{"title":"On the (de)stabilization role of protectionism","authors":"Nastasia Henry, Alain Venditti","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102993","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102993","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>To what extent protectionism affects growth and (de)stabilizes the economies? Although the impact of protectionism on growth has been widely explored without reaching a consensus, few has been said on its impact on macroeconomic stability. The present paper attempts to gauge more precisely its implications using a Barro-type (Barro, 1990) endogenous growth model with public debt and credit constraint where tariffs are a proxy of protectionism. Our main result is to show that when the debt level is high, and the share of foreign goods in total consumption is large enough, increasing tariffs may have a destabilizing effect generating some expectation coordination failures between multiple equilibria. We also exhibit some trade-off between tariffs and growth as tariffs are beneficial only to the low growth equilibrium which may only appear when the international interest rate is low enough. Finally, focusing on the local stability property, we show that the high BGP is always characterized by local indeterminacy, while the low BGP is always a saddle point. We then prove that tariffs may be responsible for the existence of large self-fulfilling fluctuations.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"113 ","pages":"Article 102993"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824000557/pdfft?md5=200595f485ebb992a2f277bd5ccc2ea8&pid=1-s2.0-S0304406824000557-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141095769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Large compound lotteries","authors":"Zvi Safra , Uzi Segal","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102994","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102994","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Extending preferences over simple lotteries to compound (two-stage) lotteries can be done using two different methods: (1) using the Reduction of compound lotteries axiom, under which probabilities of the two stages are multiplied; (2) using the compound independence axiom, under which each second stage lottery is replaced by its certainty equivalent. Except for expected utility preferences, the rankings induced by the two methods are always in disagreement and deciding on which method to use is not straightforward. Moreover, sometimes each of the two methods may seem to violate some kind of monotonicity. In this paper we demonstrate that, under some conditions, the disagreement disappears in the limit and that for (almost) any pair of compound lotteries, the two methods agree if the second stage lotteries are replicated sufficiently many times.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"113 ","pages":"Article 102994"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141136218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Alessandro Calvia , Fausto Gozzi , Marta Leocata , Georgios I. Papayiannis , Anastasios Xepapadeas , Athanasios N. Yannacopoulos
{"title":"An optimal control problem with state constraints in a spatio-temporal economic growth model on networks","authors":"Alessandro Calvia , Fausto Gozzi , Marta Leocata , Georgios I. Papayiannis , Anastasios Xepapadeas , Athanasios N. Yannacopoulos","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102991","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102991","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We introduce a spatial economic growth model where space is described as a network of interconnected geographic locations and we study a corresponding finite-dimensional optimal control problem on a graph with state constraints. Economic growth models on networks are motivated by the nature of spatial economic data, which naturally possess a graph-like structure: this fact makes these models well-suited for numerical implementation and calibration. The network setting is different from the one adopted in the related literature, where space is modeled as a subset of a Euclidean space, which gives rise to infinite dimensional optimal control problems. After introducing the model and the related control problem, we prove existence and uniqueness of an optimal control and a regularity result for the value function, which sets up the basis for a deeper study of the optimal strategies. Then, we focus on specific cases where it is possible to find, under suitable assumptions, an explicit solution of the control problem. Finally, we discuss the cases of networks of two and three geographic locations.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"113 ","pages":"Article 102991"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141240738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Folk theorem under bankruptcy","authors":"Carmen Beviá , Luis C. Corchón , Yosuke Yasuda","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102986","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102986","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this paper, we examine Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPE) within an infinite horizon oligopolistic market, accounting for the possibility of firm bankruptcy. Central to our dynamic analysis is the concept of Bankruptcy-Free (BF) allocations. The consideration of bankruptcy introduces several distinctive features not encompassed by standard models of infinitely repeated games. Notably, when firms are sufficiently patient towards future outcomes, achieving certain collusive outcomes as equilibria may not be possible. We discern qualitatively different results depending on the number of firms in the market; in a duopoly, only specific BF allocations can be sustained as SPE, while in scenarios with more than two firms, allocations outside the BF set can also be sustained as SPE. In both instances, it is crucial that the payoffs are above the minimax BF payoff, a condition more restrictive than the standard minimax payoff advocated in Folk Theorems.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 102986"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030440682400048X/pdfft?md5=50fc5f2a86eca904ded901777f205ad7&pid=1-s2.0-S030440682400048X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140650900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Managing anticipation and reference-dependent choice","authors":"Jesper Armouti-Hansen , Christopher Kops","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102988","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102988","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Extensive field and experimental evidence shows that reference points shape behavior. But, what shapes the reference point? Candidates put forward in the literature range from the status quo, to rational expectations and the narrow focus of dreaming or worrying about a single possible outcome. This paper develops a model that includes all of these candidate sources. It does so, by allowing the reference point to be any convex combination of the outcomes possible under a consumption lottery. We introduce new solution concepts for reference-dependent choices, characterize these solution concepts on the level of choice data and identify the model’s parameters.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 102988"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824000508/pdfft?md5=36bc893160cb3523a4fb2e51d4d19af1&pid=1-s2.0-S0304406824000508-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140619011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Panayotis Mertikopoulos , Heinrich H. Nax , Bary S.R. Pradelski
{"title":"Quick or cheap? Breaking points in dynamic markets","authors":"Panayotis Mertikopoulos , Heinrich H. Nax , Bary S.R. Pradelski","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102987","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102987","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine two-sided markets where players arrive stochastically over time. The cost of matching a client and provider is heterogeneous, and the distribution of costs – but not their realization – is known. In this way, a social planner is faced with two contending objectives:(<em>a</em>) to reduce the players’ <em>waiting time</em> before getting matched; and (<em>b</em>) to reduce <em>matching costs</em>. In this paper, we aim to understand when and how these objectives are incompatible. We identify two regimes dependent on the ‘speed of improvement’ of the cost of matching with respect to market size. One regime results in a <em>quick or cheap</em> dilemma without ‘free lunch’: there exists no clearing schedule that is simultaneously optimal along both objectives. In that regime, we identify a unique breaking point signifying a stark reduction in matching cost contrasted by an increase in waiting time. The other regime features a window of opportunity in which free lunch can be achieved. Which scheduling policy is optimal depends on the heterogeneity of match costs. Under limited heterogeneity, e.g., when there is a finite number of possible match costs, greedy scheduling is approximately optimal, in line with the related literature. However, with more heterogeneity greedy scheduling is never optimal. Finally, we analyze a particular model where match costs are exponentially distributed and show that it is at the boundary of the no-free-lunch regime We then characterize the optimal clearing schedule for varying social planner desiderata.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 102987"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824000491/pdfft?md5=4ea448c63550f4cbee8dd6aa69242bbd&pid=1-s2.0-S0304406824000491-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140605228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Local incentive compatibility on gross substitutes and other non-convex type-spaces","authors":"Ujjwal Kumar , Souvik Roy","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102989","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102989","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We explore the equivalence of local incentive compatibility (LIC) (Carroll 2012) and incentive compatibility (IC) in non-convex type-spaces. We provide a sufficient condition on a type-space called richness for the said equivalence. Using this result, we show that LIC and IC are equivalent on large class of non-convex type-spaces which include the gross substitutes type-space and the generalized gross substitutes and complements type-space. Finally, we provide a geometric property consisting of three conditions for the equivalence of LIC and IC, and show that all the conditions are indispensable.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 102989"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140769923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Justification within and between social contexts with the possibility of choice deferral","authors":"Hadi Pahlevan Yazdanabad","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102985","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102985","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper provides axiomatic characterizations for a class of models where a decision maker (henceforth, DM) maximizes a single preference ranking subject to a shortlist that depends on the underlying choice set and social context. Thus, the primitive is a dataset of choices from every choice set – social context pair that is called the context. The DM is supposed to choose the most preferred option from the shortlist of each context. However, due to existence of conflicting norms (or norms uncertainty), he/she might choose no option in some contexts. Therefore, unlike existing justification models, choice deferral is possible in our framework.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 102985"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140787758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cycles and self-fulfilling crises in open economies with stock collateral constraints under impatience","authors":"Suneil Parimoo","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102982","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102982","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper analytically characterizes an infinite-horizon open economy with agents that are impatient relative to the market under a stock collateral constraint, whereby borrowing is collateralized by capital assets. Households can enjoy an unconstrained allocation under a long-run depression. However, under a stable output path, the constraint binds infinitely often, leading, in all periods, to reduced debt and deflated asset prices relative to the unconstrained allocation. Under plausible parametrizations, two and three-period cycles in consumption, debt, and asset prices can emerge under constant output. Further, high indebtedness can allow for multiple equilibria.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"112 ","pages":"Article 102982"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140647503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}