二对一:三合会的威慑力

F. Zagare
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摘要

摘要 本文探讨了一个防御者和两个挑战者之间的威慑关系,这两个挑战者在博弈论上相互关联,但在其他方面却独立行动。在双重威慑博弈模型中,主要挑战者先行动,防御者后行动,而次要挑战者只有在防御者和主要挑战者做出选择后才行动。换句话说,次要挑战者的威胁既是潜在的,也是偶然的。防御者有四种类型,两个挑战者有三种类型。这些偏好假设定义了 36 种不同的战略环境或博弈。这些博弈是在完全信息和不完全信息条件下进行分析的。结果对玩家类型的具体组合非常敏感。当防御方的威胁可信度较高时,威慑最有可能成功,而当可信度较低时,威慑最有可能失败。只有在防御者和主要挑战者可信度处于中间水平时,次要挑战者才最有可能对游戏产生影响。假设挑战者实力上升,或防守者实力下降,或两者兼而有之,那么在主要挑战者与防守者实力相当之前或之后,也就是在双方实力平衡时,就会出现一个危险区。面对两个独立行动的挑战者,维持现状的防御者的主要目标应该是防止主要对手的挑战。无论假设玩家类型的配置如何,这一结论都是可靠的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Two Against One: Deterrence in the Triad
Abstract This essay explores a deterrence relationship between one defender and two challengers that are interconnected game-theoretically but are otherwise acting independently. In the double deterrence game model, the primary challenger makes the first move, defender, the second, and the secondary challenger makes its move only after the defender and the primary challenger have made their choices. In other words, the threat of the secondary challenger is both latent and contingent. There are four types of defenders, and three types of the two challengers. These preference assumptions define 36 distinct strategic environments, or games. These games are analyzed under both complete and incomplete information. The results are highly sensitive to the specific combination of player types. Deterrence is most likely to succeed when a defender’s threat is highly credible, and to fail when it is low. The secondary challenger is most likely to have an impact on play only at intermediate levels of the defender’s and the primary challenger’s credibility. Assuming a rising challenger, or a declining defender, or both, a danger zone will exist just prior to, or immediately after, the primary challenger has achieved parity with the defender, that is, when a balance of capabilities exists. The principal aim of a defender of the status quo facing two challengers acting independently should be on preventing a challenge by its primary opponent. This conclusion is robust no matter what configuration of player types one assumes.
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