Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy最新文献

Does Fiscal Decentralization Mitigate Domestic Terrorism? 财政权力下放能否缓解国内恐怖主义？

Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-07-15 DOI: 10.1515/peps-2024-0018

Mohammad Arzaghi, Khusrav Gaibulloev

{"title":"Does Fiscal Decentralization Mitigate Domestic Terrorism?","authors":"Mohammad Arzaghi, Khusrav Gaibulloev","doi":"10.1515/peps-2024-0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2024-0018","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Many countries have embarked on decentralization as a way to mitigate separation tendencies. Even though decentralization could satisfy some separation tendencies, the central government might be unable or unwilling to award the localities the level of decentralization they require to stay in the union. This mismatch may give rise to domestic violence and internal conflict. We propose a simple two-stage model that combines the decentralization and domestic terrorism literature in a single structural model, which can be readily tested using existing data in the disciplines. As long as the actual decentralization level meets the unobserved desired value by the localities, there will be a high likelihood of observing a zero incidence of domestic terrorism. Otherwise, the incidents happen regularly with mitigating effects from decentralization. Our model also accounts for the left-censoring of the terrorism data at zero. We examine our model using 5-year interval panel data of more than 60 countries based on the information for 1970–2019. Our results indicate a strong negative and statistically significant relationship between fiscal decentralization and domestic terrorism events. One percent increase in fiscal decentralization is associated with a two to three percent decline in domestic terrorism incidents. The coefficients of the selection model and domestic terrorism model generally conform to the literature.","PeriodicalId":509287,"journal":{"name":"Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141644835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

UN Peacekeeping Forces and Peace Negotiations in Africa 联合国维和部队与非洲和平谈判

Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-07-05 DOI: 10.1515/peps-2024-0009

Mohamed Niaré, Ousmane Mariko

引用次数: 0

The Military Expenditure – Economic Growth Nexus Revisited: Evidence from the United Kingdom 军费开支与经济增长关系再探：来自英国的证据

Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-05-22 DOI: 10.1515/peps-2023-0059

Robert Hanson, Joo Young Jeon

引用次数: 0

Group Grievances, Opportunity, and the Onset of Civil War: Some Theory and Tests of Competing Mechanisms, 1990–2017 群体不满、机会与内战爆发：1990-2017 年竞争机制的一些理论与检验

Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.1515/peps-2023-0053

Indra de Soysa, Henning Finseraas, K. Vadlamannati

{"title":"Group Grievances, Opportunity, and the Onset of Civil War: Some Theory and Tests of Competing Mechanisms, 1990–2017","authors":"Indra de Soysa, Henning Finseraas, K. Vadlamannati","doi":"10.1515/peps-2023-0053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2023-0053","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Recent scholarship claims that group grievances due to political exclusion and discrimination drive civil wars. The grievance perspective suggests that socio-psychological factors allow groups to overcome collective action problems. We argue that the grievance perspective (over)focuses on the ends and not means, which are critical to explain how groups survive state sanction, allowing contention to escalate to civil war. We suggest that inclusive economic governance reduces investment in state-evading infrastructures for quotidian economic reasons, leading to the buildup of rebellion-specific capital. Physical and human infrastructures of state evasion form the logistical bases for survival against state sanction. Our analyses show that group-grievance-generating political factors are poorer predictors of civil war compared with economic freedoms measured as free-market friendly policies and the private ownership of economies, which should reduce economic rents accruing to state-evading shadow markets. Our results are robust to several alternative models, data, and estimating method. Theory that ignores the means explain the main causes of costly violence only partially, or mistake symptom for cause. Freedom and inclusiveness, which should reduce grievances, are intrinsically valuable, but they are hard to obtain when violence is waged successfully for more narrower ends.","PeriodicalId":509287,"journal":{"name":"Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140357232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Why Americans Support Strict Counterterrorism Measures: Examining the Relationship between Concern about Terrorism and Public Support for Counterterrorism 为什么美国人支持严格的反恐措施？研究对恐怖主义的担忧与公众对反恐的支持之间的关系

Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-03-27 DOI: 10.1515/peps-2023-0056

Sungil Han, Wukki Kim, Quinn Gordon

引用次数: 0

Conflict Under Incapacitation and Revenge: A Game-Theoretic Exploration 无能力和复仇下的冲突：博弈论探索

Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-02-27 DOI: 10.1515/peps-2023-0058

Puja Mukherjee

{"title":"Conflict Under Incapacitation and Revenge: A Game-Theoretic Exploration","authors":"Puja Mukherjee","doi":"10.1515/peps-2023-0058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2023-0058","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In real life, winning a conflict sometimes does not end the conflict. Revenge motivations can stay and provide momentum to the conflict, thus leading to further escalation of the conflict. This is known as the value effect or vengeance effect of revenge. However, the presence of revenge can lead to de-escalation of the conflict out of self-deterrence and sometimes retaliation out of revenge is not possible if the combatant is incapacitated. Hence, the impact of revenge on the level of violence is a priori not clear. This paper is an attempt to answer that question. Using a two-period game of conflict this paper tries to show how desire and capabilities of the combatants to exact revenge can influence the intensity of the conflict. This paper shows the following: how the strategies of the combatants are influenced by the value effect of revenge, self-deterrence and incapacitation of the combatants; how the stronger combatant is in a favourable position in the conflict and can prevent its opponent from going into second period conflict out of revenge; when the combatants are equally strong the intensity of the conflict starts falling with time. It also lays out some real-life conflicts and existing empirical work to support the results.","PeriodicalId":509287,"journal":{"name":"Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140424333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Analyzing the Tripartite Relationship Among Public Debt, Economic Growth, and Political Risks: A Panel VAR Approach 分析公共债务、经济增长和政治风险之间的三方关系：面板 VAR 方法

Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.1515/peps-2023-0054

Abderrazek Ben Hamouda

引用次数: 0

Analyzing the Tripartite Relationship Among Public Debt, Economic Growth, and Political Risks: A Panel VAR Approach 分析公共债务、经济增长和政治风险之间的三方关系：面板 VAR 方法

Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-02-01 DOI: 10.1515/peps-2023-0054

Abderrazek Ben Hamouda

引用次数: 0

Rationality of the Terrorist Group and Government’s Policy: A Game Theoretic Approach 恐怖组织的理性与政府的政策：博弈论方法

Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-01-25 DOI: 10.1515/peps-2023-0030

Aishwarya Harichandan

{"title":"Rationality of the Terrorist Group and Government’s Policy: A Game Theoretic Approach","authors":"Aishwarya Harichandan","doi":"10.1515/peps-2023-0030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2023-0030","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The two ideas of the rationality of terrorist organisations and the costly leader game are used in this paper to construct a game theoretic model. It is an addition to the literature on terrorism and leader-follower games, in which the government and a terrorist organisation are the two players. Terrorist group can be rational or irrational. In case it is rational, it does the cost-benefit analysis and is open to negotiation. Only in this case, the government chooses to not spend on counter-terrorist measures. The irrational group has lexicographic preferences, which means that it prefers a successful attack to attract attention and recruits at the beginning or finish of its operation. Consequently, it is assumed that the irrational group will always attack. the irrational terrorist organisation has the option of either choosing not to mimic the rational group or choosing to do so at a psychological cost. Although the irrational group dislikes imitation. It seeks to duplicate the rational group so that the government withdraws and cuts back on spending on counter-terrorism. A costly leader model is set up in the paper, where the government can incur a cost to gather information about the type of terrorist group. In this framework, the paper provides policy prescriptions concerning counter-terrorist measures that the government should take in case the type of terrorist group being rational or irrational is unknown and it highlights the importance of intelligence.","PeriodicalId":509287,"journal":{"name":"Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139596669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Two Against One: Deterrence in the Triad 二对一：三合会的威慑力

Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-01-02 DOI: 10.1515/peps-2023-0050

F. Zagare

{"title":"Two Against One: Deterrence in the Triad","authors":"F. Zagare","doi":"10.1515/peps-2023-0050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2023-0050","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This essay explores a deterrence relationship between one defender and two challengers that are interconnected game-theoretically but are otherwise acting independently. In the double deterrence game model, the primary challenger makes the first move, defender, the second, and the secondary challenger makes its move only after the defender and the primary challenger have made their choices. In other words, the threat of the secondary challenger is both latent and contingent. There are four types of defenders, and three types of the two challengers. These preference assumptions define 36 distinct strategic environments, or games. These games are analyzed under both complete and incomplete information. The results are highly sensitive to the specific combination of player types. Deterrence is most likely to succeed when a defender’s threat is highly credible, and to fail when it is low. The secondary challenger is most likely to have an impact on play only at intermediate levels of the defender’s and the primary challenger’s credibility. Assuming a rising challenger, or a declining defender, or both, a danger zone will exist just prior to, or immediately after, the primary challenger has achieved parity with the defender, that is, when a balance of capabilities exists. The principal aim of a defender of the status quo facing two challengers acting independently should be on preventing a challenge by its primary opponent. This conclusion is robust no matter what configuration of player types one assumes.","PeriodicalId":509287,"journal":{"name":"Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139124785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0