{"title":"Health insurance, agricultural production and investments","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102918","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102918","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study the effects of health insurance coverage on agricultural production decisions, examining the causal relationships by exploiting a health care reform and providing a theoretical framework to elucidate underlying mechanisms. We find that the reform led to long-run increases in total cultivation investments and output, accompanied by a shift in households’ cultivation portfolio towards riskier crops. We explain these findings using a model of agricultural investment, highlighting the important roles of health insurance in mitigating background medical expenditure risks and enhancing health. We also find that the reform improved households’ financial well-being through reduced debts and defaults on loans.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142048048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Investigating the complexity of naloxone distribution: Which policies matter for pharmacies and potential recipients","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102917","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102917","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Despite efforts to expand naloxone access, opioid-related overdoses remain a significant contributor to mortality. We study state efforts to expand naloxone distribution through pharmacies by reducing the non-monetary costs to prescribers, dispensers, and/or potential recipients of naloxone. We find that laws that only address liability costs have small and insignificant effects on the volume of naloxone dispensed through pharmacies. In contrast, we estimate large effects of laws removing the need for patients to obtain prescriptions from traditional prescribers (e.g., primary care physicians): laws authorizing non-patient-specific prescription distribution and laws granting pharmacists prescriptive authority. We test whether areas designated as primary care shortage areas—where it would be costlier to obtain a prescription—were disproportionately impacted. Shortage areas experienced sharper growth in pharmacy naloxone dispensing in states adopting prescriptive authority policies. These gains were primarily due to those facing low out-of-pocket costs, suggesting that price barriers also must be addressed to increase naloxone purchases.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2024-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629624000626/pdfft?md5=96cfa0f5c572e743211cbb53409d0e74&pid=1-s2.0-S0167629624000626-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141736478","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Financial incentives for sanitation take-up: A randomized control trial in rural Vietnam","authors":"Cuong Viet Nguyen , Tung Duc Phung","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102916","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102916","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study assesses the impact of financial incentives on hygienic latrine ownership by poor/near-poor households in Vietnam. Rural communes were randomly assigned to a control group and three treatment arm groups: (T1) a rebate for households that installed a hygienic latrine; (T2) a financial reward for commune governments if the proportion of hygienic latrines in their commune increased by 30 percentage points; (T3) both a household rebate and a commune reward. We find a strong and positive effect from the household rebate (treatment arms 1 and 3) but an insignificant effect from the commune reward (treatment arm 2) on household ownership of a septic tank latrine. Our analysis provides suggestive evidence that microcredit is a channel through which a rebate encourages the installation of septic tank latrines. We also find that treatment arm 3 increases people's knowledge regarding sanitation and the availability of water and soap for handwashing within households.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2024-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141593757","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Geer Ang , Ya Tan , Yingjia Zhai , Fan Zhang , Qinghua Zhang
{"title":"Housing wealth, fertility and children's health in China: A regression discontinuity design","authors":"Geer Ang , Ya Tan , Yingjia Zhai , Fan Zhang , Qinghua Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102915","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102915","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper examines the influence of housing wealth on fertility outcomes through a regression discontinuity design based on a 2006 Chinese housing-market policy. Our analysis reveals that the positive impact of this policy on housing wealth significantly enhances the likelihood of fertility by 7.3 %. Our result implies that a 1 % increase in housing wealth can raise the fertility rate by 0.18 %. Furthermore, we observe that children born subsequent to the positive housing wealth shock exhibit improved health, not only at birth but also over the long term. Lastly, we present suggestive evidence suggesting that both parental pre-birth time allocation and parental health may help explain the documented positive effects of housing wealth on fertility rates.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2024-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141604445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Nudging the nudger: Performance feedback and organ donor registrations","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102914","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102914","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In a randomized controlled trial conducted in three waves over 2.5 years and involving nearly 700 customer-service representatives (CSRs) from a Canadian government service agency, we studied how providing CSRs with repeated performance feedback, with or without peer comparison, affected their subsequent organ donor registration rates. The feedback resulted in a 25 % increase in daily signups compared to otherwise equivalent encouragements and reminders. Adding benchmark information about peer performance did not amplify or diminish this effect. We observed increased registration rates for both high and low performers. A post-intervention survey indicates that CSRs in all conditions found the information included in the treatments helpful and motivating, and that signing up organ donors makes their job more meaningful. We also found suggestive evidence that performance feedback with benchmark information was the most motivating and created the least pressure to perform.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2024-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629624000596/pdfft?md5=eb49cf4f3447da7e15740335feecb0d5&pid=1-s2.0-S0167629624000596-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141713307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Geer Ang, Ya Tan, Ying Zhai, Fan Zhang, Qinghua Zhang
{"title":"Housing wealth, fertility and children's health in China: A regression discontinuity design.","authors":"Geer Ang, Ya Tan, Ying Zhai, Fan Zhang, Qinghua Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.4852579","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4852579","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the influence of housing wealth on fertility outcomes through a regression discontinuity design based on a 2006 Chinese housing-market policy. Our analysis reveals that the positive impact of this policy on housing wealth significantly enhances the likelihood of fertility by 7.3 %. Our result implies that a 1 % increase in housing wealth can raise the fertility rate by 0.18 %. Furthermore, we observe that children born subsequent to the positive housing wealth shock exhibit improved health, not only at birth but also over the long term. Lastly, we present suggestive evidence suggesting that both parental pre-birth time allocation and parental health may help explain the documented positive effects of housing wealth on fertility rates.","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141710363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The effects of alcohol sale bans on children: The case of Russia","authors":"Margarita Petrusevich","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102913","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102913","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Alcohol control policies are implemented to reduce alcoholism and related harms around the globe. This work examines the effects of a policy that restricted when alcohol could be purchased on child outcomes in Russia. To identify causal impacts, I exploit variation in the timing and severity of the restriction, which was implemented in Russian states between 2005 and 2010. Utilizing household survey data and a difference-in-differences estimation approach, I find that the policy has improved children’s physical health, with younger children being more affected, and additionally has decreased a variety of risky behavior indicators. Potential mechanisms for these effects include alcohol consumption, parental employment, household income, family stability, and time use. This work demonstrates that policies controlling parental substance access can have important effects on child health.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2024-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141581420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Getting the right tail right: Modeling tails of health expenditure distributions","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102912","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102912","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Health expenditure data almost always include extreme values, implying that the underlying distribution has heavy tails. This may result in infinite variances as well as higher-order moments and bias the commonly used least squares methods. To accommodate extreme values, we propose an estimation method that recovers the right tail of health expenditure distributions. It extends the popular two-part model to develop a novel three-part model. We apply the proposed method to claims data from one of the biggest German private health insurers. Our findings show that the estimated age gradient in health care spending differs substantially from the standard least squares method.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2024-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629624000572/pdfft?md5=7997fe9f6d9d69ec51c8f3beed9be913&pid=1-s2.0-S0167629624000572-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141623623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The education-health gradient: Revisiting the role of socio-emotional skills","authors":"Miriam Gensowski , Mette Gørtz","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102911","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102911","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Is the education-health gradient inflated because both education and health are associated with unobserved socio-emotional skills? We find that the gradient in health behaviors and outcomes is reduced by about 15 to 50% from accounting for fine-grained personality facets and up to another 50% from Locus of Control. Traditional aggregated Big-Five scales, however, have a much smaller contribution to the gradient. We use sibling-fixed effects to net out the contribution from genes and shared childhood environment, decomposing the gradient into its components with an order-invariant method. We rely on a large survey (N = 28,261) linked to high-quality Danish administrative registers with information on parental background and objectively measured diagnoses and care use. Accounting for Locus of Control yields the strongest gradient reduction in self-rated health status and objective diagnoses (30%–50%), and in health behaviors the most important factor is Extraversion, a skill that has been shown to be malleable in interventions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2024-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141460490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Amanda R. Kreider , Timothy J. Layton , Mark Shepard , Jacob Wallace
{"title":"Adverse selection and network design under regulated plan prices: Evidence from Medicaid","authors":"Amanda R. Kreider , Timothy J. Layton , Mark Shepard , Jacob Wallace","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102901","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102901","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Health plans for the poor increasingly limit access to specialty hospitals. We investigate the role of adverse selection in generating this equilibrium among private plans in Medicaid. Studying a network change, we find that covering a top cancer hospital causes severe adverse selection, increasing demand for a plan by 50% among enrollees with cancer versus no impact for others. Medicaid’s fixed insurer payments make offsetting this selection, and the contract distortions it induces, challenging, requiring either infeasibly high payment rates or near-perfect risk adjustment. By contrast, a small explicit bonus for covering the hospital is sufficient to make coverage profitable.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2024-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141472158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}