Stanford Law Review最新文献_第9页

Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience 设计风险资本市场:来自美国经验的教训

IF 4.9 1区社会学

Stanford Law Review Pub Date : 2002-12-04 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.353380

R. Gilson

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引用次数: 249

Ideology and trust: a reply to Bloche. 意识形态与信任:对布洛切的回答。

IF 4.9 1区社会学

Stanford Law Review Pub Date : 2002-12-01

Mark A Hall

引用次数: 0

In Search of Fair Housing in Cyberspace: The Implications of the Communications Decency Act for Fair Housing on the Internet 在网络空间中寻找公平住房:《通信规范法》对互联网上公平住房的影响

IF 4.9 1区社会学

Stanford Law Review Pub Date : 2002-12-01 DOI: 10.2307/1229678

Jennifer C. Chang

引用次数: 1

Ideology and trust: a reply to Bloche. 意识形态与信任:对布洛切的回答。

IF 4.9 1区社会学

Stanford Law Review Pub Date : 2002-12-01 DOI: 10.2307/1229677

M. Hall

引用次数: 0

Getting beyond Affirmative Action: Thinking about Racial Inequality in the Twenty-First Century 超越平权法案:思考21世纪的种族不平等

IF 4.9 1区社会学

Stanford Law Review Pub Date : 2002-12-01 DOI: 10.2307/1229679

M. Selmi

引用次数: 0

Classification Cancels Corporate Accountability 分类取消公司问责制

IF 4.9 1区社会学

Stanford Law Review Pub Date : 2002-12-01 DOI: 10.2307/1229672

Patrick S. McGurn

引用次数: 12

Takeover Defenses Work. Is That Such a Bad Thing 接管防御工作。这是一件坏事吗

IF 4.9 1区社会学

Stanford Law Review Pub Date : 2002-12-01 DOI: 10.2307/1229671

M. Gordon

引用次数: 20

The End of Bankruptcy 破产的终结

IF 4.9 1区社会学

Stanford Law Review Pub Date : 2002-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.359241

D. Baird, R. K. Rasmussen

{"title":"The End of Bankruptcy","authors":"D. Baird, R. K. Rasmussen","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.359241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.359241","url":null,"abstract":"The law of corporate reorganizations is conventionally justified as a way to preserve a firm's going-concern value: Specialized assets in a particular firm are worth more together in that firm than anywhere else. This paper shows that this notion is mistaken. Its flaw is that it lacks a well-developed understanding of the nature of a firm. Initially, it is easy to confuse size with specialization and overstate the extent to which assets are dedicated to a particular enterprise. Even when such dedicated assets exist, they often do not need to stay in the same firm. As Coase taught us, as the costs of contracting go down, so too does the value of keeping assets in a particular firm. But even when specialized assets must be kept inside a firm, two other forces limit the need for a traditional law of corporate reorganizations. Capital structures are increasingly designed with financial distress in mind. For these firms, control rights shift from one set of investors to another as the firm encounters difficulty. Such firms either never file for bankruptcy, or, if they do, it is only to vindicate the pre-determined allocation of control rights. Even where control rights are not sensibly allocated, a quick sale of the firm restores order. When firms can be sold as going concerns, the need for the traditional negotiated plan of reorganization disappears. The vast majority of firms in financial distress never enter bankruptcy. Today the Chapter 11 of a large firm is an auction of the assets, followed by litigation over the proceeds. To the extent we understand the law of corporate reorganizations as providing a collective forum in which creditors and their common debtor fashion a future for a firm that would otherwise be torn apart by financial distress, we may safely conclude that its era has come to an end.","PeriodicalId":51386,"journal":{"name":"Stanford Law Review","volume":"55 1","pages":"751-789"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2002-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.359241","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68610688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 170

Trust and betrayal in the medical marketplace. 医疗市场中的信任与背叛。

IF 4.9 1区社会学

Stanford Law Review Pub Date : 2002-12-01 DOI: 10.2307/1229676

M. G. Bloche

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引用次数: 15

Inside Baseball at the NLRB: Chairman Gould and His Critics NLRB内部棒球:主席古尔德和他的批评者

IF 4.9 1区社会学

Stanford Law Review Pub Date : 2002-12-01 DOI: 10.2307/1229680

M. J. Goldberg

引用次数: 3