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Fairness in Multi-Proposer-Multi-Responder Ultimatum Game 多提议者-多回应者最后通牒博弈的公平性
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-05 DOI: arxiv-2408.02410
Hana Krakovská, Rudolf Hanel, Mark Broom
{"title":"Fairness in Multi-Proposer-Multi-Responder Ultimatum Game","authors":"Hana Krakovská, Rudolf Hanel, Mark Broom","doi":"arxiv-2408.02410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.02410","url":null,"abstract":"The Ultimatum Game is conventionally formulated in the context of two\u0000players. Nonetheless, real-life scenarios often entail community interactions\u0000among numerous individuals. To address this, we introduce an extended version\u0000of the Ultimatum Game, called the Multi-Proposer-Multi-Responder Ultimatum\u0000Game. In this model, multiple responders and proposers simultaneously interact\u0000in a one-shot game, introducing competition both within proposers and within\u0000responders. We derive subgame-perfect Nash equilibria for all scenarios and\u0000explore how these non-trivial values might provide insight into proposal and\u0000rejection behavior experimentally observed in the context of one vs. one\u0000Ultimatum Game scenarios. Additionally, by considering the asymptotic numbers\u0000of players, we propose two potential estimates for a \"fair\" threshold: either\u000031.8% or 36.8% of the pie (share) for the responder.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141968817","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bargaining via Weber's law 通过韦伯定律讨价还价
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-05 DOI: arxiv-2408.02492
V. G. Bardakhchyan, A. E. Allahverdyan
{"title":"Bargaining via Weber's law","authors":"V. G. Bardakhchyan, A. E. Allahverdyan","doi":"arxiv-2408.02492","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.02492","url":null,"abstract":"We solve the two-player bargaining problem using Weber's law in\u0000psychophysics, which is applied to the perception of utility changes. By\u0000applying this law, one of the players (or both of them) defines lower and upper\u0000utility thresholds, such that once the lower threshold is established,\u0000bargaining continues in the inter-threshold domain where the solutions are\u0000acceptable to both parties. This provides a sequential solution to the\u0000bargaining problem, and it can be implemented iteratively reaching well-defined\u0000outcomes. The solution is Pareto-optimal, symmetric, and is invariant to\u0000affine-transformations of utilities. For susceptible players, iterations are\u0000unnecessary, so they converge in one stage toward the (axiomatic) Nash solution\u0000of the bargaining problem. This situation also accounts for the asymmetric Nash\u0000solution, where the weights of each player are expressed via their Weber\u0000constants. Thus the Nash solution is reached without external arbiters and\u0000without requiring the independence of irrelevant alternatives. For\u0000non-susceptible players our approach leads to different results.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"53 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141933573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Inventory problems and the parametric measure $m_λ$ 库存问题和参数度量 $m_λ$
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-04 DOI: arxiv-2408.02700
Irina Georgescu
{"title":"Inventory problems and the parametric measure $m_λ$","authors":"Irina Georgescu","doi":"arxiv-2408.02700","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.02700","url":null,"abstract":"The credibility theory was introduced by B. Liu as a new way to describe the\u0000fuzzy uncertainty. The credibility measure is the fundamental notion of the\u0000credibility theory. Recently, L.Yang and K. Iwamura extended the credibility\u0000measure by defining the parametric measure $m_{lambda}$ ($lambda$ is a real\u0000parameter in the interval $[0,1]$ and for $lambda= 1/2$ we obtain as a\u0000particular case the notion of credibility measure). By using the\u0000$m_{lambda}$-measure, we studied in this paper a risk neutral multi-item\u0000inventory problem. Our construction generalizes the credibilistic inventory\u0000model developed by Y. Li and Y. Liu in 2019. In our model, the components of\u0000demand vector are fuzzy variables and the maximization problem is formulated by\u0000using the notion of $m_{lambda}$-expected value. We shall prove a general\u0000formula for the solution of optimization problem, from which we obtained\u0000effective formulas for computing the optimal solutions in the particular cases\u0000where the demands are trapezoidal and triangular fuzzy numbers. For\u0000$lambda=1/2$ we obtain as a particular case the computation formulas of the\u0000optimal solutions of the credibilistic inventory problem of Li and Liu. These\u0000computation formulas are applied for some $m_{lambda}$-models obtained from\u0000numerical data.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141968815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Logic of Political Survival Revisited: Consequences of Elite Uncertainty Under Authoritarian Rule 再论政治生存的逻辑：专制统治下精英不确定性的后果
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-04 DOI: arxiv-2408.01887
Tamar Zeilberger
{"title":"The Logic of Political Survival Revisited: Consequences of Elite Uncertainty Under Authoritarian Rule","authors":"Tamar Zeilberger","doi":"arxiv-2408.01887","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.01887","url":null,"abstract":"Existing research has established that autocrats offer concessions to prevent\u0000ouster by their inner circle. This paper examines how those concessions are\u0000influenced by the relative uncertainty of an autocrat's inner circle about\u0000remaining in that favored body. I take as my starting point the formal model of\u0000political survival presented in Bueno de Mesquita et al.'s The Logic of\u0000Political Survival. I extend the model to account for variation in the relative\u0000uncertainty of an autocrat's inner circle. To make the math tractable, I\u0000dispense with convention and introduce comparative statics across two models\u0000with different formulations of uncertainty. This exercise reveals a set of\u0000conditions under which to expect an increase in the concessions offered by an\u0000autocrat, with implications for development and democracy. Those findings yield\u0000a corresponding set of logical corollaries with potential to further our\u0000understanding of authoritarian politics, including an unexamined facet of the\u0000\"dictator's dilemma\" (Wintrobe 1990, 1998) and related incentives for members\u0000of an inner circle to permit purges or act to destabilize their ranks. The\u0000models also identify a source of policy volatility not found outside of\u0000autocracies. Taken together, the findings suggest a need for more research on\u0000elite uncertainty in autocracies.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"77 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141933581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategic Analysis of Fair Rank-Minimizing Mechanisms with Agent Refusal Option 带有代理拒绝选项的公平排名最小化机制的策略分析
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-03 DOI: arxiv-2408.01673
Yasunori Okumura
{"title":"Strategic Analysis of Fair Rank-Minimizing Mechanisms with Agent Refusal Option","authors":"Yasunori Okumura","doi":"arxiv-2408.01673","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.01673","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines strategic issues in fair rank-minimizing mechanisms,\u0000which choose an assignment that minimizes the average rank of object types to\u0000which agents are assigned and satisfy a fairness property called equal\u0000treatment of equals. As one of these fair mechanisms, the uniform\u0000rank-minimizing mechanism is considered. We particularly focus on the case\u0000where agents can refuse their assignment and obtain the outside option instead.\u0000Without the refusal option, if the uniform rank-minimizing mechanism is used,\u0000truth-telling is not strategically dominated by any strategies. However, if\u0000agents have the option, then an outside option demotion strategy -- revealing\u0000all object types as acceptable without changing the ranking of truly acceptable\u0000ones -- strategically dominates truth-telling. Moreover, we show that adopting\u0000this strategy may lead to inefficient assignments. To counter this, we propose\u0000the modified uniform rank-minimizing mechanism, though it may lead agents to\u0000strategically reduce the number of acceptable types.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141933571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Persuading an inattentive and privately informed receiver 说服注意力不集中、私下知情的接收者
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-02 DOI: arxiv-2408.01250
Pietro Dall'Ara
{"title":"Persuading an inattentive and privately informed receiver","authors":"Pietro Dall'Ara","doi":"arxiv-2408.01250","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.01250","url":null,"abstract":"I study the persuasion of a receiver who accesses information only if she\u0000exerts costly attention effort. The sender designs an experiment to persuade\u0000the receiver to take a specific action. The experiment also affects the\u0000receiver's attention effort, that is, the probability that she updates her\u0000beliefs. As a result, persuasion has two margins: extensive (effort) and\u0000intensive (action). The receiver's utility exhibits a supermodularity property\u0000in information and effort. By leveraging this property, I prove a general\u0000equivalence between experiments and persuasion mechanisms `a la Kolotilin et\u0000al. (2017). Censoring high states is an optimal strategy for the sender in\u0000applications.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"189 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141933514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Harmful choices 有害的选择
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-02 DOI: arxiv-2408.01317
Angelo Petralia
{"title":"Harmful choices","authors":"Angelo Petralia","doi":"arxiv-2408.01317","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.01317","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the choice behavior of a decision maker (DM) who harms\u0000herself, by maximizing some distortion of her true preference, in which the\u0000first $i$ alternatives are moved to the bottom, in a reversed order. The\u0000deterministic declination of our pattern has no empirical power, but it allows\u0000to define a degree of self-punishment, which measures the extent of the denial\u0000of pleasure adopted by the DM in her decision. We analyze irrational choices\u0000that display the lowest degree of self-punishment, and a characterization of\u0000them is provided. Moreover, we characterize the choice behavior that exhibits\u0000the highest degree of self-punishment, and we show that it comprises almost all\u0000choices. We also characterize stochastic self-punishment, which collects all\u0000the Random Utility Models (RUMs) whose support is restricted to the harmful\u0000distortions of some preference. Full identification of the DM's preference and\u0000randomization over its harmful distortions is allowed if each alternative is\u0000selected from the ground set with probability greater than zero. Finally, the\u0000degree of self-punishment of harmful stochastic choices is characterized.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"188 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141933572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What does a dynamic oligopoly maximize? The continuous time Markov case 动态寡头垄断的最大化是什么？连续时间马尔科夫案例
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-30 DOI: arxiv-2407.20810
Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero
{"title":"What does a dynamic oligopoly maximize? The continuous time Markov case","authors":"Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero","doi":"arxiv-2407.20810","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2407.20810","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the question of whether the outcome of an oligopoly exploiting a\u0000nonrenewable resource can be replicated by a related monopoly, within the\u0000framework of continuous time and Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium. We establish\u0000necessary and sufficient conditions and find explicit solutions in some cases.\u0000Also, very simple models with externalities are shown which Nash equilibrium\u0000cannot be replicated in a monopoly.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"75 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141862654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Impact of Geographical Separation on Spectrum Sharing Markets 地理分隔对频谱共享市场的影响
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-30 DOI: arxiv-2407.20909
Kangle Mu, Zongyun Xie, Igor Kadota, Randall Berry
{"title":"Impact of Geographical Separation on Spectrum Sharing Markets","authors":"Kangle Mu, Zongyun Xie, Igor Kadota, Randall Berry","doi":"arxiv-2407.20909","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2407.20909","url":null,"abstract":"With the increasing demand for wireless services, spectrum management\u0000agencies and service providers (SPs) are seeking more flexible mechanisms for\u0000spectrum sharing to accommodate this growth. Such mechanisms impact the market\u0000dynamics of competitive SPs. Prior market models of spectrum sharing largely\u0000focus on scenarios where competing SPs had identical coverage areas. We depart\u0000from this and consider a scenario in which two competing SPs have overlapping\u0000but distinct coverage areas. We study the resulting competition using a Cournot\u0000model. Our findings reveal that with limited shared bandwidth, SPs might avoid\u0000overlapping areas to prevent potential losses due to interference. Sometimes\u0000SPs can strategically cooperate by agreeing not to provide service in the\u0000overlapping areas and, surprisingly, customers might also benefit from such\u0000cooperation under certain circumstances. Overall, market outcomes exhibit\u0000complex behaviors that are influenced by the sizes of coverage areas and the\u0000bandwidth of the shared spectrum.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141862655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Lattice operations for the stable set in substitutable matching markets via re-equilibration dynamics 通过再校准动力学实现可替代匹配市场稳定集的网格操作
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-30 DOI: arxiv-2407.21198
Agustin G. Bonifacio, Noelia Juarez, Paola B. Manasero
{"title":"Lattice operations for the stable set in substitutable matching markets via re-equilibration dynamics","authors":"Agustin G. Bonifacio, Noelia Juarez, Paola B. Manasero","doi":"arxiv-2407.21198","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2407.21198","url":null,"abstract":"We compute the lattice operations for the (pairwise) stable set in two-sided\u0000matching markets where only substitutability on agents' choice functions is\u0000imposed. To do this, we use Tarski operators defined on the lattices of\u0000worker-quasi-stable and firm-quasi-stable matchings. These operators resemble\u0000lay-off and vacancy chain dynamics, respectively. First, we compute the lattice\u0000operations in the many-to-one model. Then, we extend these operations to a\u0000many-to-many model with substitutable choice functions on one side and\u0000responsive preferences on the other, via a morphism that relates many-to-one\u0000with many-to-many matchings in a natural way. Finally, we present the lattice\u0000operations in the many-to-many model with substitutable choice functions on\u0000both sides.","PeriodicalId":501188,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141862653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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