Trust and betrayal in the medical marketplace.

IF 4.9 1区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences
M. G. Bloche
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引用次数: 15

Abstract

In health care law, as in other regulatory spheres, many rules are meant to promote trustworthiness. Market-oriented scholars have long urged that parties be permitted to contract out of such rules. They have argued, on efficiency grounds, for contractual enjoining of clinical decisionmaking authority; relationships among providers and health care payers; and physicians' conflicting obligations to patients, payers, and other third parties. To a large degree, courts and regulators accommodated, clearing a path in the 1980s and 1990s for the rise of managed care. But a growing body of research on the psychology of trust, altruism, and health risk raises doubts about contractual departure from rules meant to reinforce trustworthiness. Rising consumer hostility to managed care cost control methods has lent urgency to these doubts. While some contractarian scholars dismiss these doubts, others, most notably Mark Hall, take them seriously. Drawing upon some of the same empirical studies that have led others to question contractarian prescriptions, Hall argues that consumer trust is robust, indeed often present in excess, and that regulation on trust-related grounds is mostly unnecessary, even counterproductive. I contend in this essay that contractarian prescriptions for health law pose large risks for our health system's trustworthiness. Hall's case to the contrary misreads both the psychological evidence and the import and irony of Americans' backlash against managed care. Because people are uncomfortable, to the point of denial, with health care's cost-benefit tradeoffs, the medical marketplace delivers evasion and euphemism about how these tradeoffs are made. But there is also a thriving market for the exposure of evasion. Regulatory and legal deference to contractual arrangements that ration covertly thus engenders consumer anger and distrust. Rather than tolerating such arrangements, the law should demand contractual honesty as the price for deference to contractual freedom.
医疗市场中的信任与背叛。
在医疗保健法和其他监管领域,许多规则都是为了提高可信度。以市场为导向的学者长期以来一直敦促允许当事人通过合同摆脱这些规则。他们认为,基于效率的理由,合同禁止临床决策权;提供者和保健支付者之间的关系;以及医生对病人、付款人和其他第三方的相互冲突的义务。在很大程度上,法院和监管机构做出了让步,在20世纪80年代和90年代为管理式医疗的兴起扫清了道路。但是,越来越多关于信任、利他主义和健康风险的心理学研究提出了对契约背离旨在加强可信度的规则的质疑。消费者对管理式医疗成本控制方法日益增长的敌意,使这些疑虑变得更加紧迫。虽然一些契约主义学者对这些质疑不屑一顾,但其他人,尤其是马克·霍尔,却认真对待这些质疑。霍尔借鉴了一些同样的实证研究,这些研究导致其他人对契约主义处方提出质疑。霍尔认为,消费者信任是强大的,确实经常过度存在,而基于信任相关理由的监管大多是不必要的,甚至适得其反。在这篇文章中,我认为卫生法的契约处方对我们的卫生系统的可信度构成了巨大的风险。相反,霍尔的案例误读了心理学证据,以及美国人反对管理式医疗的重要性和讽刺意味。由于人们对医疗保健的成本效益权衡感到不舒服,甚至到了否认的地步,医疗市场对这些权衡是如何做出的提供了逃避和委婉的说法。但曝光逃税行为的市场也在蓬勃发展。监管和法律上对合同安排的遵从,暗中引起了消费者的愤怒和不信任。法律不应容忍这种安排,而应要求以契约诚实作为尊重契约自由的代价。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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CiteScore
4.80
自引率
2.00%
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0
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