Stanford Law Review最新文献_第10页

Is There an American "Legal Profession?" 美国有“法律职业”吗?

IF 4.9 1区社会学

Stanford Law Review Pub Date : 2002-06-01 DOI: 10.2307/1229631

Geoffrey C. Hazard join, Deborah L. Rhode

引用次数: 3

The Profession and the Public Interest 专业与公众利益

IF 4.9 1区社会学

Stanford Law Review Pub Date : 2002-06-01 DOI: 10.2307/1229634

Deborah L. Rhode

引用次数: 4

Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: Private Enforcement in American Courts after LaGrand 《维也纳领事关系公约》第36条:拉格朗之后美国法院的私人执行

IF 4.9 1区社会学

Stanford Law Review Pub Date : 2002-06-01 DOI: 10.2307/1229623

Cara H. Drinan

{"title":"Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: Private Enforcement in American Courts after LaGrand","authors":"Cara H. Drinan","doi":"10.2307/1229623","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/1229623","url":null,"abstract":"On June 27, 2001, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held in the case of Germany v. United States of America (LaGrand) that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (\"VCCR\") affords an individually enforceable right to consular access upon arrest or detention in a foreign country.1 In the United States, death penalty opponents applauded the ICJ's finding for its promise of greater due process protection, while states' rights advocates criticized the decision as an unlawful exercise of criminal appellate jurisdiction. LaGrand, in theory, resolves many questions that have plagued American courts: whether Article 36 rights are vested in an individual or a signatory state; whether the right may be privately enforced; whether domestic procedural rules may bar Article 36 claims in certain circumstances; and whether the ICJ's provisional measures are binding upon member states. The LaGrand opinion, however, leaves unclear as many issues as it clarifies. Procedurally, LaGrand has enormous implications for American criminal courts if taken at its word. Yet it remains to be seen how, and if, the American courts will incorporate the ICJ's decision in LaGrand into their jurisprudence. The United States Supreme Court has yet to address the LaGrand issues in a comprehensive manner.2 As a result, courts vary widely in","PeriodicalId":51386,"journal":{"name":"Stanford Law Review","volume":"54 1","pages":"1303"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2002-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/1229623","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68297065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

The Origins of a Judicial Icon: Justice Brennan's Warren Court Years 司法偶像的起源:布伦南法官的沃伦法庭岁月

IF 4.9 1区社会学

Stanford Law Review Pub Date : 2002-05-01 DOI: 10.2307/1229691

Kevin Driscoll

引用次数: 2

Precedent, Judicial Power, and the Constitutionality of "No-Citation" Rules in the Federal Courts of Appeals 判例、司法权与联邦上诉法院“不予引用”规则的合宪性

IF 4.9 1区社会学

Stanford Law Review Pub Date : 2002-05-01 DOI: 10.2307/1229692

Kenneth Anthony Laretto

{"title":"Precedent, Judicial Power, and the Constitutionality of \"No-Citation\" Rules in the Federal Courts of Appeals","authors":"Kenneth Anthony Laretto","doi":"10.2307/1229692","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/1229692","url":null,"abstract":"On April 13, 1996, Faye Anastasoff mailed a tax refund claim to the IRS. The deadline for the claim was April 15; Anastasoff believed that by mailing it before the deadline, the claim was valid. Ordinarily, she would have been right; the so-called mailbox rule1 provides that in most instances, a claim is timely upon receipt if it is postmarked by the original deadline. The IRS received Anastasoffs claim on April 16, and rejected it under an obscure exception to the mailbox rule.2 In the ensuing litigation, the district court rejected Anastasoffs claim that the mailbox rule applied in her case.3 On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the government provided Anastasoff with a copy of Christie v. United States,4 an unpublished decision involving a fact-pattern identical to Anastasoffs. The Eighth Circuits Rule 28A(i) provides that [u]npublished opinions are not precedent and parties generally should not cite them, although such opinions may be cited if they [have] persuasive value on a material issue and no published opinion . . . would serve as well.5 During oral argument, Circuit Judge Richard Arnold asked Anastasoffs attorney what he thought about the Christie decision. The lawyers response? [Christie is] not binding on this court.6 The court disagreed. In Anastasoff v. United States,7 a three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit ruled that Rule 28A(i), a type of no-citation rule prevalent","PeriodicalId":51386,"journal":{"name":"Stanford Law Review","volume":"54 1","pages":"1037"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2002-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/1229692","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68297410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Marxism and the Continuing Irrelevance of Normative Theory (reviewing G. A. Cohen, If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich? (2000)) 马克思主义与规范理论的持续无关性(回顾G. A. Cohen，《如果你是一个平等主义者，你为什么那么富有?》(2000))

IF 4.9 1区社会学

Stanford Law Review Pub Date : 2002-05-01 DOI: 10.2307/1229694

B. Leiter

引用次数: 4

Law, medicine, and trust. 法律，医药和信任。

IF 4.9 1区社会学

Stanford Law Review Pub Date : 2002-04-01 DOI: 10.2307/1229596

M. Hall

{"title":"Law, medicine, and trust.","authors":"M. Hall","doi":"10.2307/1229596","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/1229596","url":null,"abstract":"There is a stark dichotomy between the significance of trust in medical relationships and the lack of attention paid to trust in existing legal analyses. Health care law lacks a developed vocabulary, analytical framework, or body of empirical information for focusing on the psychological realities of trust, vulnerability and illness. This article seeks to give legal and public policy analysts the tools and information they need to begin thinking clearly and constructively about trust by establishing the following foundational features of medical care delivery: (1) Trust is essential and unavoidable in medical relationships. Patients need and want to trust, and without trust medical relationships never form or are entirely dysfunctional. (2) Beyond the mechanics of forming and conducting treatment relationships, trust may confer therapeutic benefit by activating non-specific or self-healing mechanisms, or by enhancing the effects of active therapies. Medical trust has this unique instrumental value because of its strong emotional content, which results from the deep vulnerability of illness that gives rise to trust. (3) Law can (and does) enforce trust-related expectations, punish violations of trust, facilitate the psychology of trust, and undermine trust. These effects occur both through direct regulation and through the law's expressive function and its relationship with social and professional norms. (4) These legal attitudes toward trust sometimes come into conflict because enforcing trust or punishing its violations can also weaken the psychological foundations of trust. (5) Striking the best compromise among competing legal stances toward trust often requires subtlety, complexity, and detailed empirical information about the psychology of trust. (6) Honoring these principles may require that formal legal rights be softened somewhat with the therapeutic reality of trust. Recognizing these points does not require us to jettison or rework entire sections of the field, however, since most of existing law is broadly consistent with the psychology of trust. Seeing this demonstrates that a therapeutic perspective can reconcile many of the tensions between a strong patient rights orientation and a more enlightened version of professionalism.","PeriodicalId":51386,"journal":{"name":"Stanford Law Review","volume":"55 2 1","pages":"463-527"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2002-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/1229596","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68296664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 55

Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation 多重人格障碍的法律:法律设计与解释中的歧义价值

IF 4.9 1区社会学

Stanford Law Review Pub Date : 2002-04-01 DOI: 10.2307/1229575

J. Grundfest, A. Pritchard

引用次数: 62

Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis 第一修正案分析中的实用主义与目的主义

IF 4.9 1区社会学

Stanford Law Review Pub Date : 2002-04-01 DOI: 10.2307/1229576

R. Posner

引用次数: 10

Brown Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social Science and the Supreme Court's Quest for Legitimacy 历史背景下的第11个脚注:社会科学与最高法院对合法性的追求