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Effects of Vote Delegation in Blockchains: Who Wins? 区块链中投票委托的影响：谁赢了？
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-10 DOI: arxiv-2408.05410
Hans Gersbach, Manvir Schneider, Parnian Shahkar
{"title":"Effects of Vote Delegation in Blockchains: Who Wins?","authors":"Hans Gersbach, Manvir Schneider, Parnian Shahkar","doi":"arxiv-2408.05410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.05410","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates which alternative benefits from vote delegation in\u0000binary collective decisions within blockchains. We begin by examining two\u0000extreme cases of voting weight distributions: Equal-Weight (EW), where each\u0000voter has equal voting weight, and Dominant-Weight (DW), where a single voter\u0000holds a majority of the voting weights before any delegation occurs. We show\u0000that vote delegation tends to benefit the ex-ante minority under EW, i.e., the\u0000alternative with a lower initial probability of winning. The converse holds\u0000under DW distribution. Through numerical simulations, we extend our findings to\u0000arbitrary voting weight distributions, showing that vote delegation benefits\u0000the ex-ante majority when it leads to a more balanced distribution of voting\u0000weights. Finally, in large communities where all agents have equal voting\u0000weight, vote delegation has a negligible impact on the outcome. These insights\u0000provide practical guidance for governance decisions in blockchains.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142197143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Geometric Nash Approach in Tuning the Learning Rate in Q-Learning Algorithm 调整 Q 学习算法学习率的几何纳什方法
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-09 DOI: arxiv-2408.04911
Kwadwo Osei Bonsu
{"title":"A Geometric Nash Approach in Tuning the Learning Rate in Q-Learning Algorithm","authors":"Kwadwo Osei Bonsu","doi":"arxiv-2408.04911","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.04911","url":null,"abstract":"This paper proposes a geometric approach for estimating the $alpha$ value in\u0000Q learning. We establish a systematic framework that optimizes the {alpha}\u0000parameter, thereby enhancing learning efficiency and stability. Our results\u0000show that there is a relationship between the learning rate and the angle\u0000between a vector T (total time steps in each episode of learning) and R (the\u0000reward vector for each episode). The concept of angular bisector between\u0000vectors T and R and Nash Equilibrium provide insight into estimating $alpha$\u0000such that the algorithm minimizes losses arising from exploration-exploitation\u0000trade-off.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"48 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141968813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Protected Income and Inequality Aversion 保障收入与不平等厌恶
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-09 DOI: arxiv-2408.04814
Marc Fleurbaey, Eduardo Zambrano
{"title":"Protected Income and Inequality Aversion","authors":"Marc Fleurbaey, Eduardo Zambrano","doi":"arxiv-2408.04814","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.04814","url":null,"abstract":"Imagine that a large increment can be given to an individual in a society. We\u0000ask: what is the maximal sacrifice that can be imposed on another individual\u0000according to an evaluator for the sake of this increment? We show that the\u0000answer can reveal how inequality averse an evaluator is. In particular, all\u0000Kolm-Pollak evaluators would sacrifice the full income of the sacrificed\u0000individual if their income was low enough and a declining fraction of their\u0000income otherwise. Kolm-Atkinson evaluators would sacrifice the full income of\u0000the sacrificed individual, for all income levels, if their inequality aversion\u0000was no greater than one, and sacrifice a constant fraction of their income\u0000otherwise. Motivated by these findings, we propose a class of social\u0000preferences that, starting from a baseline level of protection, protect a\u0000higher fraction of the sacrificed individual's income the lower their income.\u0000In addition to relating levels of protected income to coefficients of\u0000inequality, we also characterize the classes of additively separable social\u0000welfare functions that guarantee specific (absolute or relative) levels of\u0000protection.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"71 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141968814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Recurrent Stochastic Fluctuations with Financial Speculation 金融投机的反复随机波动
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-09 DOI: arxiv-2408.05047
Tomohiro Hirano
{"title":"Recurrent Stochastic Fluctuations with Financial Speculation","authors":"Tomohiro Hirano","doi":"arxiv-2408.05047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.05047","url":null,"abstract":"Throughout history, many countries have repeatedly experienced large swings\u0000in asset prices, which are usually accompanied by large fluctuations in\u0000macroeconomic activity. One of the characteristics of the period before major\u0000economic fluctuations is the emergence of new financial products; the situation\u0000prior to the 2008 financial crisis is a prominent example of this. During that\u0000period, a variety of structured bonds, including securitized products,\u0000appeared. Because of the high returns on such financial products, many economic\u0000agents were involved in them for speculative purposes, even if they were\u0000riskier, producing macro-scale effects. With this motivation, we present a simple macroeconomic model with financial\u0000speculation. Our model illustrates two points. First, stochastic fluctuations\u0000in asset prices and macroeconomic activity are driven by the repeated\u0000appearance and disappearance of risky financial assets, rather than expansions\u0000and contractions in credit availability. Second, in an economy with sufficient\u0000borrowing and lending, the appearance of risky financial assets leads to\u0000decreased productive capital, while in an economy with severely limited\u0000borrowing and lending, it leads to increased productive capital.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"193 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141933569","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Robust Market Design with Opaque Announcements 不透明公告的稳健市场设计
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-08 DOI: arxiv-2408.04509
Aram Grigoryan, Markus Möller
{"title":"Robust Market Design with Opaque Announcements","authors":"Aram Grigoryan, Markus Möller","doi":"arxiv-2408.04509","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.04509","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a framework where the announcements of a clearinghouse about the\u0000allocation process are opaque in the sense that there can be more than one\u0000outcome compatible with a realization of type reports. We ask whether desirable\u0000properties can be ensured under opacity in a robust sense. A property can be\u0000guaranteed under an opaque announcement if every mechanism compatible with it\u0000satisfies the property. We find an impossibility result: strategy-proofness\u0000cannot be guaranteed under any level of opacity. In contrast, in some\u0000environments, weak Maskin monotonicity and non-bossiness can be guaranteed\u0000under opacity.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141933624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Non-maximizing policies that fulfill multi-criterion aspirations in expectation 非最大化政策在预期中满足多重标准的愿望
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-08 DOI: arxiv-2408.04385
Simon Dima, Simon Fischer, Jobst Heitzig, Joss Oliver
{"title":"Non-maximizing policies that fulfill multi-criterion aspirations in expectation","authors":"Simon Dima, Simon Fischer, Jobst Heitzig, Joss Oliver","doi":"arxiv-2408.04385","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.04385","url":null,"abstract":"In dynamic programming and reinforcement learning, the policy for the\u0000sequential decision making of an agent in a stochastic environment is usually\u0000determined by expressing the goal as a scalar reward function and seeking a\u0000policy that maximizes the expected total reward. However, many goals that\u0000humans care about naturally concern multiple aspects of the world, and it may\u0000not be obvious how to condense those into a single reward function.\u0000Furthermore, maximization suffers from specification gaming, where the obtained\u0000policy achieves a high expected total reward in an unintended way, often taking\u0000extreme or nonsensical actions. Here we consider finite acyclic Markov Decision Processes with multiple\u0000distinct evaluation metrics, which do not necessarily represent quantities that\u0000the user wants to be maximized. We assume the task of the agent is to ensure\u0000that the vector of expected totals of the evaluation metrics falls into some\u0000given convex set, called the aspiration set. Our algorithm guarantees that this\u0000task is fulfilled by using simplices to approximate feasibility sets and\u0000propagate aspirations forward while ensuring they remain feasible. It has\u0000complexity linear in the number of possible state-action-successor triples and\u0000polynomial in the number of evaluation metrics. Moreover, the explicitly\u0000non-maximizing nature of the chosen policy and goals yields additional degrees\u0000of freedom, which can be used to apply heuristic safety criteria to the choice\u0000of actions. We discuss several such safety criteria that aim to steer the agent\u0000towards more conservative behavior.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"370 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141933527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Revealed Invariant Preference 显性不变偏好
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-08 DOI: arxiv-2408.04573
Peter Caradonna, Christopher P. Chambers
{"title":"Revealed Invariant Preference","authors":"Peter Caradonna, Christopher P. Chambers","doi":"arxiv-2408.04573","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.04573","url":null,"abstract":"We consider the problem of rationalizing choice data by a preference\u0000satisfying an arbitrary collection of invariance axioms. Examples of such\u0000axioms include quasilinearity, homotheticity, independence-type axioms for\u0000mixture spaces, constant relative/absolute risk and ambiguity aversion axioms,\u0000stationarity for dated rewards or consumption streams, separability, and many\u0000others. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for invariant\u0000rationalizability via a novel approach which relies on tools from the\u0000theoretical computer science literature on automated theorem proving. We also\u0000establish a generalization of the Dushnik-Miller theorem, which we use to give\u0000a complete description of the out-of-sample predictions generated by the data\u0000under any such collection of axioms.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141933513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Design and Price of Influence 影响力的设计与代价
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-07 DOI: arxiv-2408.03689
Raphael Boleslavsky, Aaron Kolb
{"title":"The Design and Price of Influence","authors":"Raphael Boleslavsky, Aaron Kolb","doi":"arxiv-2408.03689","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.03689","url":null,"abstract":"A sender has a privately known preference over the action chosen by a\u0000receiver. The sender would like to influence the receiver's decision by\u0000providing information, in the form of a statistical experiment or test. The\u0000technology for information production is controlled by a monopolist\u0000intermediary, who offers a menu of tests and prices to screen the sender's\u0000type, possibly including a \"threat\" test to punish nonparticipation. We\u0000characterize the intermediary's optimal screening menu and the associated\u0000distortions, which we show may benefit the receiver. We compare the sale of\u0000persuasive information with other forms of influence -- overt bribery and\u0000controlling access.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"74 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141933570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Course in Dynamic Optimization 动态优化课程
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-06 DOI: arxiv-2408.03034
Bar Light
{"title":"A Course in Dynamic Optimization","authors":"Bar Light","doi":"arxiv-2408.03034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.03034","url":null,"abstract":"These lecture notes are derived from a graduate-level course in dynamic\u0000optimization, offering an introduction to techniques and models extensively\u0000used in management science, economics, operations research, engineering, and\u0000computer science. The course emphasizes the theoretical underpinnings of\u0000discrete-time dynamic programming models and advanced algorithmic strategies\u0000for solving these models. Unlike typical treatments, it provides a proof for\u0000the principle of optimality for upper semi-continuous dynamic programming, a\u0000middle ground between the simpler countable state space case\u0000cite{bertsekas2012dynamic}, and the involved universally measurable case\u0000cite{bertsekas1996stochastic}. This approach is sufficiently rigorous to\u0000include important examples such as dynamic pricing, consumption-savings, and\u0000inventory management models. The course also delves into the properties of\u0000value and policy functions, leveraging classical results\u0000cite{topkis1998supermodularity} and recent developments. Additionally, it\u0000offers an introduction to reinforcement learning, including a formal proof of\u0000the convergence of Q-learning algorithms. Furthermore, the notes delve into\u0000policy gradient methods for the average reward case, presenting a convergence\u0000result for the tabular case in this context. This result is simple and similar\u0000to the discounted case but appears to be new.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141933574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Centralization in Attester-Proposer Separation 听证人-提案人分离中的集中化
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-06 DOI: arxiv-2408.03116
Mallesh Pai, Max Resnick
{"title":"Centralization in Attester-Proposer Separation","authors":"Mallesh Pai, Max Resnick","doi":"arxiv-2408.03116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.03116","url":null,"abstract":"We show that Execution Tickets and Execution Auctions dramatically increase\u0000centralization in the market for block proposals, even without multi-block MEV\u0000concerns. Previous analyses have insufficiently or incorrectly modeled the\u0000interaction between ahead-of-time auctions and just-in-time (JIT) auctions. We\u0000study a model where bidders compete in an execution auction ahead of time, and\u0000then the winner holds a JIT auction to resell the proposal rights when the slot\u0000arrives. During the execution auction, bidders only know the distribution of\u0000their valuations. Bidders then draw values from their distributions and compete\u0000in the JIT auction. We show that a bidder who wins the execution auction is\u0000substantially advantaged in the JIT auction since they can set a reserve price\u0000higher than their own realized value for the slot to increase their revenue. As\u0000a result, there is a strong centralizing force in the execution auction, which\u0000allows the ex-ante strongest bidder to win the execution auction every time,\u0000and similarly gives them the strongest incentive to buy up all the tickets.\u0000Similar results trivially apply if the resale market is imperfect, since that\u0000only reinforces the advantages of the ex-ante strong buyer. To reiterate, these\u0000results do not require the bidders to employ multi-block MEV strategies,\u0000although if they did, it would likely amplify the centralizing effects.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141968816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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