{"title":"Management control as a system: Integrating and extending theorizing on MC complementarity and institutional logics","authors":"Jonas Gerdin","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2020.100716","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2020.100716","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This abductive case study of MCS design change in a Swedish university shows how social and technical forms of control can be underpinned and held together by different institutional logics (forming so-called ‘socio-technical dyads of MC’), which gave them different, yet complementary functionalities to achieve organization-wide goals. Specifically, a since-long established neoliberal logic nurturing values of individualized freedom, market-based competition, and an entrepreneurial spirit was complemented with a programmatic logic nurturing the opposite values of centralized decision-making, and the homogenization and prioritization of research efforts. By integrating recent theorizing on MC complementarity and institutional logics when interpreting these findings, this study not only extends these literatures in several important respects, but also offers a novel way of conceptualizing MC as a system.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"49 ","pages":"Article 100716"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.mar.2020.100716","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43920340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Berend van der Kolk , Paula M.G. van Veen-Dirks , Henk J. ter Bogt
{"title":"How combinations of control elements create tensions and how these can be managed: An embedded case study","authors":"Berend van der Kolk , Paula M.G. van Veen-Dirks , Henk J. ter Bogt","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2020.100677","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2020.100677","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper explores how combinations of management control (MC) elements can create tensions, and what supervisors can do to manage these tensions. We extend the literature on the interplay of MC elements by examining the underlying micro-processes that give rise to tensions between MC elements. Specifically, drawing on both the MC and the organization literature, we investigate how interactions between MC elements can simultaneously enhance and diminish control effectiveness, for which we coin the term <em>tension complexity</em>, and how these tensions can change over time, which we label <em>tension dynamics</em>. We empirically inform our study with an embedded case study in a public sector organization in the Netherlands. Using interviews, desk research, and observations, this study specifically investigates how an organization-level MC element (the value ‘self-management’) relates to departmental MC elements, creating tensions. The findings highlight that tensions, because of their dynamic and complex nature, require continuous attention from managers. Furthermore, the case findings demonstrate how department managers can influence the tensions by affecting the balance, balance tendency, and intensity of the MC elements within them. We conclude by providing suggestions for further research into the interactions of MC elements.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"48 ","pages":"Article 100677"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.mar.2020.100677","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45174908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Governmentality and counter-conduct: A field study of accounting amidst concurrent and competing rationales and programmes","authors":"Thomas Ahrens , Laurence Ferry , Rihab Khalifa","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2020.100686","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2020.100686","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper contributes to the diverse and growing stream of accounting research on Foucault’s notion of counter-conduct, which is broadly concerned with the uses of accounting in the development of alternative ways of governing. Its key problematic lies in the roles that accounting can play in the intertwining of particular practices of governing, for instance, by underpinning practices that facilitate political campaigning, making specific policy choices, and creating new administrative arrangements. We illustrate our argument with some of the ways in which Newcastle City Council (NCC) used accounting to manoeuvre between the programmes of localism, centralism, devolution, austerity, and marketisation to develop novel forms of counter-conduct in response to austerity funding cuts. We show how accounting was used to underpin a multi-facetted counter-conduct that sought to profile itself locally and nationally against austerity as a highly visible and controversial programme of government. However, accounting also served to undermine NCC’s own counter-conduct, for example, through its engagement with longer established programmes, such as marketisation, and by rationalising the council’s administrative responses of austerity cuts.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"48 ","pages":"Article 100686"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.mar.2020.100686","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"54809286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Alisa G. Brink , Andrea Gouldman , Jacob M. Rose , Kristian Rotaru
{"title":"Effects of superiors’ compensation structures on psychophysiological responses and real earnings management decisions of subordinate managers","authors":"Alisa G. Brink , Andrea Gouldman , Jacob M. Rose , Kristian Rotaru","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2020.100691","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2020.100691","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study examines the effects of executive compensation structures and research and development (R&D) reporting methods on subordinate managers’ psychophysiological responses and decisions to engage in real earnings management. Results from one 2 × 2 between-participants experiment indicate that when R&D expenditures are capitalized, relative to expensed, managers are less willing to abandon a failing project in favor of a superior project. Importantly, executive compensation structures can effectively reduce this form of real earnings management by subordinates. When executives are paid with restricted stock, relative to when executives are compensated with unrestricted stock, their subordinate managers are less willing to continue a failing R&D project when R&D expenses are capitalized. A second experiment that employs pupillometry, eye tracking and facial analysis in order to capture participants’ psychophysiological responses to incentive structures reveals that subordinates exhibit increased arousal and more intense negative emotions when they encounter supervisor pay structures that conflict with their personal incentives. Increases in negative emotion lead to reductions in earnings management behavior. The results indicate that compensation structures for superiors, such as executives, can significantly mitigate subordinate managers’ tendency to engage in real earnings management. In addition, from a methodological perspective, the second experiment indicates that hypothetical incentives are internalized by experiment participants, and hypothetical incentives lead to predictable psychophysiological responses and related decisions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"48 ","pages":"Article 100691"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.mar.2020.100691","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46114296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Semantic narrowing in risk talk: The prevalence of communicative path dependency","authors":"Matthäus Tekathen , Niels Dechow","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2020.100692","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2020.100692","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study concerns risk talk. Recent studies draw attention to the significance of communication for the development of intelligent (reflexive) as opposed to compliance-focused, secondary forms of risk management, but also show that risk management systems do not necessarily produce reflective forms of risk talk. To develop an understanding of why reflective risk talk is (un)able to unfold, we study, through a Luhmannian lens, the communicative practices via which reflections on product quality problems as risk unfold in the setting of a division of a multinational manufacturing firm. The study shows how a technical product quality issue ended up being reduced to a financial risk calculation. In so doing, the study makes three contributions. First, we complement the prevailing focus on the role of risk tools and experts in the organisational life of risk management with an analysis of the ways communicative practices constitute organisational risk management. Second, by explicating the ways in which risk semantics in use can narrow the organisational understanding of risks, we show how pluralistic understandings of risks are easily lost at the interfaces of cross-functional communication. Third, we offer an explanation as to why risk talk may not engender the intended reflectivity. Rather than attributing this to secondary risk management, we propose that reflective risk talk is sometimes hampered by ‘communicative path dependency’, meaning that some organisations fail to change risk talk because of communicative practices that rather than to develop, delimit and perpetuate the observable and addressable space for talking about risks.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"48 ","pages":"Article 100692"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.mar.2020.100692","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48754065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Financial reporting quality and peer group selection","authors":"Bart Dierynck , Arnt Verriest","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2019.100675","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2019.100675","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Similarity between a firm and a potential peer firm with respect to important economic characteristics is a first-order criterion to select peer firms. As economic characteristics are often captured through information disclosed in publicly available financial reports, financial reporting quality (FRQ) of a potential peer firm could influence peer group selection. We hypothesize that potential peer firms with higher FRQ are more likely to be included in the peer group of another firm because the reduced information asymmetry<span> and lower reputation costs connected to higher FRQ of potential peer firms can influence the board of directors’ evaluation of similarity between the firm and a potential peer firm. Analyzing the peer groups used by S&P 900 firms for benchmarking executive compensation packages, we find support for our hypothesis and the channels we specify in our theory. Our results are robust across several measures for FRQ, albeit they are somewhat weaker when FRQ is measured by means of internal control deficiencies, fraud, and AAERs. Using alternative specifications to define the potential peer group and controlling for corporate governance strength does not change our inferences and our results also hold when we control for the presence of the potential peer firm in the peer group of the previous year. This study contributes to previous research on peer groups by examining the accounting information environment around peer group composition.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"47 ","pages":"Article 100675"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.mar.2019.100675","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43343064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do self-reported motivators really motivate higher performance?","authors":"Sofia M. Lourenço","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2019.100676","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2019.100676","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>Self-reported motivators, i.e., stated preferences for work incentives, have been examined extensively based on the assumption that they provide valuable information for the design of compensation systems. However, the extent to which these stated preferences match performance has been overlooked. I use a field experiment with sales representatives to examine whether a higher preference for an incentive leads to a greater performance effect when that incentive is introduced. Specifically, I examine whether </span><em>ex-ante</em> self-reported incentive preferences moderate incentive effects on <em>ex-post</em> objective performance. Using a setting in which sales representatives receive a fixed hourly rate, the between-subjects experimental manipulations add one of three incentive motivators: (a) money (i.e., monetary incentives in the form of cash bonuses), (b) feedback, or (c) recognition. My results show that being in the money condition (i.e., being eligible to win a cash bonus) leads to an increase in performance only for those who state a low preference for this incentive. Conversely, only those who state a high preference for feedback increase their performance when they are in the feedback condition. Finally, being in the recognition condition (i.e., being eligible to win an acknowledgement award) leads to an increase in performance regardless of the initially stated preference for this incentive.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"47 ","pages":"Article 100676"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.mar.2019.100676","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48812103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dennis D. Fehrenbacher , Steven E. Kaplan , Carly Moulang
{"title":"The role of accountability in reducing the impact of affective reactions on capital budgeting decisions","authors":"Dennis D. Fehrenbacher , Steven E. Kaplan , Carly Moulang","doi":"10.1016/j.mar.2019.100650","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mar.2019.100650","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>It is generally recognized that decisions about capital projects should be made by independent reviewers who select the economically strongest projects. However, prior research finds that reviewers’ choices can be biased by their affective reactions to a manager proposing a capital project. Potentially, this bias could be reduced by holding reviewers more accountable. We contend that holding reviewers accountable will lessen the effect of positive, but not negative, affective reactions on capital project choice. To provide evidence on our predictions, we conduct an experiment using highly experienced participants. Participants’ task is to select between two capital projects, each proposed by a different manager. Although one project is economically preferred relative to the other project, we manipulate whether there is a negative affective reaction to the manager proposing the preferred project or a positive affective reaction to the manager proposing the non-preferred project. We also manipulate the presence versus absence of reviewer accountability. As expected, participants were more likely to select the economically non-preferred project when proposed by a manager triggering a positive affective reaction, but this tendency was reduced by accountability. Also, as expected, participants were less likely to select the economically preferred project when proposed by a manager triggering a negative affective reaction, and accountability did not reduce this tendency. Implications of our findings for theory and practice are discussed.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51429,"journal":{"name":"Management Accounting Research","volume":"47 ","pages":"Article 100650"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.mar.2019.100650","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44239346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}