International Transactions in Operational Research最新文献_第10页

Optimal two-period pricing decisions and value-added service strategies of two-sided platform considering suppliers entry timing 考虑供应商进入时机的双面平台的最优两期定价决策和增值服务策略

IF 3.1 4区管理学

International Transactions in Operational Research Pub Date : 2024-02-13 DOI: 10.1111/itor.13441

Huabao Zeng, Tong Shu, Yue Yu, Jiaming Cheng

{"title":"Optimal two-period pricing decisions and value-added service strategies of two-sided platform considering suppliers entry timing","authors":"Huabao Zeng, Tong Shu, Yue Yu, Jiaming Cheng","doi":"10.1111/itor.13441","DOIUrl":"10.1111/itor.13441","url":null,"abstract":"The flourishing platform business model has been rapidly integrated into manufacturing industries, and value-added service (VAS) provided by the platforms has become a critical part of enhancing competitiveness. This study investigates the optimal two-period pricing decisions and VAS strategies of the two-sided platform for manufacturing. For both the supplier and manufacturer side, the platform decides the entry fees in each period and provides differentiated quality of basic services, as well as the VAS (if any). Moreover, the manufacturer's utility of accessing is influenced by the cross-network externality, which is related to the number of suppliers in each period. In the presence of the supplier's varying entry timing, three VAS strategies are available for the platform including: (1) VAS for suppliers in Period 1 (Model S1), (2) VAS for suppliers in Period 2 (Model S2), and (3) VAS for manufacturers in Period 1 or 2 (Model M). We establish a two-period game model under each VAS strategy. Then, the optimal platform's pricing decisions are derived, and the optimal performances in three VAS strategies are compared. Findings demonstrate that when the cross-network externality strength is large, the platform always prefers Model S1; only when both the cross-network externality strength and quality of the platform's basic service are comparatively low, the platform selects Model S2; otherwise, the platform chooses Model M. This study also extends to the scenario that the platform provides bilateral VAS in Period 1 (Model B1) or Period 2 (Model B2). Notably, the platform is not always willing to offer bilateral VAS, especially when the VAS cost coefficient is relatively high.","PeriodicalId":49176,"journal":{"name":"International Transactions in Operational Research","volume":"31 5","pages":"3341-3370"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139839642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Performance enhancement in two-stage innovation contests: Feedback and elimination schemes 两阶段创新竞赛中的绩效提升：反馈和淘汰计划

IF 3.1 4区管理学

International Transactions in Operational Research Pub Date : 2024-02-11 DOI: 10.1111/itor.13440

Yifu Li, Peng Luo, Wei Zhang, Xiaowei Fan, Shuijing Jie

{"title":"Performance enhancement in two-stage innovation contests: Feedback and elimination schemes","authors":"Yifu Li, Peng Luo, Wei Zhang, Xiaowei Fan, Shuijing Jie","doi":"10.1111/itor.13440","DOIUrl":"10.1111/itor.13440","url":null,"abstract":"Innovation is one of the driving forces of economic development and social progress, and the crowdsourcing contest is a well-established mechanism for encouraging innovation. This paper examines two incentive schemes in two-stage innovation contests: feedback and elimination. Feedback enhances the efforts by revealing the competitive status, and elimination intensifies the competition by removing less-qualified participants. We build a game theoretical model to investigate how the organizer should design the feedback and elimination schemes and then analyze the equilibrium efforts and optimal contest design in four-solver contests. The results suggest that the optimal design depends on the combined effects of the reward, effort sensitivity, and cost coefficiency. Elimination and nonelimination contests can be optimal under different conditions. Furthermore, we extend the equilibrium analysis to competitions with <math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>n</mi>\u0000 <mo>></mo>\u0000 <mn>4</mn>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation>$n&gt;4$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> contestants and investigate the optimal design with numerical studies. The most interesting result is that the elimination contest with feedback from the organizer is an ideal option for a budget-constrained enterprise that seeks an innovative solution from the public for a complex innovation project. Also, the optimal number of contestants in the second stage is not always two when feedback is combined with elimination.","PeriodicalId":49176,"journal":{"name":"International Transactions in Operational Research","volume":"31 5","pages":"3061-3089"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139765606","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Competing platform owners’ entry and an OEM's cooperation response 竞争平台所有者的加入和原始设备制造商的合作对策

IF 3.1 4区管理学

International Transactions in Operational Research Pub Date : 2024-02-11 DOI: 10.1111/itor.13443

Xiangxiang Wu, Yong Zha, Liang Liang

{"title":"Competing platform owners’ entry and an OEM's cooperation response","authors":"Xiangxiang Wu, Yong Zha, Liang Liang","doi":"10.1111/itor.13443","DOIUrl":"10.1111/itor.13443","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops a game-theoretic model that examines the entry decisions of two competing platform owners with differentiated research and development (R&D) efficiency and the response strategy of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) in selecting which platform to cooperate with. The OEM and platform owners compete on quality and price in the face of consumers with heterogeneous preferences across the dimensions of the device and platform. We analyze the interaction between the entry decisions of platform owners and the OEM's response strategy within two cooperation models. In the charging model, we find that in the absence of entry, the OEM prefers the high-efficiency platform. When only one platform owner enters, the OEM prefers the low-efficiency platform. If the differentiated R&D efficiency and the device differentiation cost are large, both platform owners will choose to enter and the OEM will cooperate with the low-efficiency platform. In the bundling model, when only one platform owner enters, only at a large cost of device differentiation will the OEM cooperate with the platform that enters the market to weaken market competition. In particular, when only the high-efficiency platform enters, it is interesting that there exists a large cost of device differentiation that makes the high-efficiency platform more favorable in the case when the OEM cooperates with the low-efficiency platform. Our study provides practical insights into platform entry and OEM response.","PeriodicalId":49176,"journal":{"name":"International Transactions in Operational Research","volume":"31 5","pages":"3318-3340"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139765683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Discrete cooperative coverage location models with alternative facility types in a probabilistic setting 概率环境下具有替代设施类型的离散合作覆盖位置模型

IF 3.1 4区管理学

International Transactions in Operational Research Pub Date : 2024-01-25 DOI: 10.1111/itor.13426

Maria Michopoulou, Ioannis Giannikos

引用次数: 0

Special Issue on “Sustainable and Responsive Transportation and Logistics” 关于 "可持续和响应性运输与物流 "的特刊

IF 3.1 4区管理学

International Transactions in Operational Research Pub Date : 2024-01-24 DOI: 10.1111/itor.13437

引用次数: 0

Special Issue on “Efficiency and Productivity Analysis of Public Services in Practice” 实践中的公共服务效率和生产力分析 "特刊

IF 3.1 4区管理学

International Transactions in Operational Research Pub Date : 2024-01-24 DOI: 10.1111/itor.13436

引用次数: 0

Special Issue on “Decision Support Systems in an uncertain world” 不确定世界中的决策支持系统 "特刊

IF 3.1 4区管理学

International Transactions in Operational Research Pub Date : 2024-01-24 DOI: 10.1111/itor.13435

引用次数: 0

Special Issue on “Artificial Intelligence-Driven Decision Making in Health and Medicine” 人工智能驱动的健康与医学决策 "特刊

IF 3.1 4区管理学

International Transactions in Operational Research Pub Date : 2024-01-24 DOI: 10.1111/itor.13434

引用次数: 0

A predictive multistage postdisaster damage assessment framework for drone routing 无人机路由的多阶段灾后损害预测评估框架

IF 3.1 4区管理学

International Transactions in Operational Research Pub Date : 2024-01-24 DOI: 10.1111/itor.13429

Birce Adsanver, Elvin Coban, Burcu Balcik

引用次数: 0

Just-in-time scheduling problem with due windows and release dates for precast bridge girders 预制桥梁大梁的准时制排程问题（含到期窗口和放行日期

IF 3.1 4区管理学

International Transactions in Operational Research Pub Date : 2024-01-22 DOI: 10.1111/itor.13431

Gang Liu, Hongwei Wang, Yong Xie

{"title":"Just-in-time scheduling problem with due windows and release dates for precast bridge girders","authors":"Gang Liu, Hongwei Wang, Yong Xie","doi":"10.1111/itor.13431","DOIUrl":"10.1111/itor.13431","url":null,"abstract":"As the prefabrication construction method plays an increasingly important role in the construction of cross-sea bridges, coordinating the schedule between off-site prefabrication and on-site assembly becomes crucial and challenging. This paper studies a just-in-time single-machine scheduling problem with due windows and release dates, which originates from the production and supply process of large segments of precast steel box girders in bridge construction. To solve this problem, we equivalently decompose it into the independent and same type of subproblems and formulate a mixed-integer linear mathematical programming model. Furthermore, we propose a branch-and-bound algorithm with the initialization of a novel linear early and tardy dispatching rule with due windows to solve the problem exactly. The dispatching rule, based on the local dominance criteria with due windows, is designed and used to improve the upper bound. Moreover, a lower bound is obtained by further decomposing and relaxing the subproblems. Finally, the parameter of the dispatching rule is calibrated, and the best search strategy of the branch-and-bound algorithm is determined. The comprehensive computational experiments carried out show the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed branch-and-bound algorithm.","PeriodicalId":49176,"journal":{"name":"International Transactions in Operational Research","volume":"31 4","pages":"2366-2398"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139582249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0