results also hold when we control for the presence of the potential peer firm in the peer group of the previous year. This study contributes to previous research on peer groups by examining the accounting information environment around peer group composition.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"47 ","pages":"Article 100675"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.mar.2019.100675","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43343064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Do self-reported motivators really motivate higher performance? 自我激励真的能激发更高的绩效吗?

IF 4.6 2区管理学

Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2020-06-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mar.2019.100676

Sofia M. Lourenço

{"title":"Do self-reported motivators really motivate higher performance?","authors":"Sofia M. Lourenço","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2019.100676","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2019.100676","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>Self-reported motivators, i.e., stated preferences for work incentives, have been examined extensively based on the assumption that they provide valuable information for the design of compensation systems. However, the extent to which these stated preferences match performance has been overlooked. I use a field experiment with sales representatives to examine whether a higher preference for an incentive leads to a greater performance effect when that incentive is introduced. Specifically, I examine whether </span><em>ex-ante</em> self-reported incentive preferences moderate incentive effects on <em>ex-post</em> objective performance. Using a setting in which sales representatives receive a fixed hourly rate, the between-subjects experimental manipulations add one of three incentive motivators: (a) money (i.e., monetary incentives in the form of cash bonuses), (b) feedback, or (c) recognition. My results show that being in the money condition (i.e., being eligible to win a cash bonus) leads to an increase in performance only for those who state a low preference for this incentive. Conversely, only those who state a high preference for feedback increase their performance when they are in the feedback condition. Finally, being in the recognition condition (i.e., being eligible to win an acknowledgement award) leads to an increase in performance regardless of the initially stated preference for this incentive.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"47 ","pages":"Article 100676"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.mar.2019.100676","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48812103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Erratum to “Contested organizational change and accounting in trials of incompatibility” [Manage. Account. Res. 45 (2019) 100641] 对“有争议的组织变革和不相容试验中的会计”的勘误[管理]。帐户。Res. 45 (2019) 100641]

IF 4.6 2区管理学

Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2020-06-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mar.2020.100693

Mark Christensen , Peter Skærbæk , Kjell Tryggestad

引用次数: 1

The role of accountability in reducing the impact of affective reactions on capital budgeting decisions 问责制在减少情感反应对资本预算决策的影响中的作用

IF 4.6 2区管理学

Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2020-06-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mar.2019.100650

Dennis D. Fehrenbacher , Steven E. Kaplan , Carly Moulang

{"title":"The role of accountability in reducing the impact of affective reactions on capital budgeting decisions","authors":"Dennis D. Fehrenbacher , Steven E. Kaplan , Carly Moulang","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2019.100650","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2019.100650","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>It is generally recognized that decisions about capital projects should be made by independent reviewers who select the economically strongest projects. However, prior research finds that reviewers’ choices can be biased by their affective reactions to a manager proposing a capital project. Potentially, this bias could be reduced by holding reviewers more accountable. We contend that holding reviewers accountable will lessen the effect of positive, but not negative, affective reactions on capital project choice. To provide evidence on our predictions, we conduct an experiment using highly experienced participants. Participants’ task is to select between two capital projects, each proposed by a different manager. Although one project is economically preferred relative to the other project, we manipulate whether there is a negative affective reaction to the manager proposing the preferred project or a positive affective reaction to the manager proposing the non-preferred project. We also manipulate the presence versus absence of reviewer accountability. As expected, participants were more likely to select the economically non-preferred project when proposed by a manager triggering a positive affective reaction, but this tendency was reduced by accountability. Also, as expected, participants were less likely to select the economically preferred project when proposed by a manager triggering a negative affective reaction, and accountability did not reduce this tendency. Implications of our findings for theory and practice are discussed.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"47 ","pages":"Article 100650"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.mar.2019.100650","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44239346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 18

Does performance pay increase productivity? Evidence from a medical typing unit 绩效工资能提高工作效率吗?医学鉴定部门提供的证据

IF 4.6 2区管理学

Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2020-06-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mar.2019.100649

Oliver Unger , Andrea Szczesny , Martin Holderried

{"title":"Does performance pay increase productivity? Evidence from a medical typing unit","authors":"Oliver Unger , Andrea Szczesny , Martin Holderried","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2019.100649","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2019.100649","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Using unique data from a medical typing unit (2011–2014), this paper empirically explores the influence of performance pay on employee productivity in a risk-less low incentive intensity environment. We analyze a routine task performed by lower-level employees. We analyze a setting with strong sectoral agreements and thus a clear (and comparatively high) basic wage level set by the general collective bargaining agreement. We find that despite the risk-less design and low incentive intensity of the setting, switching employees from fixed wages to partially performance-based compensation (PPBC) significantly increases the number of typed pages by 9.53%. Over a one-year period, this rate of increase translates into approximately one additional month of output at a fraction of the usual cost. We also find that these results do not disappear over time. In contrast, the observed gains split into an initial increase in productivity following the switch to PPBC (+3.25%) and additional gains while an employee remains on PPBC. Therefore, we assume that a type of learning begins once an employee switches to PPBC and that this learning is the most pronounced during the first months following the change in compensation. Furthermore, we find no evidence of potentially misplaced incentives in the selection of tasks by the employees (i.e., cherry picking) and no indications of reduced quality.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"47 ","pages":"Article 100649"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.mar.2019.100649","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43103179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7

Cost Volume Profit Analysis (CVP-Analysis) 成本-量-利分析(CVP-Analysis)

IF 4.6 2区管理学

Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2020-04-20 DOI: 10.24053/9783739880280-134

引用次数: 0

Process Costing (Manufacturing Accounting) 过程成本核算(制造会计)

IF 4.6 2区管理学

Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2020-04-20 DOI: 10.24053/9783739880280-328

引用次数: 0

Multiple-Level Contribution Margin Accounting 多层次出资保证金会计

IF 4.6 2区管理学

Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2020-04-20 DOI: 10.24053/9783739880280-339

引用次数: 0

Degree of Operating Leverage (DOL) 经营杠杆度(DOL)

IF 4.6 2区管理学

Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2020-04-20 DOI: 10.24053/9783739880280-150

引用次数: 0