{"title":"Driver-centric urban logistics optimization: vehicle routing with heterogeneous fixed drivers","authors":"Ming Deng, Yi Ding","doi":"10.1111/itor.13619","DOIUrl":"10.1111/itor.13619","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the era of flourishing online shopping, efficient delivery operations are essential for companies to enhance customer satisfaction and stay competitive. Previous studies often overlooked the attributes of delivery drivers, particularly their regional knowledge, which significantly impacts the optimization of last-mile delivery operations. This paper introduces the vehicle routing problem with heterogeneous fixed drivers (VRP-HFD), a novel extension of traditional vehicle routing models. It incorporates the unique attributes of drivers, including their regional knowledge and driving qualifications. We propose a mathematical model that captures the relationships among drivers, vehicles, and customers, aiming to minimize both the number of unserved customers and total operational costs. To address the increased complexity in the VRP-HFD model, we develop a hybrid adaptive genetic algorithm (HAGA) that integrates multichromosome coding, adaptive genetic operators, and local search techniques to enhance solution quality. Computational experiments using real-world instances demonstrate the effectiveness of HAGA in generating high-quality solutions compared to the baseline algorithms. Our findings underscore the critical role of driver attributes in optimizing last-mile delivery operations, offering valuable insights for logistics companies committed to improving service efficiency and customer satisfaction.</p>","PeriodicalId":49176,"journal":{"name":"International Transactions in Operational Research","volume":"33 5","pages":"3258-3281"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2026-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147683867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Quality disclosure in agricultural supply chains: farmer versus platform disclosure","authors":"Yong Tan, Ziwei Zhou, Xu Guan, Yuan Jiang","doi":"10.1111/itor.70008","DOIUrl":"10.1111/itor.70008","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper investigates the firms' equilibrium disclosure strategies in an agricultural supply chain, wherein the farmer sells agricultural products through an intermediary platform to the end market. Both the farmer and the platform privately observe the product quality information and independently determine whether to disclose this information to the consumers. We examine two disclosure formats, farmer disclosure format and platform disclosure format, depending on who is responsible for quality disclosure. Our analysis reveals that the commission rate exerts a nontrivial impact on the farmer's and platform's disclosure incentive and their profits. The farmer has the incentive to disclose the quality information only when the commission rate is low, while the platform chooses to disclose the quality information only when the commission rate is high. Additionally, under farmer (platform) disclosure format, the platform's (farmer's) profit exhibits nonmonotonic pattern with respect to the commission rate when the disclosure cost is low. Moreover, we show that both the farmer and the platform may opt to take the disclosure responsibility by itself, and in certain conditions, their preferences for two disclosure formats could be aligned, resulting in a “win-win” situation for both parties.</p>","PeriodicalId":49176,"journal":{"name":"International Transactions in Operational Research","volume":"33 5","pages":"2870-2892"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2026-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147683889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Service strategy of a sharing platform in a supply chain under information asymmetry","authors":"Zi-Han Gong, Jian-Cai Wang, Yao-Yu Wang, Dan-Yang Xu","doi":"10.1111/itor.70136","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.70136","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Sharing platforms can operate in a B2C (business-to-customer) mode, a C2C (customer-to-customer) mode, or a hybrid. The choice of sharing mode not only influences downstream customers but also has consequences for upstream product manufacturers. Additionally, the sharing platform's ability to gather user and provider data creates information advantages over manufacturers. Motivated by this, we consider a supply chain where a manufacturer can sell products to a sharing platform, where the latter holds private information about the proportion of renters. A type-dependent screening model is developed to study the sharing platform's service strategy and the manufacturer's contract design. Our findings indicate that, under information symmetry, when the cannibalization effect from B2C intensifies (i.e., the renter proportion and service fee are high), expanding the customer base or raising the service fee can harm the sharing platform. However, when this effect is weak, adopting a hybrid mode allows the sharing platform to benefit from broader market coverage and a higher fee. Under information asymmetry, the sharing platform is classified as either <i>H</i>-type or <i>L</i>-type based on its private information. When the level of information uncertainty is high, the manufacturer may shut down the inefficient <i>L</i>-type sharing platform. Alternatively, if the manufacturer does not shut down the <i>L</i>-type sharing platform, when the service fee is low, both types adopt the hybrid mode, and the manufacturer suffers as the sharing platform receives more commission income from the C2C mode. Interestingly, the sharing platform's profit may be non-monotonic in the level of information uncertainty.</p>","PeriodicalId":49176,"journal":{"name":"International Transactions in Operational Research","volume":"33 5","pages":"2977-3012"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2026-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147683839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Preface to the Special Issue on “Sharing Platforms for Sustainability: Exploring Strategies, Trade-offs, and Applications”","authors":"Pietro De Giovanni, Yiwen Bian","doi":"10.1111/itor.70179","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.70179","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49176,"journal":{"name":"International Transactions in Operational Research","volume":"33 5","pages":"2825-2826"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2026-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147682879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Competing recycling platforms’ compatible strategy considering sorted policy","authors":"Peihan Li, Yongjian Li, Pengwen Hou","doi":"10.1111/itor.70165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.70165","url":null,"abstract":"<p>As large-scale recycling platforms (LRPs) increasingly enable small-scale recycling platforms (SRPs) to integrate into their recycling platforms, this embedding mechanism transforms their competitive relationship into one of co-opetition. In this study, we explore the problem of compatible strategy considering an LRP with awareness and valuation advantages and an SRP. In the compatible case, customers can return their used products directly to LRP through its recycling platform or to SRP through either LRP’ s compatible channel or SRP's own platform. Additionally, numerous recycling platforms have been adopting a sorted policy to enhance their profitability. Our major research findings are as follows: First, due to complex relationships in co-opetition case, increasing awareness advantage may have negative impacts on LRP's profit. Second, while the recycling platforms’ equilibrium strategies under unsorted recycling are always the same, under sorted recycling, they differ when the valuation advantage falls within an intermediate range. Third, under sorted recycling, despite its valuation disadvantage, SRP's profit may exceed LRP's when the unit reuse profit of recycled products is high. Finally, regardless of sorted recycling, while social welfare always benefits from the compatible channel, consumer surplus consistently deteriorates. Our findings not only provide important implications for recycling platforms to implement compatible strategies to achieve win–win outcomes but also suggest that governments should adopt a balanced approach in regulating recycling platforms under sorted recycling initiatives.</p>","PeriodicalId":49176,"journal":{"name":"International Transactions in Operational Research","volume":"33 5","pages":"3051-3087"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2026-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147684088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Winning is not the only metric: the complexity of control manipulation in knockout tournaments for a redefined goal","authors":"Hadassa Daltrophe, Tammar Shrot, Lior Aronshtam","doi":"10.1111/itor.70044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.70044","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study control manipulation by generalizing the notion of success in knockout tournaments. The definition of success can be broadened to include other concepts of accomplishment rather than focusing solely on the identity of the tournament winner. Manipulation can be done in favor of diverse stakeholders. Each stakeholder may have a different goal to maximize concerning its party of interest—a player or a set of players. To formalize this, we use a weighted tournament graph model and define a score function that measures the success of the party of interest. Given the match outcome for any pair of players, we analyze the complexity of performing the manipulation for various manipulation types. We consider manipulation in favor of a single player achieving the highest score in the tournament and in favor of a set of players achieving a higher score than the complementary set. Furthermore, using the suggested model, we analyze the complexities of the manipulations done in favor of a particular player or set that wishes to prevail over another player or set. We define problems that address these types of manipulation and analyze their complexity. Although the general problems are NP-complete, we show broad scenarios in which the problems are polynomial-time solvable.</p>","PeriodicalId":49176,"journal":{"name":"International Transactions in Operational Research","volume":"33 5","pages":"3110-3127"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2026-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/itor.70044","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147683262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Competition between two home-sharing platforms: Equilibrium strategies for commission contract choice","authors":"Zhi-Ping Fan, Xue Chi, Zhongpeng Dong","doi":"10.1111/itor.70042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.70042","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In a competitive environment, it is worthwhile focusing on how home-sharing platforms choose their own commission contracts. This study investigates the equilibrium strategies of two competing platforms choosing commission contracts in a duopoly market, where each platform can adopt the one-sided-user commission contract or the two-sided-user commission contract. Several key findings are obtained. Under certain conditions, the choice of commission contracts of two platforms can reach Nash equilibrium. In an equilibrium state, two platforms should choose the two different (same) contracts when the network externality intensity is small (large). Particularly, they may fall into the prisoner dilemma when both platforms adopt the one-sided-user commission contract. The two platforms can reduce the profit loss caused by the prisoner dilemma by reducing the competition intensity on the supply side. Under certain conditions, the different commission contracts adopted by the two platforms can achieve Pareto improvement for the platforms, customers, and hosts.</p>","PeriodicalId":49176,"journal":{"name":"International Transactions in Operational Research","volume":"33 5","pages":"3013-3050"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2026-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147683439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The electric vehicle routing problem with time windows, partial recharges, and covering locations","authors":"Vincent F. Yu, Pham Tuan Anh","doi":"10.1111/itor.70018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.70018","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This research studies the electric vehicle routing problem with time windows, partial recharges, and covering locations (EVRPTW-PR-CL), as an extension of the electric vehicle routing problem with time windows and partial recharges (EVRPTW-PR), where covering locations (CLs) are facilities equipped with parcel lockers (PLs) and charging stations (CSs). The presence of PLs offers customers an alternative delivery option, where they are provided incentives to collect their parcels themselves, called self-pickup (SP) services. The objective is to seek routing plans that minimize the sum of travel costs, fixed operational costs for used EVs and CLs, and compensation paid to customers served by SP. To solve the problem, we derive a mixed-integer programming model and design an effective variable neighborhood search (VNS) algorithm coupled with problem-specific neighborhood operators, a dynamic programming procedure for optimal CS insertions, and a tailored set partitioning formulation (SPF) to enhance solution quality by utilizing collected routes so far. Numerical experiments are conducted on benchmark instances. VNS not only provides new best-known EVRPTW-PR solutions but also solves EVRPTW-PR-CL instances efficiently. Lastly, we present the effects of delivery options and compensation, offering insights that help decision makers design more sustainable and cost-effective last-mile delivery networks.</p>","PeriodicalId":49176,"journal":{"name":"International Transactions in Operational Research","volume":"33 5","pages":"3187-3225"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2026-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147683745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Fei Ye, Jianchang Fan, Guoyin Zhang, Yuhui Li, Kaiming Zheng
{"title":"The impact of car-sharing platforms' electric vehicle adoption level on firms, consumers, and carbon emissions","authors":"Fei Ye, Jianchang Fan, Guoyin Zhang, Yuhui Li, Kaiming Zheng","doi":"10.1111/itor.70110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.70110","url":null,"abstract":"<p>As car sharing emerges as a popular mode of transportation, the adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) by car-sharing platforms may exert significant impacts on related firms, consumers, and the environment. To examine these effects, we develop a dynamic game model consisting of a car manufacturer (M), a retailer (R), and a car-sharing platform (hereafter referred to as the platform) to investigate the impact of the platform's adoption of specialized EVs on supply chain members, consumers, and total carbon emissions (TCE). Analytical results show that the adoption level of EVs can affect M's channel choice when the service quality of the platform is high enough. Furthermore, when M selects dual channels, increasing the adoption level of EVs has a positive impact on R's profit, a negative impact on the profits of M and platform, and a nonmonotonic impact on the total profit of the supply chain; Moreover, as the adoption level of EVs increases, consumer surplus may decrease, the TCE of both fuel and electric vehicles may initially decrease and then increase, and the social welfare may initially increase and then decrease. Finally, if the production cost of EVs is high while the production cost of fuel vehicles is low, the platform should not adopt EVs. However, if the production costs of both types are high, the platform should adopt EVs.</p>","PeriodicalId":49176,"journal":{"name":"International Transactions in Operational Research","volume":"33 5","pages":"2950-2976"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2026-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147684054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Special Issue on “Network Design, Energy Efficiency, and Intelligent Methods in Logistics Systems”","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/itor.70149","DOIUrl":"10.1111/itor.70149","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49176,"journal":{"name":"International Transactions in Operational Research","volume":"33 4","pages":"2816-2817"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2026-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146147948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}