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Reject or revise: Gender differences in persistence and publishing in economics 拒绝或修改：经济学持续性和出版方面的性别差异
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Economic Inquiry Pub Date : 2024-04-02 DOI: 10.1111/ecin.13218
Gauri Kartini Shastry, Olga Shurchkov
{"title":"Reject or revise: Gender differences in persistence and publishing in economics","authors":"Gauri Kartini Shastry,&nbsp;Olga Shurchkov","doi":"10.1111/ecin.13218","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ecin.13218","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We design an experiment to study gender differences in reactions to editorial decisions on submissions to top economics journals. Respondents read a hypothetical editor's letter where the decision (e.g., revise and resubmit) is randomized across participants. Relative to an R&amp;R, female assistant professors who receive a rejection perceive a significantly lower likelihood of subsequently publishing the paper in any leading journal than comparable male assistant professors. We do not find this gender difference among tenured professors. We consider several mechanisms, pointing to gender differences in attribution of negative feedback to ability and confidence under time constraints as likely explanations.</p>","PeriodicalId":51380,"journal":{"name":"Economic Inquiry","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140587729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Whoever you want me to be: Personality and incentives 你想让我成为谁都行：个性与激励
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Economic Inquiry Pub Date : 2024-03-29 DOI: 10.1111/ecin.13220
Andrew McGee, Peter McGee
{"title":"Whoever you want me to be: Personality and incentives","authors":"Andrew McGee,&nbsp;Peter McGee","doi":"10.1111/ecin.13220","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ecin.13220","url":null,"abstract":"<p>What can employers learn from personality tests when applicants have incentives to misrepresent themselves? Using a within-subject, laboratory experiment, we compare personality measures with and without incentives for misrepresentation. Incentivized personality measures are weakly to moderately correlated with non-incentivized measures in all treatments. When test-takers are given a job ad indicating that an extrovert (introvert) is desired, extroversion measures are positively (negatively) correlated with IQ. Among other characteristics, only locus of control appears related to faking on personality measures. Our findings highlight the identification challenges in measuring personality and the potential for correlations between incentivized personality measures and other traits.</p>","PeriodicalId":51380,"journal":{"name":"Economic Inquiry","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecin.13220","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140602502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Market intelligence gathering, asymmetric information, and the instability of money demand 市场情报搜集、信息不对称和货币需求的不稳定性
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Economic Inquiry Pub Date : 2024-03-28 DOI: 10.1111/ecin.13211
Seon Tae Kim, Alessandro Marchesiani
{"title":"Market intelligence gathering, asymmetric information, and the instability of money demand","authors":"Seon Tae Kim,&nbsp;Alessandro Marchesiani","doi":"10.1111/ecin.13211","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ecin.13211","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The observed money demand in the U.S. had a stable negative relation with the interest rate up until the 1990s. After this period, this relation fell apart and has never been restored. We show that the central bank's ability to gather information, referred to as market intelligence (MI), matters to generate an upward-sloping money demand curve. We calibrate the model to the U.S. data for the period from 1990 to 2019 and show that MI helps to match the money demand. We also show that it is beneficial for the society, since it mitigates the inefficiency associated with asymmetric information.</p>","PeriodicalId":51380,"journal":{"name":"Economic Inquiry","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecin.13211","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140370464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Selective reporting of placebo tests in top economics journals 顶级经济学期刊对安慰剂试验的选择性报道
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Economic Inquiry Pub Date : 2024-03-25 DOI: 10.1111/ecin.13217
Anna Dreber, Magnus Johannesson, Yifan Yang
{"title":"Selective reporting of placebo tests in top economics journals","authors":"Anna Dreber,&nbsp;Magnus Johannesson,&nbsp;Yifan Yang","doi":"10.1111/ecin.13217","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ecin.13217","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Placebo tests provide incentives to underreport statistically significant tests, a form of reversed p-hacking. We test for such underreporting in 11 top economics journals between 2009 and 2021 based on a pre-registered analysis plan. If the null hypothesis is true in all tests, 2.5% of them should be significant at the 5% level with an effect in the same direction as the main test (and 5% in total). The actual fraction of statistically significant placebo tests with an effect in the same direction is 1.29% (95% CI [0.83, 1.63]), and the overall fraction of statistically significant placebo tests is 3.10% (95% CI [2.2, 4.0]).</p>","PeriodicalId":51380,"journal":{"name":"Economic Inquiry","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecin.13217","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140298579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Sentiments and spending intentions: Evidence from Florida 情绪和消费意向：佛罗里达州的证据
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Economic Inquiry Pub Date : 2024-03-20 DOI: 10.1111/ecin.13215
Hector H. Sandoval, Anita N. Walsh
{"title":"Sentiments and spending intentions: Evidence from Florida","authors":"Hector H. Sandoval,&nbsp;Anita N. Walsh","doi":"10.1111/ecin.13215","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ecin.13215","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Consumer sentiment is considered an important indicator of changes in household spending. However, the evidence of the causal relationship between sentiment and consumption is mixed and scarce. We address this gap using data from the monthly Florida Consumer Attitude Survey, which captures party affiliation, consumer sentiment, and spending intentions since 1991. We employ political partisanship as an instrument for sentiment and find a significant effect of sentiment on spending intentions. Finally, we provide evidence that spending intentions relate to actual spending and show that spending increased among counties with a larger share of Republican voters following the 2016 presidential election.</p>","PeriodicalId":51380,"journal":{"name":"Economic Inquiry","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140165221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Three-player contests with a potential inactive player: Endogenous timing of effort exertion 三人竞赛，可能有一名不活跃的选手：内生的努力时间
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Economic Inquiry Pub Date : 2024-03-16 DOI: 10.1111/ecin.13209
Kyung Hwan Baik, Jong Hwa Lee
{"title":"Three-player contests with a potential inactive player: Endogenous timing of effort exertion","authors":"Kyung Hwan Baik,&nbsp;Jong Hwa Lee","doi":"10.1111/ecin.13209","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ecin.13209","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study a contest where there are two active players in equilibrium when three players expend effort simultaneously to win a prize. We look at how endogenous timing of effort exertion affects the players' behavior. The players play the following game. First, they announce simultaneously whether they each will expend effort in period 1 or in period 2. Then, after knowing when they expend effort, each player expends effort in the period which he announced. We find interesting results, focusing on the players' decisions on when to expend effort, the identities of active players, and the effort levels in a subgame-perfect equilibrium.</p>","PeriodicalId":51380,"journal":{"name":"Economic Inquiry","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecin.13209","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140152241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Whistle-blowing and the incentive to hire 举报和雇用动机
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Economic Inquiry Pub Date : 2024-03-06 DOI: 10.1111/ecin.13212
Jef De Mot, Murat C. Mungan
{"title":"Whistle-blowing and the incentive to hire","authors":"Jef De Mot,&nbsp;Murat C. Mungan","doi":"10.1111/ecin.13212","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ecin.13212","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider a previously neglected cost of whistle-blower awards: employers may base their hiring decisions, on the margin, not on the productivity of an employee but rather on the probability that the employee will become a whistle-blower. We develop a three-stage model to examine how productivity losses due to distortions at the hiring stage influence optimal whistle-blower rewards. We characterize optimal rewards for whistle-blowing, and show that when rewards can be chosen according to either the benefits of the employer from offending or the productivity of the worker being hired, productivity-based rewards are superior to benefit-based rewards.</p>","PeriodicalId":51380,"journal":{"name":"Economic Inquiry","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecin.13212","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140075450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Macroprudential policies and Brexit: A welfare analysis 宏观审慎政策与英国脱欧：福利分析
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Economic Inquiry Pub Date : 2024-03-06 DOI: 10.1111/ecin.13214
Margarita Rubio
{"title":"Macroprudential policies and Brexit: A welfare analysis","authors":"Margarita Rubio","doi":"10.1111/ecin.13214","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ecin.13214","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Brexit will have implications on financial stability and the implementation of macroprudential policies. The United Kingdom (UK) will no longer be subject to the jurisdiction of the European Systemic Risk Board. This paper studies the welfare implications of this change of regime. By means of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, I compare the pre-Brexit scenario with the new one, in which the UK sets macroprudential policy independently. I find that, after Brexit, the UK is better off by setting its own macroprudential policy without taking into account Europe's welfare as a whole.</p>","PeriodicalId":51380,"journal":{"name":"Economic Inquiry","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140075381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Privacy regulation and firm performance: Estimating the GDPR effect globally 隐私法规与公司业绩：估算 GDPR 在全球的影响
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Economic Inquiry Pub Date : 2024-03-04 DOI: 10.1111/ecin.13213
Carl Benedikt Frey, Giorgio Presidente
{"title":"Privacy regulation and firm performance: Estimating the GDPR effect globally","authors":"Carl Benedikt Frey,&nbsp;Giorgio Presidente","doi":"10.1111/ecin.13213","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ecin.13213","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines how privacy regulation shaped firm performance. Controlling for firm and country-industry-year unobserved characteristics, we compare the outcomes of firms at different levels of exposure to EU markets, before and after the enforcement of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2018. We find that the GDPR had the unintended consequence of harming the profitability of companies targeting European consumers through the cost channel. Technology firms experienced a 2.1% decline in profits, but not in sales. The GDPR increased extra expenses, added to firms wage bills, and accelerated patenting in GDPR-related technology fields. The main burdens have been borne by smaller companies.</p>","PeriodicalId":51380,"journal":{"name":"Economic Inquiry","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecin.13213","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140044188","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Social learning about climate risks 关于气候风险的社会学习
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Economic Inquiry Pub Date : 2024-03-01 DOI: 10.1111/ecin.13210
Yilan Xu, Sébastien Box-Couillard
{"title":"Social learning about climate risks","authors":"Yilan Xu,&nbsp;Sébastien Box-Couillard","doi":"10.1111/ecin.13210","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ecin.13210","url":null,"abstract":"<p>With a social network adjacency matrix constructed from the Facebook Social Connectedness Index (SCI), this paper examines whether social learning facilitates climate risk perception updates to inform climate adaptation. We find that Hurricanes Harvey and Irma-induced regional flooding increased flood insurance policies nationwide to the extent of each county's social network proximity to the flooded areas, with a corresponding update in climate risk perception. Social learning resulted in an additional 250,000 policies in flooded counties and 81,000 policies in unflooded counties over 3 years. We find evidence of the salience effect but no support for adverse selection or over-insurance.</p>","PeriodicalId":51380,"journal":{"name":"Economic Inquiry","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecin.13210","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140019000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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