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引用次数: 20
摘要
在《交错董事会的强大反收购力量:理论、证据和政策》一书中，Lucian Arye Bebchuk、John C. Coates IV和Guhan Subramanian (BC&S)教授试图证明，拥有毒丸权利计划和“有效的”交错董事会的恶意收购目标可以——“大多数时候确实如此”——保持独立，而不是将自己卖给最初的收购者或另一个买家。正如所提出的，他们的发现颠覆了传统智慧，并证明了在他们看来，对有关收购防御的法律进行重大“重新考虑”是合理的。他们有什么发现吗?我们真的应该感到震惊吗?-知道收购防御有效吗?
In The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy,1 Professors Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV, and Guhan Subramanian (BC&S) purport to demonstrate that hostile takeover targets that have a poison pill rights plan and an "effective" staggered board can-"and most of the time do"2-remain independent rather than sell themselves to the initial raider or another buyer. As presented, their findings turn conventional wisdom on its head and justify, in their view, significant "reconsideration" of the law regarding takeover defenses. Are they on to something here? Should we, indeed, be shocked-shocked!-to lear that takeover defenses work?
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